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Editorial

EVEN THE MOST secular-minded historian will be likely to allow that the appearance of Jesus Christ upon the earthly scene has worked more far-reaching changes in the observed course of human history than any other single event has ever done. From the beginning Christ set men thinking—thinking of the salvation he offered, of the obedience he demanded, of the way of life he proposed, of the enlightenment he brought, and of the bearing of it all upon each new-emerging human problem. But he also set men thinking about himself, and especially about the relation in which he stood to the one God and Father of all. Already in the days of his flesh he encouraged his disciples to put this question to themselves. "Whom say ye that I am?" he asked them. Christology is the attempt to answer that question.

From the second to the seventh century theological discussion was above all Christological in its preoccupation. Writing in the fourth, St. Gregory of Nazianzus reports that if you went into a shop in Constantinople to buy a loaf, the baker instead of telling you the price would argue that the Father is greater than the Son; that the money-changer would talk about the Begotten and the Unbegotten; and that, if you visited the baths, the attendant would be likely to assure you that the Son proceeds from nothing.

The Church's answer was gradually beaten into shape by the decisions of the great Ecumenical Councils, and reached apparent finality by the time of the sixth of these, which met at Constantinople in 680. Most Christian theologians would still agree that these decisions were the right ones in the limited sense that the better of the alternatives which were before the minds of the disputants was in each case chosen.

But the alternatives now before us, and open to us, are often different; and that for three reasons. The first reason is the great advance in historical scholarship, especially in the criticism of the biblical documents. The second is our greater difficulty in operating with the thought-forms, derived as they were from Greek philosophy and Roman law, in which the traditional formulae were expressed. And the third is that, whereas these formulae may have been well suited to the correction of the erroneous by-ways of thought into which men were in that ancient time tempted—so that St. Athanasius could describe the Chalcedonian formula as "a signpost against all heresies"—the errors against which the Church has now to protect itself are often very different. They vary as widely as possible in viewpoint, but that very variation serves well to illustrate the contemporary problem.

J. B.

Contemporary Trends in Christology

i. The Christ of Our Christian Faith

W. NORMAN PITTINGER

IN HIS STIMULATING little book, *Meaning and Purpose*, Dr. Kenneth Walker, the British scientist, writes these words: "However different may be the terms in which we describe our surroundings, it is difficult to look upon [the universe] without recognizing the purposive and designed nature of the whole."¹ In that sentence Dr. Walker sums up the argument of his book, which may briefly be stated as the insistence that materialistic naturalism, anthropocentric humanism, uncommitted agnosticism and the new "religions" of race and state have failed utterly, not only as faiths by which men can live as men, but also as attempts to make sense of human experience and of existence as a whole. He believes that it is only by a recognition of the "purposive and designed nature of the whole" creation—intimated by science, felt inwardly in man's moral sense, and confirmed in the testimony of the great religions of the world—that we can find both peace of mind, intellectually speaking, and peace of soul, spiritually speaking.

That argument is well known to us today. Everywhere we find a desire to return, or go forward, to an interpretation of life which is at bottom religious. Nor is this movement confined to the intellectuals, although as is often the case they have led the way. In quite humble and, as we are prone to say, "unintellectual" people, the urgent need for some firm religious grounding is apparent; and one need only talk to chance companions on train, bus or airplane to discover that underneath the blatant "materialism" (to use a word which I dislike) of our contemporaries, there is a profound discontent with a merely this-worldly understanding of life and an earnest seeking—often in strange and perverted ways—for something more basic which can be the "master-light" of all their seeing.

¹ Penguin Books, 1950.

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One manifestation of this tendency is to be seen in the increasing concern in educational circles for what are called "moral and spiritual values." Our long flirtation with a purely factual educational process, based on the assumption that the more we know the better and happier we shall be, has ended in frustration. Educators, both in secondary schools and at the college and university level, are talking more and more of the need for interpretation, and the kind of interpretation which they wish is in terms of those values which, as they now see, are at the heart of Western culture and indeed of all culture everywhere.

We can only rejoice at this change of heart. It is altogether to the good that those who have control of the educational system should recognize the inadequacies of what it is the fashion to call a secularistic education. It is even more a matter for rejoicing that they are not willing, in many instances, to rest content with a purely humanistic view of education. And we shall gain nothing, and perhaps lose much, by snide comments on this tendency, such as may be found in some religious writers of our time.

But those of us who stand in the great tradition of Christian faith cannot rest content with any such interest in "moral and spiritual values." For it is our conviction that these values, important as they are, can only be maintained when a much more basic faith in the reality of God is first reached and sustained. And it is our further conviction that the Christian affirmation that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," with all that follows from that affirmation, is the real answer to man's problem of estrangement, alienation, frustration, and despair. Values, as such, may be merely adjectival to the universe; it is possible to give them real and enduring status (ontological status, if we may use the philosophical term) only when they are seen as reflections of him who is the great Fact, namely, the reality of God. And the reality of God meets us significantly and compellingly only as we see him revealing himself in his creation, in that "purposive and designed nature of the whole" to which Dr. Walker refers. For a Christian, the *point d'appui* of such a revelation is Jesus Christ, in whom the "purposive and designed nature" (or in Christian terms the "Word of God") is believed to be manifest in the total life of a brother man, given to us men for our "wholeness" or salvation.

This is why educators today are often willing to speak frankly for the Christian faith, for it is in Christ and in him alone that men may find "the way, the truth, and the life," and having found it may walk in the way, know the truth, and live the life which is from God and to God. I shall attempt to say four things about this matter: First, that in Jesus

the Lord we see the real meaning of human life. Second, that in him God meets us, and we may therefore see the real meaning of the universe itself. Third, that from him we receive the new power which can enable us to live, certainly in *principle*, and more fully than otherwise in *fact*, as "sons of God." And fourth, that the only way in which all this can be done is through devoted participation in the life of the Christian community in which Christ is known and his "benefits," as the theologian would put it, are made available to succeeding generations of men.

But before I begin, I must first of all insist that the willingness to accept Christ as having such significance for us is no matter of easy acquiescence or simple intellectual assent, but rather (in the term now so popular among us) "an existential decision." I do not, myself, think that the recognition of this fact is a discovery of Søren Kierkegaard or any of the new theologians; it has always been a truth of Christian experience and has always found some place in the Christian theological tradition. St. Paul, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, not to mention the reforming divines both on the continent and in England, never thought that confrontation by Christ and self-commitment to him were easy matters, optional matters, or simply intellectual matters. Yet we must confess that of all those who profess and call themselves Christians, the man who for our day has made this most vivid and clear is the great Danish thinker. It is a hundred years since Kierkegaard wrote; but his writings, rediscovered and made available for us in translation, have a quality which speaks directly to our condition.

For we know now, as we may have forgotten in the recent past, that (as Pascal said) *il faut parier*—man must gamble; and the gamble is not only imposed upon us by the necessities of our situation; it is also a gamble which involves the whole man, as in the subjective pathos which is truth apprehended and made one's own he commits himself without reserve to the Fact, the fact of Christ. To make this a real decision for students today is much more important, in my judgment, than to talk grandly about "moral and spiritual values." For life at bottom *is* decision; and while no decision can commend itself to us if it is sheerly irrational and utterly unreasonable, yet decision must be made. It is the specific and unique Christian claim—the very *differentia* of Christianity—that Jesus Christ has the right to make this demand for decision, and that our destiny (once we have known the claim for Christ and have been placed in the position where decision may meaningfully be made) depends upon the way in which we decide. "This is the way: walk ye in it."

I

We turn now to the first of my points—that in Jesus the Lord we see the real meaning of human life. It is here that we have a point of contact with the “liberal Protestantism” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Although that movement is now dead in all circles that count for anything in the theological world, those of us who are within the stream of historical Christianity must gladly accept—as so many today in their violent reaction will not do—the enormous gains won for us by that “return to the Jesus of history.” Christianity was not in its primitive days, and never has been, the simple following of the Master; but it is nevertheless true that the recovery of a vivid picture of his life as man was a great accomplishment. And it is also true that we shall never rightly understand what is meant by the divinity of Jesus until and unless we have reckoned with him in his humanity. The imitation of Christ is not the imitation of Jesus, yet Jesus is the Christ and it is our right and duty to catch his Spirit as he walked the ways of the world in the days of his flesh. Above all, it is our right and duty to see his human life, in all its simplicity and in all its grandeur, as a real human life, in which we glimpse the meaning of the lives of each one of us.

Nor need we let ourselves be defeated in this attempt by the findings of New Testament scholarship. The change from the older view, that the figure of Jesus was recoverable in fairly precise detail, to the newer view, that the Gospels (like all the rest of the New Testament) are written “from faith to faith,” represents—even for left-wing critics who subscribe to the methods of the form-critical school—not a denial of the reality of Jesus as a historical figure, nor yet a losing of his life in “the mists of faith,” but a change in *stance*. If we concern ourselves not with the details, nor with the quite unrecoverable biographical development, but with the total impression made, the *portrait* as over against the *candid camera shot*, we shall find that the Jesus of history is indeed known; and being known, is lovable and adorable.

What is the essence of his life? It can be summed up in two phrases: “obedient sonship to God” expressed in “charity to men.” Here is One “whose meat was to do the will of him that sent him”; and that will was “to go about doing good.” Man’s sorry history is a long tale of disobedience to the best that he knows, the right that he sees, the excellence that in his deepest heart he would express. In Jesus Christ we see One in whom desire and deed were identical, who realized to the full the divine intention for

man, and who is therefore true Man, the Second Adam (in St. Paul's phrase) who reverses the appalling and estranging defection from that intention which marks the First Adam, man in his alienation from himself and therefore from his God.

So it is that our clue to human meaning, the secret of God's purpose for us men, is found when we turn to Christ. For is not the real explanation of our human distress and disease the simple but all-encompassing truth that we are dis-integrated, dis-ordered, mal-adjusted people, unrelated on the one hand to the reality of God and on the other to our fellow men? Or if not unrelated—for that cannot be, since by definition man is a mind-body in relationship to others and the Other—then related in distorted and distorting ways? And because this is not how we ought to be, nor how we really are in the depths of the divine purpose for us, we are in a tragic dilemma: "the good that we would, we do not; the evil that we would not, that we do."

Human life is meant to be obedient sonship to God, expressed in charity to men. That is no easy formula for success, nor does it do much to bring us "peace of mind." Rather it shames us into confession of sin and presents us with problems that are beyond our answering. But if it be the fact, it is good and right that we should know it for what it is, and ourselves for what we are; for only so, in the dreadful honesty of self-knowledge and in the light of the divine meaning of human existence, shall we ever hope to come to the rightness and excellence which may be ours.

II

This leads me at once to the second of my points: that in Jesus God meets us and we may therefore see the real meaning of the universe itself. Now we have come to the assertion of the divinity of Christ, from which so many in our generation have turned. But the proper question to ask such people, I am sure, is what they think is really meant by the divinity of Christ. If they assume that this Christian assertion implies a denial of the true humanity of our Lord, they misunderstand completely—although they do this in company with a great many who think themselves supremely orthodox. If they assume that the divinity of Christ rests for proof on a miraculous birth, unnatural wonders performed during his earthly ministry, and a resuscitation of his dead body, they misunderstand—although once again in company with many who think themselves specially orthodox.

It is of the essence of the Christian assertion of our Lord's divinity that it is found in and through and under his humanity, and not as the

contradiction or negation of that humanity; he is very God in very man, nothing less. And the faith in him as such does not find its demonstration in the miraculous stories told about him—some of which may have basis in fact, some of which may be the high deliverance of the mythopeic faculty of faith—but rather in the totality of his impact upon men. Here is One so supreme in his obedient sonship, so abounding in his charity, so effectual in his enabling of those who are drawn to him—and of this last we shall speak in a moment—that the definition of him breaks through simply human categories and compels those who are in his company to say, with St. Thomas in the Fourth Gospel, "My Lord and my God."

This is no place to work out a theology of the Incarnation, of the divine-human reality of Jesus Christ. But I am obliged to say at least this much: that portrayals of the Incarnation as "rescue expeditions from some other planet," and the rest of the stock in trade of many of our contemporary apologists for orthodox Christianity, are both denials of the profoundest reaches of patristic theology and also, on the face of it, nonsensical and meaningless analogies. Rather we must say that in Christ we have the focal expression, for us men and for our salvation, of the pervasive and universal presence and operation of the Word of God—that Word "by whom all things were made" and who is "the light that lighteneth every man." We do not honor our Lord by removing him from all relationship to earlier or other gracious manifestations and workings of God; on the contrary, we turn him into a meaningless intrusion, by a deistic God who has made himself otherwise remote from his creation, into a world which has never known him or sought after him save to the end of frustration and complete despair. It is not in this way that we shall see Jesus as "Word of God incarnate," "Word of the Father, now in flesh appearing." Rather, we shall understand something of what is meant by his divinity when we recognize that in our very acceptance of him, we demonstrate that God dwells in us, and in all men, as the ground of their being and the hidden motive in all their seeking. "Thou wouldest not seek me," Pascal heard God say to him, "if thou hadst not already found me."

So we may say that the Word of God, who is God Self-Expressive and God Outgoing, is urgent in every son of man; but alas! through the resistance we offer to that urgency, as well as through the fact that in the providential governing of events the time was not yet ready, we are broken and dreadfully imperfect vehicles. Christ, said St. Athanasius, is the *organon*, the perfected instrument, for the Divine Word. But he is also the

First-born of many brethren, who through him shall be brought to their divinely intended rightness and excellence.

What, then, is the meaning of the universe itself, of reality, when seen in the light of Christ? It is the expression of God, who himself is Reality with an upper-case "R," *ens realissimum* as well as *valor valorum*. We do not know the whole story; and in any event, to finite minds that whole story would be unintelligible if it were knowable. But "the light shineth in darkness"; and by that light we grasp dimly, yet with the firm assurance of faith, that God's "nature and his name is love"; and that a purpose of good, a design which is altogether right and excellent, is being worked out from the minutest particle of matter to the great sweep of the planets. Thus life is made safe, for everything is in the hands of a God who is "of one substance" with Jesus Christ our Lord, the incarnate Word of God. We shall do well so to turn round the familiar phrase from the Nicene Creed, for it is not only the necessity of faith which compels us to affirm of Christ that *he* is divine and hence "of one substance with the Father"; it is also the assurance drawn from faith that the Father, in the mystery of his life and purpose, is "of one substance" with Christ and thus is known to be unutterable goodness and everlasting righteousness.

III

I have spoken of the effectual quality of Christ's enabling of those drawn to him. And that is my third point: that from him we receive the new power which can enable us to live, certainly in principle, and more fully than otherwise in fact, as "sons of God." Here is "salvation."

Now I am quite aware of the very prevalent misunderstanding of this word. For many of our contemporaries it suggests extrication of man from his sinful predicament in such wise that he is given a guarantee of eternal life when the vicissitudes of earthly existence are past. I should not wish to deny that this is part of the truth, but I think we can arrive at the whole truth (or as much of it as we can understand) in another and better way. The etymology of the word "salvation," in the Latin, as of its synonym *soteria* in the Greek, as well as the Anglo-Saxon word for "holiness," will give us our approach. For all these words mean "health" or "well-being." Man's chief trouble is that he is sick; the very dis-ease which marks his frustration and sense of maladjustment is the result of a disease which pervades his life. That disease comes about because man has sought to cut himself off, not only in religious ways but in his entire existence, from the only source of true health, God himself. Of course man cannot totally

sever his relationship to God, for if he did man would cease to be. But he can, and he does, live in willed estrangement from God. Nor is this true of man only as an individual; it is true of man in society, for no man lives to himself alone but all men live in relationships with their fellow men and thus are "persons" rather than mere individuals.

Who then shall deliver man? Surely he cannot deliver himself, for he has tried this and found it but futility and loss. His brothers cannot do it, for man in society is only man writ large and his dilemmas remain as they were, only magnified now to include the race. His pretty schemes and clever devices cannot do it, for it is all too true, as our gadget-minded generation knows, that after our "great fall,"

All the king's horses and all the king's men
Cannot put Humpty Dumpty together again.

There is only one source of deliverance. That is Reality itself, Reality himself, the Lord God who made us and loves us. It is precisely here that the significance of our second point becomes clear. It is in the faith that God meets us in Jesus Christ, focally and supremely, that the whole strength of Christianity rests. "I can do all things through Christ who strengtheneth me." "Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord."

When we are incorporated, through faith and by love, into the obedient sonship of Christ, and when his charity flows into us and delivers us from our silly self-seeking and our distorted self-expression, then we are indeed free. "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." This is the truth that makes us free: not accumulation of knowledge, not piling up of facts, not encyclopedias filled with more and more information, but the Truth (*Aletheia*, Reality) which is God. This evangelical note in Christianity—the gospel of man's deliverance by the work of Christ—is our message to a world tossed to and fro in worry, weariness, and despair, all of them the consequence of self-estrangement from God and the appalling results which that estrangement entails.

It is, of course, an obvious fact that we are not "made perfect" in a moment's time. The "old Adam" must be beaten down; the silly self-seeking and distorted self-expression must be made over into the seeking of that which is truly ours and the expressing of that which is truly God's. But the "finished work" of Christ is our guarantee that it can and will be done, as his grace runs down into the secret runnels of our lives and we are "sanctified in the Holy Spirit." Nor is this a matter of "works," for surely we have learned that no man can earn what really belongs to

his peace. Even in human relationships, we cannot buy love; it comes to us always as an unearned gift; it is of grace, not of works. Supremely is this true of our God-relationship, to use Kierkegaard's phrase. We are *made free*, we *receive salvation*, we *are enabled* by Christ. Not that there is nothing for us to do; on the contrary, we are to work out our salvation "with fear and trembling," precisely because "it is God that worketh in us, to will and to do of his good pleasure." And at the end of the day, when (as St. John of the Cross tells us) "we shall be judged by our loving," we shall confess, in all honesty as in all humility, that

Every virtue we possess,
And every victory won,
And every thought of holiness,
Are *his* alone.

But again, I must give a warning. The realities which Christian faith and thought call the Incarnation and the Atonement did not have for one of their purposes the destruction of our human minds. We are not given penny-in-the-slot answers to the problems which beset us; God does not deal with us as automata. In one sense our problems—say, of racial relations, of war, of economic justice, of ordinary human relationships—are made more serious, exactly because we have now the power to see more deeply into them and to understand more completely all that is involved. But in the grace of God in Jesus Christ, and through the Spirit that is given us, we shall be able to do the next thing the best we know how, striving to bring more of the divine justice and the divine charity into the affairs of men, and always "justified by faith"—which is to say, always accepted by God even though we be appallingly unacceptable, and always confident that whatever of good is found in our actions will be used by him for the building up of his Kingdom and the fulfillment of his all-holy will.

IV

My last point, you will remember, is: the only way in which all this can be done is through devoted participation in the life of the Christian community in which Christ is known and his "benefits" are made available to succeeding generations of men. Surely we have become aware, in these latter days, that a purely personal Christianity will not suffice. Nor has it ever sufficed. From the days of the New Testament, and earlier, Christianity has been lived in "the new Israel after the Spirit," in "the fellowship of the Holy Ghost." We need our brethren; our brethren need us;

together we need the community which exists as a great corporate response to the love of God in Christ. The Church, with all of its human imperfection, is part of the gospel of Jesus Christ; for, in the fine phrase of Professor John Knox, it is "the community which remembers Jesus."

I am a high churchman, in the sense that I think highly of the Church, its institutions, its sacraments, its ways and its works. But I rejoice that a member of the Society of Friends like Elton Trueblood agrees that it is only in the life of the community of Christians that we can appropriate the riches of our heritage and share in the hope which is in Christ. To be a churchman requires, I know, much patience as it requires also much humility. But since when were these qualities not required of a Christian? All that we know of Christ, all that we know of his work, all that we know of life in him, comes to us through the church and only through it. Save for three or four slight remarks in pagan writers, there is not even a reference to Jesus in the whole of early literature apart from the New Testament. We ought to be able to put up with a great deal of stuffiness and stickiness, found to be sure in the institutional embodiment of the Christian tradition, when we owe so much to that embodiment.

And the use of the word "embodiment" may recall us to the New Testament portrayal of the Church as "the Body of Christ." For what is a "body" but an instrument used for expression? and what other instrument exists in the world for the expression of the person and will and work of Christ, save the Church? We shall never understand the full meaning of Christian faith unless we are "made very members incorporate in the mystical Body of Christ, which is the blessed company of all faithful people." To pray its prayers, to receive its sacraments, to meditate upon its Scriptures, to live its life: here is the way to a deeper and ever-deepening Christian belonging, an ever more real apprehension of our Christian faith.

Let me end this discussion of our great Christian affirmation by some fine words from an address given in England by a friend of mine, R. Douglas Richardson, until recently Principal of Ripon Hall in Oxford:

The Church is recognizable as finding its whole life in the message and person of Jesus Christ. Such essential Christianity the world has not yet fully seen, except in the lives of the saints. Yet the existence and the inspiration of the Church lies in this one vocation of Christ's disciples to show him forth and work out the implications of his way of life, to be steadfast in its hold on the Reality whose nature he disclosed and on the sacraments which link earth to heaven. Real Christianity, because it is the religion both of Incarnation and redemption, hallows all our life and makes it dedicate to God; it blesses our family ties, and strengthens our souls at their departing; above all, it constantly renews and transforms our every action; and it

is centered in memories of an historical person, in memories of his suffering and triumph. And all this it is the function of the Church to set forth and to mark with its ministry, so as to teach it and make it available for every man, woman and child who comes within its system. Its creeds are intended as signposts to the nature of Reality. Its worship is practiced with techniques whereby souls are released from the constraints of effort and of solitude and plunged into the rich life-currents of a great tradition. In the performance of the symbolic acts of baptism, confirmation, marriage, prayer and Eucharist—which are not only symbols but effectual, grace-evoking sacraments—it is the Church's task to nurture souls and educate the moral and the intellectual powers.

That quotation brings us back to the place at which we started. Those Christians who are especially concerned with the education of the intellectual and moral powers of our people have an obligation, through their own earnest and devoted participation in the Christian tradition, to bring themselves and their students to that richness and fullness of life which belongs to those who worship, love, and serve the Lord Jesus Christ in his Holy Church. So we can all become "more than conquerors through him who loved us."

2. Some Aspects of New Testament Christology

MARTIN RIST

I

THE WELL-KNOWN PHRASE, "The Jesus of history and the Christ of faith," marks an attempt to emphasize the differences between the historical Jesus of Nazareth as he actually lived, worked, taught, and died in Palestine in the first third of the first century and the Christ of early Christian faith, religious experience, and belief. It is probably superfluous to note that both the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith are to be found in the New Testament, in places so intermingled that it is difficult to separate the one from the other.

Admittedly, there are relationships between the actual Jesus of history and the Christ of early Christian belief, but the two are not necessarily the same; in fact, there are important and basic differences as well. Furthermore, and this may be overlooked, there are marked differences in the Christ of faith as he is interpreted and depicted by the different New Testament writers; indeed, a single author may present different and not wholly consistent views about Christ in his book. A fundamental purpose of modern New Testament scholarship is to study the New Testament sources by the generally approved methods of historical investigation, thereby, insofar as is possible, recovering the Jesus of history from the overlay of the Christ of faith.

The problem may be pointed up (in an exaggerated form, to be sure) by comparing the Mary of history with the Mary of Roman Catholic faith, of Roman Catholic Mariology. Surprisingly little is known about the Mary of history. She was a Jewish woman, apparently Galilean, the wife of a Jewish artisan named Joseph. She not only was the mother of Jesus, but she also bore four other sons, whose names are given in Mark, and at least two daughters, who are not named. She may have been widowed before Jesus began his career; she seemingly was disturbed by the ministry of her firstborn, at least in the beginning; she is mentioned in connection with the wedding at Cana, but scarcely in complimentary terms; she apparently was with Jesus toward the end of his life; and she

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was included with other women who were with the disciples in the upper room following the ascension. Otherwise not much is known with any certainty; she passes off the stage of history without notice.

However, according to Mariology, she was born miraculously and immaculately, without the taint of original sin, and she lived sinlessly. Not only was she the virgin mother of the Son of God, but she was perpetually a virgin. Furthermore, she came to be called Theotokos, the Mother of God. She performed miracles during her life, and has been responsible for numerous miracles since then. Because of her sinlessness and her relationship to Christ she was assumed bodily into heaven, where she is now the Queen of heaven, the mediatrix, and the co-redemptrix with Jesus. All of this is substantiated by her appearances now and then to certain persons here on earth.¹ The Protestant may ask, "Just what relationship exists between the Mary of history and the Catholic Mary?"

To return to Jesus, in the main the sources of our knowledge of the Jesus of history are the Gospels, especially Mark, Matthew, and Luke; but even these, to a greater or less degree, are Christological in character. There is a high degree of Christology in the Gospel of John, in certain of Paul's letters, in Hebrews, in I Peter, and in Revelation, but the Christologies of these books differ considerably. Indeed, strictly speaking there is no New Testament Christology; there are New Testament Christologies. Moreover, in certain passages there is a minimum of Christology: there is practically none in either the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew or in the corresponding Sermon on the Plain in Luke. There is very little in the parables of the Synoptic Gospels (the parable in Mk. 12:1ff. shows evidences of having been reworked) or in other Synoptic teachings generally accepted by scholars as authentic. Indeed, if we follow the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels, Jesus himself had little if any Christology; on the other hand, much of the teaching in the Fourth Gospel is centered upon the person and work of Jesus. Like the Synoptics, the Book of James reveals scant interest in the subject.

The term itself is derived from the Greek *Christos*, the Anointed, which is the Greek equivalent for the Hebrew *Ha-Mashiach*, also the Anointed, transliterated as "Messiah." Accordingly Christology implies that Jesus was the Messiah of Jewish expectations. Whether Jesus considered himself to be Messiah in any sense of the term is a moot question among New Testament scholars. The majority, it seems, believe

¹ See Miegge, Giovanni, *The Virgin Mary*, Lutterworth Press, 1955; Attwater, Donald, *A Dictionary of Mary*, P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1956.

that Jesus did present himself as the Messiah, but there is little agreement concerning what meanings he may have read into this concept. There are others, however, who believe that Jesus did not teach that he was the Messiah, but that he looked upon himself as continuing the work of John the Baptist as a prophetic teacher of repentance and righteousness proclaiming the coming of the Kingdom of God. Even so, the Gospels do depict him as the Messiah, whatever Jesus considered his mission to have been.

However, the type of Messiah pictured in the Gospels is not that of any known Jewish expectation; in part it is a merging of Jewish beliefs, in part it includes new concepts as the person of Jesus underwent interpretation.² Contrary to Jewish beliefs, the basic Christian Messianic concept involved two advents, with Jesus as Messiah suffering and dying upon the cross at the end of his first advent. In this first advent he was, according to some sources, of wholly human origin, as was true in certain Jewish Messianic views. Mark betrays no knowledge of any supernatural origin for Jesus; Hebrews, in one passage at least, considers him to have been of human origin, like his brothers in every respect (Heb. 2:17; cf. 4:15ff.; 5:7-10). This deficiency, however, was rectified, for in Mark he was adopted as the Son of God at the time of his baptism by John the Baptist (see also the account of the Transfiguration); and according to Hebrews also he was adopted as God's Son (Heb. 1:5; 5:5), but the time and occasion are not stated.

The birth of Jesus as related in Matthew and Luke represents not only an attempt to provide him with a miraculous birth, but, more importantly, with a supernatural as well as a human origin. Curiously enough, the rest of the New Testament, including the remaining chapters of these two Gospels, is silent about this matter, although it is described in two early extracanonical works, the Ascension of Isaiah and Ignatius' letter to the Ephesians. Indeed, the genealogies in Matthew and Luke are Joseph's, not Mary's; in the Gospel of John, which refers to Mary as the mother of Jesus, Joseph is called his father by Philip (Jn. 1:45) and by the Jews (6:42) without any correction. Without any reference to the virgin birth, Paul states that Jesus was descended from the flesh of David (Rom. 1:3) and was born of "woman" (Gal. 4:4). No known Jewish source predicts the birth of the Messiah in the miraculous manner related in Matthew and Luke.

² See Mowinkel, Sigismund, *He That Cometh*, Abingdon Press, 1954, for an excellent survey of Messianic hopes.

More remarkable than the virgin birth, however, is Paul's explanation of the origin of Jesus. He writes in Col. 1:15-16 that Christ Jesus was the pre-existent image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creation who was God's agent in creating everything else. Similarly, in the Christological passage in Phil. 2:6-11 (possibly from an early Christian hymn), Jesus Christ who was pre-existent with God, in the form of God and equal with him, emptied himself voluntarily and was born in the likeness of man. According to Heb. 1:2, in contrast to the adoptionist view expressed elsewhere in this book, Jesus Christ was the pre-existent Son of God who created the world long before his appearance upon this earth. In Revelation, in keeping with the astralism of this work, the heavenly Christ-child was born in heaven to the woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and a crown of twelve stars on her head (Rev. 12:1-6).

While the ultimate origin of the Logos prologue to the Gospel of John may be uncertain, it is evident that the evangelist used it to counteract a Docetic view to the effect that Jesus had not actually been born, was not incarnate in human flesh, but was a pre-existent heavenly being, a Gnostic aeon or emanation, who had only a seeming spirit body while on earth. On the contrary, Jesus is represented by the evangelist as the pre-existent Logos, not a secondary emanation; he was divine by nature, was the agent of God in creating the universe, and later on became incarnate in a fleshly, human body.⁸

None of these concepts is found in Jewish beliefs about the origin of the Messiah. Instead, for the most part he was to be of wholly human origin; in a few cases, as in I Enoch, he would be a heavenly, angelic being who would appear on earth at the proper time. In no instance would he be considered divine in his person, or of divine origin. We may ask, did Jesus think of himself as pre-existent? as the divine Logos? as the heavenly creator of the universe? The Synoptic Gospels provide no evidence that he did.

In the main we are dependent upon the Gospels for our knowledge of the career of the Jesus of history. There are, of course, marked differences between the Synoptic portrayals and that of John, so much so that we are almost required to make a choice between the two traditions. In none of the Gospels, however, does Jesus do what was generally expected of the Messiah: to deliver Israel from her enemies, whether human or

⁸See Moffatt, James, *The Theology of the Gospels*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924, pp. 167ff.

supernatural. However, his reported exorcisms of demons in the Synoptic Gospels may presage his eschatological victory over Satan in his second advent.

II

Save for the incarnation, suffering, and death upon the cross Paul is only incidentally interested in the earthly career of Jesus. Certain teachings of Jesus are reflected in Paul's letters, however. Practically nothing about the Jesus of history can be gleaned from the twenty-two chapters of Revelation. Hebrews states in quite general terms that Jesus, though subject to temptation, lived sinlessly in obedience to God. (Heb. 4:15; 5:7-10); otherwise, apart from his passion, little is said about the earthly life of Jesus. For the most part the rest of the books of the New Testament pay little attention to the Jesus of history, save for his crucifixion, but even this is not described with any detail.

The crucifixion, of course, became most important in the thinking of the New Testament writers; for example, more than a third of the earliest Gospel is given to the events of the last week. However, the very fact of the crucifixion required a reinterpretation of Jesus' messianic role as presented in Christian belief, for up to this time the Jews had no concept of a suffering and dying Messiah, least of all of one who would die on a Roman cross. Instead, he was to be a conqueror, a victor, as God's representative here on earth and Israel's champion.

The crucifixion marks a turning point, for it required the development in the belief of the second coming of Christ as an apocalyptic Messiah. First of all, however, there is the period immediately following the crucifixion to consider. Soon—how early is not clear—it was believed that Jesus preached to the spirits in prison, i.e., to the dead in Sheol or Hades (I Peter 3:19; 4:6; cf. Matt. 27:51-53; Eph. 4:8-9). Most of the early Christians believed in the physical resurrection of Jesus, but some seemed to prefer a belief in a spiritual or immaterial resurrection (see Jn. 20:19; Lk. 24:16, 31; I Cor. 15:44). The Docetists, of course, had no place for a physical resurrection.

The resurrection, whether physical or spiritual, necessitated an ascension or exaltation to heaven, whence Christ will return in his second coming. The only description of the ascension in the New Testament is in Acts 1:9, and it is very brief. The belief in an ascension of some kind, however, is generally assumed in the New Testament, since it was believed that Jesus Christ had been exalted to heaven. It might be noted that in the Gospel of John the crucifixion and the exaltation of Jesus

are inseparable, for the "lifting up" of Jesus is used in a double sense, his being lifted up on the cross and his being lifted up to God; both constitute his glorification. (Jn. 3:13-14; 8:28; 12:20-36; 17:1-5. Cf. Lk. 23:43; 24:26.)

The Christian belief in Jesus Christ as an apocalyptic Messiah stems from certain Jewish concepts, save that for the Jew the apocalyptic Messiah would perform his functions in his first and only advent. The fullest presentation, of course, is given in the Book of Revelation. The basic assumption is that Satan is in immediate and direct control of the present age of human history and of this world, thereby accounting for all evils, persecutions, sufferings, sin, and death itself. Man is helpless before the power of Satan and his demonic and human agents; there is nothing that he can do save to be faithful relying on divine intervention, which he hopes will be very soon. Accordingly, after a long series of divine punishments of the wicked, Satan and his forces of evil will be overcome, Satan's rule and age will be brought to a catastrophic but fitting end. Angels, for the most part, will be God's agents in bringing this about, but toward the close of this present age the heavenly Christ will return to earth to wage war in person against his human and supernatural enemies. Next, there will be a messianic kingdom of a thousand years in Jerusalem, where Christ will rule with his saints. Following this, the world will be destroyed, Satan will be confined to the lake of fire, and God's eternal reign of peace and righteousness will be established in the new Jerusalem and the new Eden which will come down from heaven. In all of this cosmic drama Christ has little, if any, role until his second advent at the end of time (Rev. 19:11ff.). Actually, it is an angel, not Christ, who will imprison Satan (Rev. 20:2); nor does Christ have any role in casting Satan into the lake of fire (Rev. 20:10). In the new age it is God, not Christ, who has pre-eminence.

The apocalyptic pattern provides an explanation for the presence of evil in this age in this world, and it also gives a dramatic solution to the problem. A pattern somewhat similar to that of Revelation is given by Paul (I Cor. 15:20-28), save that Christ is to destroy all of his enemies during his interim reign, after which he will be subjected to God. The advent of the apocalyptic Christ is also predicted in Mark 13 and parallels in Matthew and Luke, and in II Peter 3:1-13, but no interim messianic reign is envisioned in these sources.

Actually, Pauline Christology represents the confluence of two distinct streams of thought, one, that of an apocalyptic Messiah which flows

from Judaism, the other that of a Savior Lord, which apparently flows from Hellenism, specifically, from the so-called mystery religions. These religions differed in detail, but were characterized by the belief in a god who had suffered and died, but had been restored to life and exalted to heaven. Those who were initiated into the mystic rites of the deity, in which his passion was re-enacted, entered into mystical union with him and were saved, becoming immortal, whereas before they had no hope of immortality.

Paul's dualistic world view prepared the way for his concept of the work of the apocalyptic Christ, who was also his Lord and Savior. He believed that this world and this age were under the control of Satan and his evil forces. These included demons; the heavenly bodies and constellations (which were generally considered to be malevolent); Sin, personified; the flesh, regarded as the seat of Sin; and Death, the result of Sin. Both the cosmos and the individual were pervaded with these evil forces. The individual, being a microcosm, cannot be saved from these forces until they are purged from the cosmos. Furthermore, the Law, Jewish legalism, which had ruled until Jesus Christ, not only could not save man, but actually had enslaved him, becoming an occasion for sin and death. Accordingly, man must also be saved from the work of the Law.

It is here that Christ as an apocalyptic Messiah and a Savior Lord enacts his all-important role. Through his incarnation, his sufferings, his sacrificial death upon the cross, and his resurrection from the dead, he had begun to overcome Satan, to disarm the malevolent heavenly bodies, the principalities and powers, to dethrone Sin, to transform the flesh, to make the Law unnecessary, and to overcome Death. By virtue of this work of redemption those who had faith in him, who were baptized as well, died to the old and were saved from Satan and all his enslaving forces of evil. This was accomplished through the grace of God, not through their own works or merits. All of this was made possible by Christ in his first advent. The Christian was a transformed individual, a new creature, a holy person. Even though he might die before the return of Christ in his second advent, an event that might occur at any time, he would live eternally, for he had become an immortal person. All of this was guaranteed by the work of Christ in his first advent; however, the victory would not be complete until he returned a second time, when Satan and all his evil forces, including man's worst enemy, Death, would be finally and thoroughly conquered.

Accordingly, through Christ as a dying and rising Savior and as an apocalyptic Messiah the cosmos would be redeemed and the individual might be saved from Sin and Death to a glorious immortality. Exactly why the incarnation, sufferings, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ should make all this possible is not explained; Paul was satisfied to assert it as a fact, and apparently thought his readers would be satisfied.⁴

III

The Gospel of John, as previously indicated, leads into a somewhat different area of thought. Save for a brief mention in Jn. 5:25-29, the Gospel is nonapocalyptic. Jesus is not the apocalyptic Messiah who will destroy Satan and all of his works in his visible second coming. Instead, there is to be no physical second advent; Christ will come at any time to the believer in a spiritual manner, as the Paraclete (the Counselor or Intercessor), for apparently the Paraclete is his spiritual *alter ego*. Nor is there to be an eschatological judgment; instead, the individual will be judged here and now, depending upon whether he believes that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.

Jesus Christ not only is the Logos and the Son of God, but he is also Light, Life, Truth, the Way, the Door. He not only reveals God, but he is the revelation of God to men. His death may be considered redemptive, but it was his life as the Son of God on earth, as one with God, that is revelatory. Through belief on him, and through participation in the sacraments, the living water of baptism and the bread of life of the Lord's Supper, the believer not only becomes united with Christ as Christ is in union with his Father, but he also is reborn to eternal life. Jesus had come down from heaven, and then returned to his Father. However, he has prepared a place for his followers, and he will show them the way so that they might be with him and with his Father. Although designed to combat Gnosticism, the Christology of the Fourth Gospel may be considered to be quasi-Gnostic.⁵

An extreme Christology of the early church may be briefly noted. According to an accepted translation of John 1:1 (see the RSV), the Logos not only was with God, but *was* God (cf. the early text of 1:18); also, in 20:28 Thomas addressed Jesus Christ as "My Lord and my God." However, elsewhere in this Gospel the Father and the Son are

⁴ See Carré, Henry Beach, *Paul's Doctrine of Redemption*, The Macmillan Company, 1914, for a fuller discussion of cosmic and personal salvation; also, see Morgan, William, *The Religion and Theology of Paul*, T. and T. Clark, 1917. Also Bultmann, Rudolf, *Theology of the New Testament*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951, Vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 187-352.

⁵ See Colwell, E. C., and Titus, E. L., *The Gospel of the Spirit*, Harper & Brothers, 1953, pp. 142-182.

not identified as one, but are rather clearly differentiated despite their close relationship. Similarly, Ignatius of Antioch, a contemporary of the author of the Fourth Gospel, identified Jesus Christ as God in a number of places (Eph., Inscr.; 5:3; 18:2; Rom., Inscr.; 3:3; 6:3; Polyc., 8:3), but in other passages he, too, differentiated between the Father and the Son. Even so, before the end of the second century the identification of the Son with the Father as one person had developed into a heresy known as Monarchianism. This implied that it was God the Father who was born of the Virgin Mary, who suffered and died upon the cross. This identification, especially the implication that the impossible Father had suffered and died (Patripassionism), was unacceptable to the orthodox theologians. It is therefore interesting to note that the World Council of Churches calls itself "A fellowship of churches which accepts our Lord Jesus Christ as God [sic] and Savior."

A somewhat different Christological pattern is that of Jesus Christ the heavenly High Priest as depicted in Hebrews. Jesus Christ, like all humans, was subject to temptation, sin, and death. Nevertheless, by reason of his obedience to God and his sinlessness he overcame death, and was exalted to heaven as a heavenly High Priest. Melchidezek of the Old Testament is used as a prototype, but this is only possible through allegorical interpretation. Since Jesus Christ had been tempted, had suffered, and died, he was a High Priest who had sympathy and compassion for tempted, suffering, and mortal mankind. Through his voluntary sacrifice of himself salvation was possible to those who would heed his call to come to him to be baptized and to be sanctified through his blood. Thus they would not only be saved from their sins, but would be assured of a blessed immortality (Heb. 2:17-18; 4:14-16; 5:7-9; 7:27-28; 10:19-25; 13:12-16). There is relatively little apocalypticism in this book; also, its High Priest concept of Jesus is somewhat removed from messianic expectations. Instead, Jesus is a Savior Lord, who through his death, resurrection, and exaltation provides the means of salvation and immortality for sinful and mortal man. We may be reminded in part of Isis who sympathized with suffering humanity because of her sorrow when Osiris was slain. When Osiris had been restored to life and both he and she had been exalted as gods, she established her sacred rites whereby mortals could be saved and become immortal.*

One other book, I Peter, deserves mention. Written in a time of persecution, it may be an expansion of an early baptismal sermon. It

* See Plutarch, *On Isis and Osiris*, 27.

is through baptism, which is thoroughly sacramental, that the individual is reborn, is saved, is made holy, is assured of an imperishable inheritance, immortality (I Peter 1:3-5, 23-25; 2:2-3; 3:21-22). All this has been made possible by the atoning death of Jesus Christ, who was destined before the foundation of the world, and became manifest to mankind (1:20). He bore the sins of mankind upon the cross (2:24), and he died once for sins in order to bring men to God (3:18). God raised him from the dead and exalted him to heaven on his right hand, where angels, authorities, and powers are subject to him (3:22). Furthermore (this was to encourage the persecuted Christians), just as Jesus Christ suffered as an innocent person and endured this patiently without retaliating, so the Christians must follow his example. In part the views of I Peter are reflections of Paul's, especially in Romans. However, the heavenly Christ is not an apocalyptic Messiah; he is mainly a Savior Lord.⁷

IV

By way of a brief summary, there is a considerable amount of difference in the New Testament between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. For the most part, save for the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus, the Christological views of the New Testament are based upon the Christ of faith (indeed, are the Christ of faith) rather than upon the Jesus of history. And it is clear that there is no one New Testament Christology; instead, there are various New Testament Christologies. These show some basic similarities, but at the same time they display some basic differences, even incompatibilities. For example, there is very little in common between the Christology of the Fourth Gospel and that of Revelation. Consequently, a theologian, if he is to be reasonably consistent, when basing his Christology upon the New Testament must be selective, choosing one type of Christological belief as against another. If this is so, we may ask what determines the basis of selection: why is John, perhaps, preferred to Revelation, or Revelation to John? or Paul to the Synoptic Gospels, or the Synoptic Gospels to Paul? What are the objective criteria that determine the choices made? Further, when the theologian deals with those sections of the New Testament which have little or no Christology, how should he evaluate them? Finally, in developing a Christology, what distinctions should he make between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith, and, having made distinctions, to which should he give the greater consideration?

⁷ See Beare, F. W., *The First Epistle of Peter*, The Macmillan Company, 1947.

3. A Preface to Christology

CYRIL C. RICHARDSON

I SHOULD LIKE in this article to argue two fundamental points in Christology. The first is that an *orthodox* doctrine of the person of Christ can only be expressed paradoxically. Every effort to overcome the paradox compromises something which it is essential to say. The second point I wish to raise is whether such a Christology is really defensible. This will involve a consideration of the *method* of our approach to the doctrine of Christ. The conclusion will be that serious objections may be raised to the orthodox viewpoint, but that there is no way by which we may know for certain whether it is true or not.

I

The orthodox doctrine of the person of Christ holds these two things to be true: first, that Jesus was perfect man, and second, that Jesus was the Son of God. It is contended that Jesus was the perfection of human nature within the context of first-century Palestine. This perfection lay in his sinlessness, his uninterrupted communion with God, his absolute obedience to God's demands, his willing and undeviating surrender of his life to God and to his fellow men. But for this to be possible, it is argued, Jesus could not have been a mere man. Man is fallen and sinful, and of himself could never fully respond to God's grace, obey his demands, and exemplify what human nature was intended to be. Therefore, beside his humanity we must assume that Jesus was also the Son of God. Only God could do what was done in Jesus. Only God could restore human nature to its true destiny. The person of Jesus must therefore be that of the Second Person of the Trinity. Jesus is Savior not because as mere man he achieved a divine status or by the effort of human will overcame temptation. Rather he is Savior because in him God condescended to man's estate. God stooped that man might be raised. God was born and suffered as a man in order that man might be redeemed from his fallen state.

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These two things, therefore, it is essential to say: Jesus was *man*, for only *through* man could human nature be restored; but Jesus is also *God*, for only *by* God could the restoration be accomplished. If Jesus is not man, then human nature has not been redeemed or the power of sin conquered. If Jesus is not God the victory could never have been won. Man, by himself, could not overcome his predicament.

These affirmations rest, of course, on other presuppositions which we cannot discuss here, but must take for granted. There is, for instance, the underlying assumption that what was accomplished in the human nature of Jesus can in principle and by faith be participated in by mankind in general. Jesus is not only an example we are called to follow, but himself makes available to us the renewed nature by which such an imitation of him is possible. As man he does something for the whole human race whose unity is fundamental. He does not merely awaken in us the ideal to which we are called, but he provides the power to achieve it and the reconciliation with God which was lost by sin.

The long history of Christology, which found its classic formulation at the Council of Chalcedon, has been the quest to state as adequately as possible this dual reality of Jesus, both as God and man. What finally triumphed in orthodoxy was the affirmation that one and the same Jesus Christ was made known in two natures. He was God and man. But, it was asked, how can these two disparate natures be united? How can the finite and the infinite, the transcendent and the conditioned, the uncreated and the created, meet in this single figure of first-century history? The ultimate answer was this: the "person" of Jesus was the Logos; the manhood or human nature had no identity of its own, but found its identity, center, metaphysical ego in the Logos. There were not two "persons" joined together in terms of will, as if one were to imagine that the human being Jesus united himself to God by obedience and willing surrender. Rather was the ultimate reality of Jesus God, who for our redemption took upon himself human nature. But this human nature only gained its reality as ontologically united to the Word. It never existed as an entity in its own right prior to such a union. There was not "a man" Jesus, who at some moment became united to the Logos. Rather was there the Logos, who at a moment in time, in the incarnation assumed human nature. Thus the "person" of Jesus, the "I" in its deepest, most profound sense, the principle of identity which gave this particular man his reality and metaphysical status, his *hypostasis*, was the Logos.

This is the doctrine of the *enhypostasia*, as Severus of Antioch and Leontius of Byzantium worked it out, and as Karl Barth has lately championed it. It is a doctrine implicit in the formula of Chalcedon, but not until the sixth century was it given formal expression. What it meant was that the ontological "subject" of Jesus was not "a man," but the Second Person of the Trinity.

To avoid misunderstanding it must not be supposed that such a doctrine implied that the human nature was a purely *passive* instrument of the Word. On the contrary the doctrine of the two wills (or "energies") in Jesus, as formulated at III Constantinople in A.D. 680, made it clear that the human nature had its own appropriate powers, tendencies and capacities. Nonetheless, such a human will or energy was viewed as a property of "nature" rather than of "person." The ultimate subject, center, or principle of identity, "person" in its strict sense, was the Word. In the assumption of the human nature, said Alcuin, the person perishes, not the nature. The human nature has only the person of the Word. It has no human person in this sense.

In the course of Christian history objections to this way of viewing the matter have been raised. They characterize the Nestorian protest to Chalcedon, and are well represented by Donald Baillie's recent book, *God Was in Christ*. The argument is that if the human nature lacks a human "person"—a human center, subject and principle of identity—it is incomplete. Baillie therefore treats the union of Jesus with God in terms of grace, by which a particular human being responds to God's gracious activity.

Now there is some real significance in this protest against the *enhypostasia*. A human nature without a human person is surely unreal. And however much our modern use of the word "person" differs from that of the Fathers, the objection still has point. For while *we* think of "person" largely in terms of self-consciousness and *they* in terms of a metaphysical principle of identity, in the last analysis there is not a great deal of difference. For what is involved is the ultimate "I," which can be viewed either from a subjective point of view in terms of consciousness, or from an objective point of view in terms of ontology. This ultimate "I," to be sure, differs from any particular moment of self-consciousness, since we never know ourselves fully, never are able to plumb our total reality; and the Fathers always granted that Jesus had a *human* consciousness beside his God-consciousness. Yet the fundamental point remains, that the ultimate subject of the actions and thoughts of Jesus is, in the

Fathers, the Logos, and not *a* human being. The dual natures act according to their disparate capacities, but the ultimate *Actor* is always the Word and not an instance of human nature.

The error of Chalcedon, it seems to me, and of the consequent *enhypostasia*, lay in the failure to put the paradox in the *person*. They put it only in the natures. Hence they created a false solution to the initial problem—a solution which is basically Monophysite. Indeed, the *enhypostasia* was invented by the moderate Monophysite, Severus of Antioch, a decade or two previous to its classic formulation by Leontius. What really triumphed in the Church was a moderate Monophysite view; and it is an irony of history that Chalcedonians and Monophysites were divided largely by a battle of words. Both rejected “Eutychianism”;¹ and while there were differences between them on the extent to which they viewed the human nature as active or passive, their basic affirmations (as the modern study of Monophysitism has shown) were identical. Both affirmed that the person of Jesus was the Logos, and the human nature had no other person.

In order to affirm fully the divine and human in Jesus, it is essential to state the matter paradoxically. To fail to do so is to compromise one or other of the truths we seek to state. If there is a unity of person behind the two natures (as Chalcedon claimed), then the humanity is not full humanity. It lacks its most distinctive element—its human *subject*. There the Nestorians were right. But we have to go on from this and to say that Jesus is God. That is self-contradictory and paradoxical. Yet it can be expressed in no other way. We have to say both Nestorian and Monophysite things at the same time, and compromise neither assertion. If Jesus is the perfection of human nature, he must be *a* man: subject to the conditions of life of the first century, tempted, triumphant and obedient to grace as *a* man. The “imitation of Christ” makes no sense if Jesus is only the Logos assuming human nature. Jesus must be *a* man as we are, pointing us to the life God intended for us, inspiring us as one of *ourselves*—not as God clothed in flesh. That is the Nestorian truth. But we have also to say the opposite. Jesus is God. That is the Monophysite truth. Jesus is Savior precisely because he is *not* man as we are. No man could overcome the power of sin and renew human

¹ I.e. The confusion of the two natures, though whether Eutyches himself really taught this is a dark question indeed. Most (if not all) of his confused utterances are subject to an orthodox interpretation. It may be noted that “Monophysite” does *not* mean that Jesus had only one nature (in the abstract, Chalcedonian sense), but only one person. They used the word nature (*physis*) as the virtual equivalent of “person.”

nature. Only God in his condescension could do that. Hence the person of Jesus is God and *not* a man.

We can only hold these two truths together by stating contradictions. We have reached the confines of human thought. We have to talk in paradoxes. Unless we do, we destroy one or other of these two essential truths. If Jesus is not a man, he cannot speak to our condition. If Jesus is not God, he cannot save. The question Nestorians and D. M. Baillie can never answer is this: How was it possible for *that* particular instance of human nature to respond so fully to God—to experience that deep union with God which we experience only interruptedly? Only the Monophysites can answer that question, by saying the ultimate person was God and not *a* man. But the Monophysites, on their side, can never answer the question: Wherein lies the reality of Jesus' temptations? Wherein is his human freedom? Only the Nestorians can answer that, by saying Jesus was *a* human person who genuinely faced temptation and suffering and in his *freedom* was victorious.

To do full justice to the orthodox position we must state a paradox. It is not only the paradox of the two natures of Chalcedon. It is the paradox of the very *person* of Jesus, who is at one and the same time *a* human person in his freedom, in the precarious status of contingency, and also God in his condescension and love.

II

But is this orthodox position tenable? Here we reach the deepest issue of Christology. How can we know that Jesus was as the Gospel and St. Paul portray him?

In actual fact we cannot know with certainty, because the *method* of inquiry is such that it can issue in no sure knowledge. Had this been fully appreciated before, much debate on Christology could have been more charitable.

There are two ways by which to gain knowledge of Jesus. One is by faith, the other is by historical inquiry. In neither case can we reach historical certainty. On the whole, as I shall try to indicate later, I am inclined to consider the Gospel portrait as significantly idealized. My more important point, however, is that the methods of faith and historical inquiry can give us no sure knowledge of his perfection or sinlessness.

We are not directly related to the Jesus of history. We are related to him only in terms of faith. We have pictures and symbols of him in the Gospel, in the liturgy, in Christian art and so on. We have imaginative

pictures which are dynamic and effectual in the Church and in our lives. We behold the cross and we adore the God of love who in his condescension shares our suffering and triumphs over our sin. But, in faith, there is no way of knowing if the pictures we have of Jesus are *true* of the Jesus of history. Indeed, whether they are true or not does not matter a great deal. Perhaps it matters not at all. For their power to change lives, to transform us to absorb hostility so that we can love, to find the center of our life in God and not in ourselves, does not depend on their relation to a man in the first century. If they transform us, it is because they are *true pictures of the way God is*, and of the life he makes available to us in his abundant grace. If by them we are made courageous instead of fearful; able to face tragedy with hope, and despair with victory, it is because they are correct symbols of the redeemed life, and accurately portray both God's judgment and his salvation. The extent to which these pictures involve distorted history is really quite secondary. Details about the life of Jesus, just as questions about Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch, are not central. What is central is whether the religious symbols are true expressions of God's nature and the way life is. That they are such is clear from the fact they have power to transform us and are alive in the Christian community.

To say that the question of the Jesus of history is secondary must not be misconstrued to mean that the issue of history *itself* is secondary. The Christian symbols affirm that history is meaningful, that the body is a good, that God is creator. But these principles do not hang upon the details of Jesus' life, or even upon the question whether he was perfect or sinless. They are affirmations of faith which historical details cannot alter. We believe God is love, despite the fact that injustice often triumphs in this life, that virtue and temporal reward are not evenly balanced, that the righteous frequently suffer. But our belief hangs upon the fact that our deepest satisfactions are found in obeying God, in embracing his love and acting as if he were love. Whatever, therefore, history may have to say of Jesus cannot alter that conviction. It belongs to the very stuff of our existence. It does not depend upon obscure events of A.D. 30. It is obvious, of course, that our basic religious convictions and the symbols in which they are expressed have their origins in Israel's spiritual pilgrimage and in the events of first-century Palestine. There the symbols were born. But the extent to which they carry in themselves nonhistorical elements is secondary. What is important is that we live by them and find in them true pictures of God.

Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century this question of the distorted history in our symbols has been a burning issue. But we have learned now to discriminate fact and myth (at any rate in Old Testament history), and our faith has not been thereby impaired. It was, of course, a shock for the Church to learn that the Bible was not a geological and anthropological textbook. To some extent it has still to learn that the New Testament is not a historical or even a psychological textbook. But neither our faith in the God it depicts nor our faith in his condescension, in his suffering in our sufferings, in his victory over sin and waste, can be destroyed as we learn the imperfections of the Bible at many levels. The same applies to the life of Jesus. Even if we have an idealized portrait of a first-century prophet, rabbi, exorcist, and martyr, that by no means destroys the validity of the Church's symbols, nor detracts from the contribution to religious history which Jesus and his interpreters made. Nor does it compromise the fact that it was God who was acting in Jesus, and out of this action the Christian symbols were born. If we cannot believe in the old, literal manner that the world's salvation was accomplished on the Cross, we *can* and *do* believe that this is a true symbol of what God is *always* doing to transform the world into his image.

Faith in the Christian symbols—our only direct relation with Jesus—can never tell us how much distorted history they contain. Faith can never reach back to the Jesus of history. We can, of course, *say* that we believe the Virgin Birth and the walking on the water to be true to fact. But that does not make them so. Faith has to do with our apprehension of God, with our belief about his judgments, love and victory. It can never penetrate the past details of history, though it may well affirm that history is the arena of a decisive struggle of good and evil, and that in the events surrounding Jesus God disclosed himself.

But if faith cannot reach the Jesus of history, neither can historical research reach him with certainty. The historical *method* precludes dealing with the New Testament documents as if Jesus were more than a man. For that method is based on the presupposition that general human structures are decisive in determining precisely what happened. Thus the historical method *precludes* the divinity of Jesus. If Jesus is divine, in the orthodox sense, the historical method of the study of the Gospels is misleading and irrelevant. For the historical method deals with documents and incidents on the assumption that truth and falsity can be assessed on the basis of what is true of men in general. What is particular

is secondary and is seen as exemplification, in infinite variety, of the basic patterns of human nature. History, to be sure, has constantly to be rewritten as we learn more about man's capacities and the variant patterns of culture. But the miraculous *per se* is excluded. To give an example, fifty years ago the cures of Epidaurus were scorned by the medical historian. But our modern study leads us to be more sympathetic, for we are understanding something of spiritual healing as a human pattern. But this sympathy is not based upon these cures as *miraculous*; it sees them as instances of an innate human capacity.

The historian who approaches the Gospels will deal with Jesus in the same terms as those in which he seeks to understand all great religious genius. He will refuse the Virgin Birth because people are not born that way. He will understand the resurrection in terms of visions and post-mortem apparitions. He will treat the healings as he does those of Epidaurus. He precludes the possibility of the orthodox answer by his very method. That does not mean he is right. For all he knows, Jesus *may* have formed clay birds and made them fly. But bounded by his method the historian is forced to treat this as a pious fable. He will, moreover, point out how the omniscience and omnipotence of Jesus increase in the Gospels the further in time they are removed from the events they depict; and this will lead the historian to suppose that the same idealizing tendency is already at work in the earliest Gospel strata.

Now is there any way out of this dilemma? Faith cannot assure us that the Christian symbols precisely correspond to actual events in past history. The rigorous application of the historical method, by its very nature, precludes the orthodox answer, and hence (if the orthodox answer is true) is irrelevant and inappropriate. How, then, shall we know if the Jesus of history corresponds to the Jesus of faith?

There are false answers to this question which I can do no more than allude to here. There are those who say that Jesus made such an impact on history that the orthodox answer is right. Others claim Paul cannot have been deceived, so few years after the Resurrection. These answers, and many like them, are simply *non sequiturs*. The course of Christian history has parallels in other religions, and the facts can be accounted for on quite different grounds than the orthodox ones.

What weighs with me is that there are in the Gospel narrative a sufficient number of instances to indicate that Jesus did not have the sinless and perfect character which the orthodox answer presupposes. It is for this reason that I believe the use of the historical method is justified,

and that an orthodox Christology, while not impossible, is unlikely to be correct.

These instances have always embarrassed the Church, and the answers given by the orthodox appear to me to be unsatisfactory. Why, for instance, did Jesus submit himself to be baptized by John? The obvious answer would seem to be that he felt sinful and, like all men, separated from God. Why did he say, "Why callest thou me good?" Was it not because he felt that only God, in contrast to himself, was really good? Why does the Gospel depict Jesus as failing sympathetically to understand his enemies, in the controversies on Sabbath, handwashing, the temple, and so on? Do we not have here an instance of the prophetic strain of Israel's religion, which strain did not do full justice to the priestly tradition? The uncharitable colors in which the Gospels paint the Pharisees find their counterparts in the early Protestant literature on Romanists (and the equal lack of charity of Romanists toward Protestants). Finally, why Gethsemane and the cry of dereliction on the Cross? Do not these express the truly human situation? It is one, to be sure, in which Jesus is ultimately triumphant, as has happened (to some measure) before and will happen again in history, where dedication to God entails the final martyrdom. But all these instances, taken together, lead me to be hesitant in saying, without qualification, that Jesus represented perfect manhood, and the person of Jesus was the Logos. Rather should I say that the Logos grasped the human Jesus, and out of his victorious life the Christian symbols were born.

Out of the events surrounding the figure of Jesus there arose the Christian symbols, as the great religious symbols of the world have always been born out of events that involved some ambiguity. These symbols represent an idealized portrait of Jesus. In their absolute quality they entail distorted history, but they are *also true pictures of God* who acted in Jesus. Therein lie their vitality and truth. God is the one who loves, who condescends, suffering in all our suffering to redeem the world, who transforms the waste of creation into the goodness of himself. We behold him wherever love, courage, mercy, justice and truth are triumphant. We hear his voice in the stern demands of Christian duty, and in the conscience pricked by the suffering of our fellows. And we live in the abiding conviction that by God's suffering love we are redeemed, and ourselves made able to suffer for others.

One final word. Christological controversy has engendered more *odium theologicum* than any other issue. Since certainty on the historical

question is impossible (whether we approach it by faith or by the historical method), should we not learn charity toward each other? At any rate we may pray that God will give us the grace to deal sympathetically with views opposed to our own.

APPENDIX ON CHALCEDON

The only reasonable interpretation of the decree of Chalcedon that our Lord Jesus Christ is "one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, acknowledged in two natures unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably . . . [both natures] concurring into one *prosopon* and one *hypostasis*," appears to me to be the *idea* which lies behind the *enhypostasia*. In defense of this I should urge the following:

(a) The Council approved as orthodox Cyril's Second Letter to Nestorius, his letter to John of Antioch (with the Union Creed), and the Tome of Leo. These three documents all say the same thing in different ways, viz., that the Word became flesh in such a way that the properties of each nature were preserved in their integrity, but the two natures were two natures of a single *hypostasis*. The natural inference is that the hypostasis is that of the Word who acts appropriately in terms of *either* of his two natures. The continual contrast in Cyril and Leo between "Word" and "flesh" would indicate this. The one is "personal," the other not. The "flesh," that is, has no subsistence in its own right apart from its union with the Word at the incarnation.

(b) A single, incautious sentence of Leo in par. 2 shows clearly the trend of his thought. It might even have been written by Apollinaris: "The Word dwelt among us, that is, in that flesh which *he* took from a human being [i.e., Mary] and which *he* animated with the spirit of a rational life (*spiritu vitae rationalis animavit*)."

(c) This same tendency is evident in III Constantinople. The two energies or wills are properties of nature, and the human one is deified. "His human will although deified was not suppressed." That is, because it is the *Word* which uses the human will as the other properties of the human nature, it is deified, because it is God who here acts through a human energy.

(d) The same tendency is *also* evident in such Antiochenes as Theodore. His Epistle 151, for instance (written about A.D. 431), says exactly what Leo's Tome says. It has the same contrast of Word and flesh, the same alternation of divine and human properties, the same insistence on the *one* person.

(e) The battle, at any rate in its later stages, was almost entirely one of *words*. When it is recognized that Cyril uses *physis* for an individual, concrete existence ("One *physis* of the Word and it made flesh"), it is clear that after the union there can only be *one physis* in this sense. But the Nestorians meant by *physis* the properties, qualities of a mode of being. Hence after the union there must be *two* natures. They were saying the same thing in different words and misunderstanding each other. Cyril thought the Nestorians taught two Sons (which, on the whole, they did not). Theodoret thought Cyril confused the natures (which he did not). What Chalcedon did was to put into Antiochene language on *physis*, and Alexandrine language on *hypostasis*,² what both the moderate parties meant: viz., that the Word assumed complete human nature, but the hypostasis, the ontological reality behind both natures, was that of the Second Person of the Trinity.

(f) In the early part of the debate the Antiochenes had a *tendency* toward *two* Sons. This is true of Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia and of parts of Nestorius. But it is not true of such writers as Theodoret. On the other hand, extreme Monophysites had a tendency to confuse the natures (as some incautious utterances of Eutyches and Julian of Halicarnassus), but this is not true of Cyril or Severus of Antioch.

(g) After Chalcedon the battle continued on the words, the Monophysites refusing the Antiochene sense of *physis*, and contending Leo had hypostatized the natures. So far as there was any sense in this battle it was about the *quality* of human nature. Is it only a passive instrument of the divine, or has it a more active role to play? This is really the Eastern form of the Western debate on irresistible grace, and had significant consequences for piety.

² I.e., "hypostatic union," not "prosopic conjunction."

4. Christology or Ecclesiology? A Critical Examination of the Christology of John Knox

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

I. THE STANDPOINT

IN A SERIES of small but impressive and influential books published over the years since 1941, Professor John Knox has doubtless made, among American theologians, the most sustained and boldly creative contribution to contemporary christological thought outside the European scene.¹ He regularly approaches the christological question from the side of New Testament studies which are, indeed, the field of his professional labors. As an exegete he is uniformly insightful and profound. But, while he works as a historical scholar, his program and the import of his work are unquestionably theological or doctrinal. There is even some indication, as, for example, his insistence "that biblical historical criticism not only has no stranglehold on Christian faith, but does not have it in its power to destroy one jot or one tittle of the gospel," that Dr. Knox is paradoxically eager to emancipate faith and doctrine from history.² In consequence, it would seem, he casts some considerable doubt upon the usefulness of his own peculiar task as historian.

The "doctrine" just referred to is, in point of fact, however, indistinguishable, in Knox's view, from the faith and faith-engendering experience of the Christian church—whether the early church or its *bona fide* succession—and it is not really so much the case that Knox has abdicated the historical task as that he has consistently contended for the reidentification or relocation of its proper subject matter.

Quite abruptly, therefore, it may be stated that the proper subject matter of Christian historical understanding is an "event," an "eschatological" one, which includes within itself Jesus as remembered as well

¹ The works referred to are the following: *The Man Christ Jesus*, Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1941; *Christ the Lord*, Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1945; *On the Meaning of Christ*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947; *Criticism and Faith*, New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1952; *The Early Church*, New York: Abingdon Press, 1955; *The Death of Christ*, New York: Abingdon Press, 1958.

² *Criticism and Faith*, p. 21.

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as the believing community. The subject matter is, therefore, not the person of Jesus,³ and not especially "the historical life of Jesus." It is not Jesus' consciousness regarding his own significance, nor his *ipsissima verba*.⁴ It is rather the faith-interpreted experience of the early Christian community *within* which "the miracle of the resurrection" occurred as constitutive of the church itself. That "miracle" is recurrently defined as "the coming of the Spirit,"⁵ or as the "inexplicable fact" of the "realized identity" of Jesus as he was remembered with the Lord, living and presently known.⁶ Further, what is available to historical investigation, according to Knox, is a Christ-event culminating in the coming of the Spirit together with the identification, in the community's experience, of the living Christ both with Jesus as remembered and with the Spirit. Or, defined still more closely, the subject matter is the church as "the new order of the Spirit."⁷

Dr. Knox uniformly stresses the reality of "a new kind of life" which entered the world with the community.⁸ This is, manifestly, subject matter available to historical inquiry, and is, at the same time, appropriable in the recurring experience of faith. This datum, Knox evidently believes, is the business of historical understanding faithfully to delineate, and its honest exposition will be, in point of fact, one important condition of recurring participation as, also, its explication will supply the content of Christian doctrine. Herein is perhaps one reason for the way in which Knox regularly seems to pass from history to dogmatic. For dogmatic is the faithful account of the faith of the Christian church; it is, I think, *kirchliche dogmatik*. In all this, revelation is kept explicitly historical by identifying it with an "event" which includes within itself the distinctively new life of the community. Indeed, it is declared that revelation took place in an "event," not a person,⁹ and is located within the experience of the church.¹⁰

From this, and for Christology, certain important consequences are, it would seem, involved: We are recurrently reminded that in Christology we have not to do with the person of Christ, a messianic consciousness of Jesus, an incarnation of the Word in him,¹¹ or with the resurrection con-

³ Cf. *On the Meaning of Christ*, pp. 18-25, and *The Early Church*, pp. 66-67.

⁴ *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 47, 49, 55. Cf. *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 64.

⁵ Cf. *The Man Christ Jesus*, pp. 39-40; *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 29, 31, 41; *The Death of Christ*, p. 128 *et al.*

⁶ This formula is consistently employed; cf. *Criticism and Faith*, p. 41; *The Early Church*, pp. 52, 65, 68; *The Death of Christ*, p. 109.

⁷ Cf. *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 103; *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 32, 52-53; *The Death of Christ*, p. 128.

⁸ *The Man Christ Jesus*, p. 69; *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 59; *The Early Church*, p. 75.

⁹ *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 44.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26; cf. *The Death of Christ*, p. 109.

¹¹ *Christ the Lord*, pp. 88-89.

sidered as an objective event. Even of the Cross, Knox says, "faith had a part in creating it."¹² Such questions about Jesus as "who is he?" or "whose Son is he?" are discouraged and, according to Knox, should be replaced by such questions about the community as "What is the *reality* in which these persons who knew Jesus and now remember him participate, and which constitutes the essential principle of the community's existence?"¹³

In the light of these suggestions, one is prompted to ask in all candor whether we do not have herewith a daring alteration of the christological standpoint. When the church has discussed Christology, it has usually supposed it was referring to the dignity of Jesus Christ's person, not to itself. Such was the concern classically represented by Chalcedon, but Knox warns against Hellenism, metaphysics, and Chalcedon in a way certainly reminiscent of Herrmann and Harnack. He proffers as the "reality" for christological reflection "the eschatological event,"¹⁴ namely, the new life in the Spirit, realization of the resurrection,¹⁵ or "the experience of the divine life in the community."¹⁶

Dr. Knox's thought on these lines comes, I think, to conspicuous ripeness in his volume, *The Early Church*. Therein he seems to me to complete his effort to relocate the miracle of Christian origins. It is notable in his contention that the early Christians did not believe "that the event and the community were divine because they also believed that Jesus was divine; but rather he was seen to be divine because of the way in which he was related to an event and a community whose divine significance was a matter of intimate and indubitable conviction."¹⁷ Plainly, Knox is reversing the order of dependency, and is deriving the dignity of Christ from the community of faith, though not fully intending it so.

It is a fact quite unmistakable that in the whole range of Knox's writings there is a pervasive effort to shift the locus of the Incarnation from Jesus as the Christ and to relocate it in a more comprehensive total event which Knox understands to embrace the historical career of Jesus, the coming of the Spirit, and the new life of the church. Long before Lund, Knox was affirming the inseparable unity of Christ and his church; but, in this conjugation, it is clear that Knox continually leans toward a higher ecclesiology than Christology, or perhaps we might say that ecclesiology has come to embrace Christology.

¹² *The Death of Christ*, p. 129.

¹³ *The Early Church*, p. 67. *Italics are mine.*

¹⁴ *The Early Church*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

This seems to me to be openly spelled out in Knox's latest writings. Raising the question whether Christology refers to person, event, or community, and having declared earlier that the term "Christ" in the New Testament encompasses, in its amplitude, event and community as well as person,¹⁸ Knox declares: "It follows from this that the christological question does not need to be construed as a question about the person; it can just as appropriately be thought of as a question about the event or the community."¹⁹ Plainly, for Knox, it involves all three, but one does not escape the strong impression that Knox's real stress falls upon the last two. They are accorded a causal antecedence which Knox does not fully intend but which follows ineluctably from his theory of the knowledge of history as "event" in which the subject is constitutive of the event and possesses a necessary antecedence *in ordine cognoscendi* to the object of knowledge. In addition, the stress falls upon the event and the community because these, happily, are positively identifiable by historical scholarship and are also appropriate in living faith. Of the Incarnation, therefore, all that Knox can confidently affirm is "the eschatological event," embracing Jesus as perceived by the community and constituting thereby the event.

Here, I believe, is a new form of historical and christological positivism: when the Jesus of history became too elusive for historical science to recover—a fact early acknowledged by Knox²⁰—a historical substitute seemed indispensable, namely, the kerygmatic and Spirit-filled community. So with profundity and daring, Knox set about clarifying a basic issue of contemporary theology. Confronted with a choice between Christology, in the traditional sense, and ecclesiology, Knox proposes to incorporate Christology within ecclesiology—Christ within the church.

II. THE ISSUE

It is well nigh indubitable that Knox relinquishes very nearly all responsibility for a doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ. It is now our business to inquire of Knox's writings the grounds of this stringency.

Although there are evidences of a surviving realism in historical knowledge in *The Man Christ Jesus*—a realism Knox clings to tenaciously, if ambiguously, throughout his writings—already in this early book the basic critical problem of Knox's work stands disclosed. Although therein the historicity of Jesus may not be seriously questioned, Knox concedes that "the

¹⁸ *On the Meaning of Christ*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁹ *The Early Church*, p. 66.

²⁰ *The Man Christ Jesus*, p. 68.

amount of knowledge of Jesus which we may properly claim has been materially reduced.”²¹ The memory of Jesus in the church preserves continuity with his historical existence, but already Knox is prepared to refer the messiahship of Jesus to the “creativity” of the community—an estimate of the latter in which he is always conspicuously generous.

The messianic self-consciousness of Jesus is, for Knox, psychologically incredible,²² but he acknowledges that Jesus “did regard himself as sustaining a relation of peculiar intimacy and responsibility to the kingdom of God.”²³ There was a “mystery about his consciousness of himself,” and “the Christian church had its origin in a mystery, if not in a miracle . . .”²⁴ And this “mystery,” which is the objective *prius* of the church’s memory is, apparently, about all that can be asserted with confidence about the person of Jesus by way of historical reconstruction. The reason is that “the historical student tracing backward the history of the church can proceed facilely enough until he reaches the vigorous, joyous faith of the primitive Christian community.”²⁵ But when he attempts to get behind the faith of the early church “he immediately runs into insuperable difficulties.”²⁶ For the historian “cannot lay his finger on a cause even approximately adequate to the effect.”²⁷ If the cause was the personality of Jesus, then we must face the fact that “Jesus’ personality cannot be fully recovered and no historical reconstruction of it on the basis of the Gospels quite accounts for the effects. . . .”²⁸

Reflection indicates, then, that the “effect,” but not the “cause adequate to the effect,” is the surviving assured content of positive historical knowledge. Perhaps, then, it will be necessary in some measure to derive the cause from the effect conceived as entailed in the effect. Hereafter Knox’s program will be the twofold effort, on the one hand to avoid historical skepticism by finding the career of Jesus implied in the effect,²⁹ and, on the other hand, that of reconceiving the Christ-event as possessed of sufficient capaciousness to include Jesus, the coming of the Spirit, and the community of new life in an inseverable unity—the true christological datum.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 65. Cf. *Christ the Lord*, pp. 39-41; *The Death of Christ*, ch. iii.

²³ *The Man Christ Jesus*, p. 66.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Cf. *On the Meaning of Christ*, pp. 6, 67, 85; *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 30, 33, 38, 40.

III. THE METHOD

It is now our task to indicate the various lines of approach by which Professor Knox has methodically advanced the program just mentioned. In *The Man Christ Jesus*, Knox adopted a principle thereafter to be retained, a principle held in common with form criticism, that "we cannot know the historical Jesus—Jesus 'simply as he was'—until we have some realization of what he meant to those who stood nearest to him."³⁰ Consequently, it is denied that we can "really separate between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of early Christian faith."³¹ This is the first step; and the second is to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to endeavor to find in the only surviving historical datum, the Jesus of faith, adequate grounds for assurance of its authenticity. In the last analysis, the appeal must always be to the church, to the community of Christian apperception. Whether he was then fully aware of it or not, in his book *The Man Christ Jesus* I find evidence that Knox was already on the way to abandoning "objective" history for the theological circle.

What was begun in the first book was advanced with greater sureness of touch in its sequel, *Christ the Lord*. There Knox began, as he has continued, to speak of the "career of Jesus" as the "center" of a complex of events which, collectively, we know in the New Testament as Jesus Christ. Herewith the revelation occurrence is beginning to be depersonalized and more inclusive. "Fact" and "interpretation" of fact are said to be inseparable—softening thereby the loss of the "bare fact" by accenting the receiving subject which apprehends it. The meaning attaching to the "occurrence," as entertained by responsive subjects, becomes contributory to, even constitutive of, the occurrence itself. Warning is issued by Knox, as with Bultmann's *Jesus*, against a historiography of "false objectivity." Imaginative participation is seen to be essential for true historical understanding.³² If the public career of Jesus "may be stated in a few ingredient essentials," the meaning of it can be ascertained only by attention to its realized significance in the life of the early community.

Gradually we see "fact" being replaced by something called "the event." This is comprised of Jesus as remembered, as interpreted, and as known still.³³ Jesus, as "known still," is the resurrection, that is, the realization of "the present and living Lord." This, in turn, is shortly identified

³⁰ *The Man Christ Jesus*, p. 73. Cf. p. 93 and *Criticism and Faith*, p. 32.

³¹ *Christ the Lord*, p. 3. Cf. *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 42, 49, 52.

³² *Christ the Lord*, p. 5.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 59. The structure of the book is determined by these three principal themes.

with the coming of the Holy Spirit.³⁴ And Knox asserts that it "was in the experience of that spiritual reality that the faith of the resurrection really consisted."³⁵ In all this, I think we discern a shift of focus from the so-called "fact" to the interior life of the community, thus to provide a new location for both the historical and the christological datum. The way out of skepticism, attending the older quest for the historical Jesus, is by way of redefinition of the datum so as to embrace object and subject in it as one reality. But this must in the nature of things, I think, give a certain primacy to the subject (i.e., the community of faith), because it alone is really accessible to knowledge.

So we are prepared for the flowering of Knox's theory of the historical and revelatory event as set forth in two succeeding works, *On the Meaning of Christ* and *Criticism and Faith*. It was already apparent in *The Man Christ Jesus* that "event" had come to embrace "a new kind of life" which had found expression in the church.³⁶ In *Christ the Lord*, event was Jesus, remembered, interpreted, and known still. Now, in these later works, the event is declared to encompass: (1) a series of events through which God made himself known, (2) a person who was the center of that complex of events, (3) and the community which both came into existence with the event and provided the locus of it.³⁷

Knox has now defined the more capacious christological datum toward which he had been working. A "true Christology," he asserts, is concerned with this threefold complex considered as a unitary reality, but he also urges that the category of "event" (1) has a certain primacy over both person (2) and community (3). It is more appropriate and adequate.³⁸ His reason is, I think, that the complex of events which conveyed "the revelation of God in Christ" embraces and unites what had been sundered by historical skepticism, namely, the one remembered and the community that remembers. The "total event," therefore, Knox asserts, is the "reality" with which we are concerned. In it the "fact" is given *in and with* the faithful response of the community.³⁹ Thus the event becomes the Christ-event, and it is summarily defined "as that historical occurrence or cluster of occurrences which culminated in the coming of the Spirit and the creation of the church."⁴⁰ As the "fact" has become wholly implicated with the

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

³⁶ *The Man Christ Jesus*, p. 69.

³⁷ *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 19.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 65-67.

⁴⁰ *Criticism and Faith*, p. 31. Cf. *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 34.

"response," so the Jesus of history has become forever transformed into the Christ-faith-event.

This outcome was implemented by Knox's developing conception of the social nature of any and every historical event.⁴¹ It always has two sides: "the external occasion and the human response, the thing 'out there' and the way in which this objective element is received and appropriated."⁴² The response is said to be "a constituent and creative element in the event itself, *and the event had not fully happened* [speaking of Christ] until this response of faith had been fully made."⁴³ On this view, Knox's earlier contention of the inseparability of the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith is not only substantiated but demonstrated. The former, *ex hypothesi*, cannot be known to exist in independence. Therefore a form of epistemological idealism becomes explicit in Knox's assertion that a historical event "is not something hypothetical and unrecoverable which lies before or back of the experience of the persons to whom it occurred."⁴⁴ Thus, of an historical event, including the Jesus of history, it surely follows that the knower becomes causally determinative of the event, so much so, indeed, as at least to suggest Berkeley's *esse est percipi*.

IV. THE RESULTS

In barest outline Professor Knox's solution to the problem of historical skepticism, which has consistently engaged his scholarly concern, has been sketched, it is hoped with fidelity to his own exposition. The solution, especially as it relates to the social nature of "event," is not unlike C. H. Dodd's, although more explicit.⁴⁵ By means of it a number of vexing problems are partly resolved.

In the first place, it suggests that the quest of the historical Jesus, apart from the response of faith to him, is either, in principle, misconceived if not impossible, or else can disclose nothing but the most superficial "accidents" as opposed to the substance of his career. Secondly, Knox's theory requires a redefinition of the true historical Jesus as the Christ of the early church's faith, so that the early contention of Knox that we cannot "really separate" the two is vindicated. Thirdly, the problem of historical skepticism, entailed in the "objective" quest, and as a consequence of it, is overcome or transcended. For now it will be recognized that the

⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 40, and *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 59f.

⁴² *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 66. Cf. *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 33, 59, 82, 86.

⁴³ *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 67. Italics and brackets are mine.

⁴⁴ *Criticism and Faith*, p. 33.

⁴⁵ Cf. *History and the Gospel*, London: Nisbet & Co., 1952, pp. 28, 36.

only historical Christ-event of which we can intelligibly speak is also indubitably the empirical emergent life of the community of the Spirit. In a quite recent statement Knox reminds us that, while we may uncritically believe that we have contact with the event other than through the community, "is it not obvious, when one reflects on it," he asks, "that the sole residuum of the event was the church?"⁴⁶ Fourthly, therefore, since "the event and the community are indissolubly involved with each other,"⁴⁷ we have assurance, not alone of the ready accessibility of the event, we may also avoid all the inadequacies of "historicism." For, with Herrmann and Bultmann, Knox has all along been aware of the impossibility of grounding faith upon the shifting and merely probable findings of historical research in the unrevised objective sense. Existential participation, that is faith, is possible if it is participation in the life of the community.

In the fifth place, and here we come to the heart of the christological question, the Christ-event is so enlarged in compass that it is understood to include, not alone the career of Jesus, but the coming of the Spirit or the realization of the resurrection in the life of the community. We have here an empirical reality not only positively identifiable and appropriate, but, in addition, we are no longer obliged to restrict the christological question to the person of Jesus Christ. In principle, to speak of Jesus Christ is to involve ourselves, as believers, as well. Now we can include in Christology what is "latent or implicit in that empirical fact," including the new life in the church; and we can avoid, furthermore, historically divisive and insoluble disputes as when Christology wrongly ranges beyond "the empirical meaning of the fact" to formulate speculative metaphysical answers about the divinity of Jesus Christ or the divine dignity of his person.⁴⁸

And finally, in the sixth place, it is possible to see that Knox is now equipped to relocate the miracle of Christian origins and to avoid the scandal of particularity.⁴⁹ It is not to be located in the career or self-consciousness of Jesus, not in *his* incarnation, nor *his* sacrificial death, nor *his* resurrection considered as *objects* of faith. It is around such questions that the profitless strife between fundamentalism and modernism has centered.⁵⁰ Rather, the miracle is what God did through Christ to effect "the eschatological event," the empirically determinable new order of life in

⁴⁶ *The Early Church*, p. 45. Cf. *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 32, 59-61.

⁴⁷ *Criticism and Faith*, p. 60.

⁴⁸ *On the Meaning of Christ*, pp. 17-19ff.; also *The Early Church*, pp. 74-76.

⁴⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 61; also *The Death of Christ*, pp. 109, 120-121.

⁵⁰ *Criticism and Faith*, p. 54.

the Christian community.⁵¹ The divinity of the remembered Jesus "rested on the experience of the divine in the life of the community," says Knox.⁵² And doubtless this is true in the order of knowing; but is it true according to the order of being? Jesus Christ is known in his benefits, but does this warrant us in locating the miracle there and making the object depend upon the subject—the divinity of Jesus a reflection of the new divine life in the community? Evidently, the christological event has received literally a polar shift and relocation. It now centers in the church rather than in Jesus Christ, since Jesus Christ cannot be located except in the church. The medium of this polar transference has been the social theory of historical event.

V. THE OUTCOME

In evaluating the christological developments in Knox's thought, one should recognize the problems which he has truly faced with both candor and profound concern. These problems, latent in late nineteenth-century biblical criticism, were fully recognized only in the recent past. With Knox there is the open recognition that historical study of the New Testament sources cannot supply a cause in Jesus adequate to the emergence of a new community of the Spirit, the church. Very early in this century W. Herrmann had recognized that the certainties of faith could never be made to rest upon the mere probabilities of history. And the bearing of form criticism has been that the only Jesus we can know is Jesus as Christ and Lord of the community of faith. Professor Knox therefore has conceived the task as that of indicating *how* the Jesus of history, the originative "center" of the event, could be reunited with the Christ of the church's faith.

Now there are always two basic ways to solve the problem of correlating subject and object in experience, namely, to start from one side or the other. Knox has chosen to solve the problem from the side of the subject of experience. What Knox has actually done is to effect a "Copernican revolution" after the manner of Kant in the sphere of christological knowledge. A problem quite analogous to that which confronted Kant in the matter of knowledge of the world confronts Knox in the problem of the knowledge of Jesus Christ: He can find no ground of adequation between the objective "cause," Jesus in his history, and the content (effect) of the subject's, that is, the church's, experience. The cause he complains is not adequate to the effect because the cause has dwindled to less and less under the acids of radical criticism.

⁵¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 49, 52; *On the Meaning of Christ*, pp. 14, 28, 33.
⁵² *The Early Church*, pp. 70, 73; *The Death of Christ*, p. 159.

In this extremity there is for Knox but one solution, namely, to affirm as Kant affirmed in his "transcendental analytic" that the "matter" or raw material of knowledge is apprehensible only as structured and formed by the subject of cognition. This, I believe, is plainly what is involved in Knox's theory of the social nature of the "event." The "event" entails reference to an antecedent given, but the given is known only as it is received and constituted in its specific form by the participating response of the subject of experience, in this instance, the community of faith.⁵³

In short, very much in the manner of Kant's critical idealism, the community of apperception, the church, is constitutive of the event; the subject determines the object, not in its being, but in its being what it is known as. What the given, the "matter," is in itself—that is, the career and person of Jesus, the *ding-an-sich*—must necessarily remain unknowable. Thus, recurrently, Knox refers to Jesus in his history as the "something that happened" because he concedes that what it is in itself is mostly inaccessible to critical historical knowledge.⁵⁴ It is only as it is known *as*. So Knox redefines the christological datum, the event, as he must on this view, to include within itself both the objective and subjective factors in one moment of experience of the Spirit. The event is, therefore, "primary," as Knox claims, in the sense that it is inclusive of both subject and object.

Since, then, the response of faith is constitutive of the event, there is no legitimate appeal beyond the community of apperception. The criterion of truth, also Kantian, is not adequation but a certain universality. In this instance, it is the consensus within the community of faith. Thus we emerge in this theory of christological knowledge with an undoubted phenomenism. We have Christ Jesus *as he is received* (i.e., the eschatological event) in the church. This is the datum of Christology. Thus the so-called historical Jesus is dissolved in the amalgam of critical epistemological idealism.

As I understand it, this means that Christology now unquestionably includes ecclesiology or, rather, ecclesiology includes Christology and that, indeed, without the church, Christology is impossible. This latter point would be an innocuous truism if it did not entail some thought-provoking consequences. The first is that we must now, I think, inescapably accord to the church a certain divinity we have been unable to ascribe to Jesus. This indeed is necessarily implicated in the theory that the church is constitutive of the event and also that there is no appeal beyond this community of apperception regarding the truth of Jesus Christ. Since, furthermore,

⁵³ *The Early Church*, p. 73.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Criticism and Faith*, pp. 30, 36, 106; *On the Meaning of Christ*, pp. 28, 33.

Knox insists that the event only fully occurred in the church,⁵⁵ the identifiable locus of the incarnation must be there. In this cumulative outcome, I do not see that the end of the most radical Protestant scholarship in New Testament studies is many steps away from Rome.

Another outcome seems to be this: If we can no longer talk of the event of Jesus Christ out of relation with the apperceiving community, we seem to be finally bereaved of the "humanity" of Jesus Christ as well as of his word in all ages *against* the Church. Clearly the humanity of Jesus has some relation of dependence upon the historicity. But, in all strictness, Knox cannot on his ground argue for the availability of the humanity except as it is allegedly implicit in the remembering community, which, however, knows only the Lord the Spirit. Intended or not, this is methodological docetism. It has, I think, no way out except to view the church as the sole residuum of Christ's humanity, as very literally the body of Christ.⁵⁶ Christ and his church have drawn so close together as to become well nigh indistinguishable.

Professor Knox has conceded to holding a "high" doctrine of the church.⁵⁷ This is an understatement. But he has himself warned against docetism⁵⁸ and any tendency "to absorb the event completely within the life of the church."⁵⁹ This, however, is exactly the tendency of his own thought. I would have to say that, on the basis of his phenomenalist epistemology, he cannot despite his protests, any more than Kant, affirm anything, with certainty about the antecedent reality of the "object," Jesus Christ. He can only affirm the availability of the phenomenon, that is, "the new order of the Spirit"—the Church.⁶⁰ It is an axiom with Knox that to "objectify" the event Jesus Christ is to destroy it; thus the resurrection occurred "within the experience of the first disciples."⁶¹ This surely is to "objectify" the event in the church; and there, it seems, the event of Christ occurred.

Ecclesiology has, I think, embraced if not replaced Christology. The program is complete: "historical criticism . . . does not have it in its power to destroy one jot or one tittle of the gospel." No, nor is there any assured standard by which the historical church may be brought before the judgment of Christ, for Christ is at one with his Church. Which Church?

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁵⁹ *Criticism and Faith*, p. 82.

⁶⁰ *The Early Church*, p. 65.

⁶¹ *On the Meaning of Christ*, p. 40.

Walter Rauschenbusch in Historical Perspective

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

THE BOOK BY Walter Rauschenbusch which shook the religious world of our nation, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, appeared just a half century ago. So much has happened in that half century both to the world and to us as a nation, that it is not altogether surprising that a book which meant so much to American religious life and to the older among us personally should be so obviously dated. Perhaps that is the fate of any book or of any personality no matter how creative, for we are all little creatures in the great drama of history in which we are involved, partly as actors and partly as spectators; and even the most imaginative mind cannot anticipate the future which separates the wheat from the chaff in our meditations.

I

The pace of history has been so rapid that even those of us who are old enough to have lived through it have to remind ourselves of the historic situation in which Rauschenbusch both fired and guided the Christian conscience of the nation. America had gone far on the road to technical efficiency which makes her now the most powerful nation of the world. But the mechanics of justice lagged woefully behind and we were retarded by a half century in our social legislation behind the Western European nations. Even Bismarck's Germany had immeasurably more advanced social legislation than our country. The social distress in the nation at the turn of the century is accurately and vividly described in the chapter entitled "The Present Crisis" in Rauschenbusch's famed book. "The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer," he declared. The latter statement was probably not accurate except in the relative sense that the

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growing wealth of the rich made the poverty of the poor more and more intolerable. Rauschenbusch devotes many pages to the idea of equality as a regulative principle of justice and proves that our national life violates this regulative principle. He quotes an economist who estimated that in 1890, one per cent of the population owned half of the wealth of the nation.

The result of this situation of poverty and wealth was that the wealthy had the political power to protect their wealth against the rising resentments of the poor. It is interesting that Rauschenbusch, upon the basis of the facts of his day, adopts the Marxist thesis of the primacy of economic power. While failing to define the government as the "executive committee of the ruling classes," he does quote the dire prophecies of the eminent sociologist, Professor Giddings, made in 1904, "What we are witnessing today is the decay, perhaps the permanent decay, of republican institutions."

It is interesting that the whole generation identified injustice with monarchial institutions or with "despotism," which were regarded as identical. The possibility of despotism in the name of the "people's democracy" had not yet loomed on the historical horizon. "A class which is economically strong," wrote Rauschenbusch, "will have the necessary influence to secure and enforce laws which protect its economic interest. . . . Politics is embroidered with patriotic sentiment and phrases, but at bottom, consciously or unconsciously, the economic interests dominate it always."¹ Thus spoke the voice of realism at the turn of the century, and Rauschenbusch's semi-Marxist version of the relation of economics to politics seemed as true at the turn of the century in America as it seemed in the middle of the previous century in Europe. More than a quarter of a century was required to construct the proper equilibria of power to refute the thesis of the importance of political power. Rauschenbusch adduced the evidence in the failure to protect the workers against injury in the absence of pensions and unemployment insurance and in the unequal tax laws, for the pessimistic thesis that government was indeed in league with the rich.

Rauschenbusch's approval of Theodore Roosevelt's minor reforms and his gratitude for T.R.'s stance against the "malefactors of great wealth" is a reminder of the ethos of an era in which none of the equalizing tendencies of modern European democracy had become operative in America and in which the present standards of social security were practically unknown. It was a strange world and one which well might have shaken the conscience of the nation earlier than it did.

¹ *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, The Macmillan Company, 1907, pp. 253-4.

The question of the reason for the moral and political complacency of the nation under these social injustices brings us to the equally strange moral and religious climate of the country at the turn of the century. We must remember that so much injustice had produced many forms of political revolt at the close of the century, that the Populist Movement prospered among the agrarians of the West, that Bryan had been nominated for the presidency after delivering his "Cross of Gold" speech (but had also been defeated in the subsequent election). The "Knights of Labor" had been organized and strikes were brutally suppressed in the budding steel industry. The poor were resistive, though their rebellion had never reached the organized political rebellion of the Marxist workers of Europe. The real mystery was the moral and political complacency of middle-class culture, and particularly of middle-class Protestantism.

Perhaps the reason for this complacency must be found in the fact that the nation was so much wealthier than Europe and social mobility was so much greater, both because of the constantly expanding economy and the advancing frontier, that social resentments had less provocation than in the Old World. The complacency of middle-class Protestantism had a special reason which Rauschenbusch seems never to have noted. He ascribed all of its blindness to its individualism, and he meant that kind of Calvinism which believed it exhausted the moral demand of Christianity in inculcating thrift, industry and honesty. This was indeed the main heritage of New England Puritanism. But the additional social fact was that the nation's labor force was constantly recruited from Slavic and Latin and Irish peoples. It was, therefore, Catholic in religion while the Anglo-Saxon ruling minority was predominantly Protestant. The class struggle thus had a particularly religious overtone which has never ceased to influence religious attitudes to this day. For to this day, Catholicism has more intimate relations with the world of labor than Protestantism; witness the significance of the Catholic Trade Union League which, incidentally, has been so active in ridding the unions of the menace of communism.

But there were other cultural sources of middle-class complacency which operated at least to give that complacency some shreds of rationalization to cover the nakedness of its moral position. Most of these cultural influences may best be defined as "social Darwinism." It would be more accurate to say that the *laissez-faire* doctrines of classical economics, which became so popular after the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, were reinforced by the application of the Darwinian idea of the "survival of the fittest" to the realm of social policy, in which the idea supported

the already established theory that economic life had its own laws which were to be interfered with at one's peril. One might tentatively have a quirk of conscience about all the injustices which Rauschenbusch and other reformers enumerated but one could always hope that the operation of the free market, including the free market of labor, would eliminate all these abuses.

Ordinarily, or rather normally, such a Spencerian doctrine which equated human history with nature, and its "laws" with the "laws of nature," might seem to be anathema to the Christian faith, informed by the idea of man being made in the image of God. But nothing can stop a powerful idea when it conforms to the interests of the class which entertains it. The fact is that social Darwinism even more than Calvinism made the Protestant middle class complacent. It would be more accurate to say that the combination of Calvinism and social Darwinism was the real source of Protestant middle-class complacency, so that Henry Ward Beecher could say that he had never seen an honest and thrifty man begging for bread.

II

It cannot be said that Rauschenbusch challenged these ideologically anchored illusions basically. His message was simply to insist on the social relevance of the Christian faith and the social responsibility of the Christian. He did this by a special emphasis or special application of the liberal interpretation of the Gospel which was regnant in the nineteenth century and which was, in a sense, the religious application of the idea of progress and of the perfectability of man. In terms of secular ideologies, he set the voluntaristic ideas of Comte against the determinism of Spencer. It is interesting that even in his *Theology for the Social Gospel* he never clearly betrayed the religious rather than the secular source of his faith. For while on the secular side it was the idea of progress, on the religious side it was none other than the radicalism of sectarian Christianity which, as a Baptist, he had inherited from his father.

He closes his *Theology for the Social Gospel* with these words: "Before the Reformation, the Prophet had only a precarious foothold inside the church and had no right to live outside of it. The rise of free religion and political democracy has given him a field and a task. The era of prophetic and democratic Christianity has just begun." What is interesting about this observation is that even in the Orthodox Reformation the prophet, as he or as we conceive him, had little place. Certainly Luther's doctrine of the two realms gave no room for anything which Rauschenbusch defines

as prophetic Christianity. Nor are the limitations of the Calvinist theocracy with its conception of the "rule of the saints" discussed or the legitimacy of the Anabaptist radicalism analyzed. For in Rauschenbusch's estimation, the Reformation performed its significant task in emancipating the church from the despotic and priestly regime of Catholicism. The whole history of Christianity is viewed as an evolutionary process in which the prophets first state the conditions of the kingdom of God which is then brought to a culmination in the life and teachings of Jesus. For "The fundamental first step in the salvation of mankind was the achievement of the personality of Jesus. Within Him, the kingdom of God got its first foothold in humanity. It was by virtue of his personality that he became the initiator of the kingdom."²

This position assigned to Jesus does not quite fit the evolutionary conception of history nor the role which he assigns to the prophets. It slightly obscures one of the genuine achievements of Rauschenbusch and the whole social gospel school of thought. That was to rediscover the prophets as teachers of social righteousness. One of the most eloquent chapters in Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis* was the first chapter, entitled "The Historical Roots of Christianity: The Hebrew Prophets." In this chapter he calls the prophets to witness that the righteousness which God requires "was not merely the private morality of the home but the public morality in which the life of the nation was founded. They said less about the pure heart of the individual than about just institutions for the nation."³

One may question whether the social gospel fully understood Hebraic prophetism with its overtone of Messianism, because the prophetic witness was co-ordinated too simply to their evolutionary conception of history. The whole tension of prophetism, with its demands upon the nation which neither that nation nor any nation can fulfill, was certainly obscured. But the errors did not prevent the social gospel from recognizing the importance of the prophetic insistence on social righteousness and on collective morality. That insistence makes the Old Testament a perpetual resource for a Christian social ethic, and raises the question whether in the history of Christianity ethics as distinguished from theology can ever develop an adequate social ethic if it neglects the Old Testament prophetism. For without the Old Testament witness, the moral tension between Christ and the world, as explicated in the New Testament, is always in danger of

² *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, The Macmillan Company, 1917, p. 151.

³ *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 8.

creating or of providing an escape for the tension in either the asceticism of the Medieval Church or the Pietistic individualism of Protestantism.

Rauschenbusch, incidentally, erroneously ascribes asceticism solely to Greek dualism and does not do justice to the fact that the eschatological rigor of the New Testament, if translated into specific law, is bound to result in asceticism. One needs only to think of the influence upon medieval thought of the story of the rich young man on the one hand and of the critical attitude toward the family on the other hand. It is a question whether the social gospel fully understood the *agape* motif of the New Testament. This school would certainly have been surprised and outraged by Nygren's interpretation of *agape*—by which I do not imply that Nygren is absolutely correct in his conception of a fundamental contradiction between *agape* and all forms of natural love. For Rauschenbusch and his school, love is "the community building faculty." "Man," he declares, "is fundamentally gregarious and morality consists in being a good member of the community. Man is moral when he is social and immoral when he is anti-social." One of Rauschenbusch's disciples insisted that Christianity was foolishly exercised about the relation of love to justice, for that tension would not arise if one conceived all love as mutual love. Aristotle's *philia*, in short, contained the whole answer to the tension of love and justice.

Perhaps this brings us to the heart of the problem of the Christian social ethic as expounded by the social gospel. It did not understand either the height of the pinnacle of love or the base of justice. For the height of love is certainly more unprudential and uncalculating than mutual love and it contains universalistic demands which challenge any particular community. "If ye love them which love you, what reward have ye?" declared Jesus. About the family, that seedpot of all community, he made the critical judgment, "Whosoever loveth father and mother more than me is not worthy of me."

Furthermore, the motif of self-sacrifice and forgiveness are the pinnacles of the love which is expounded in the New Testament. It is obviously not easy to construct a social ethic from these nonprudential, heroic and ecstatic dimensions of the love ethic. That is one of the many reasons why Christianity in its various versions has not been too successful in guiding the collective morality of mankind; which is not to say that these pinnacles of the love ethic are irrelevant. They certainly describe the moral possibilities on the edge of the impossible for the individual life as it transcends collective possibilities. But the cross of Christ is a scandal in the field of ethics, and the social gospel obscured the pinnacle of the truth of the cross

in the field of ethics by reducing love too simply to the dimension of mutual love. Rauschenbusch's final chapter envisages social progress in the direction of an ideal communism which naturally did not have the benefit of our hindsight. He could not know that collectivism would, in the name of exalting (in his words) "people not things," create a power system which was blind not only to the sin of the wielders of power but to the indeterminate possibilities of both good and evil in the free play of individual freedom beyond the immediate necessities of the community.

This brings us to the other defect in the teachings of the social gospel. It did not understand the mechanics of justice though it contributed tremendously to the creation of a sense of justice. It did not understand justice because it did not measure adequately the power and persistence of man's self-concern, particularly in collective self-concern. Rauschenbusch, in his *Theology for the Social Gospel*, devotes a chapter to "Original Sin" in an effort to rehabilitate a doctrine which had become odious to his generation. He does this by attributing the universality of sin to the transmission of egoistic tendencies through faulty institutions. This leads inevitably to the Marxian hope of a radical change in the evil institutions, particularly the institution of property. Rauschenbusch never took the step toward Marxism except by implication. But many of his followers did, including many of us. A few even got caught in the toils of Stalinism. They did not realize that the nationalization of property would make for a monopoly of power for the oligarchy which managed the socialized property—a monopoly of power which the capitalist oligarchs possessed in the day when we were exercised about social injustice.

Meanwhile, a tolerable justice was established in all of Western civilization not by the wisdom of its wise men but by the wisdom which a free society was able to generate in separating truth from error in the warring creeds of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. This was done not systematically but pragmatically in actual political and economic history. Not only did the "New Deal" provide minimal social securities through the intervention of the state, in defiance of the individualistic creed which Rauschenbusch rightly criticized, but what is more important, organized labor began to set power against power. For justice in a sinful world demands an equilibrium of power. Power in juxtaposition with weakness is bound to cause exploitation. This basic fact cannot be obscured by the pathetic current developments in the labor movement with which that scoundrel, Hoffa, is related. These developments merely prove that every new advance in history creates its own problems on the new level of achievement.

III

We began by calling attention to the great difference in the moral and political climate of our day and the catastrophic mood of Rauschenbusch's generation. This difference was created not by the triumph of one philosophy over another or by the triumph of Comte over Spencer, but by the beneficent play of cultural and social forces in a free society. In this development, creeds and dogmas were transmuted into a wisdom better than that possessed by any dogma, and a free society was able to establish immunity against the corruptions of collectivism by overcoming the corruption of extravagant individualism. The progress which Western democracies have made in political and economic justice would seem to have vindicated the optimism which the social gospel shared with its generation and to have refuted the undertone of catastrophism which was the Marxian admixture in the Utopianism of that generation. It did, indeed, refute the catastrophism but it failed to vindicate the historical optimism. That was the real common treasure between the secular liberalism and Christian liberalism at the turn of the century. Rauschenbusch expressed this optimism in familiar terms by identifying the "kingdom of God" with historical progress. He suggested that the apocalyptic note in later prophetism was merely the shell in which Jesus' more adequate ideas of the kingdom grew.

Jesus [he wrote] had the scientific insight which comes to most men only by training but to the elect few by divine gift. He grasped the substance of that law of organic development in nature and history which our own day at last has begun to elaborate systematically. His parable of the sower, the net, the tares, the mustard seed, and the leaven are all polemical in character. He was seeking to displace the crude and misleading catastrophic conceptions with the saner views of the coming of the kingdom. This conception of growth demanded not only a finer insight but a higher faith.⁴

One reads this capitulation of a great theologian and a great Christian soul to the regnant idea of progress of his day with some dismay because it proves how vulnerable we are to the illusions of our generation. In the light of our own more tragic experience—which includes not only the progress toward democracy in the nations of the West, but the Nazi horrors, two world wars and the present contest with a totalitarianism (which is in some respects better but also in many respects worse than Nazism because it is the corruption of a valid idea)—we know these hopes of the nineteenth century to have been illusions. We also recognize that the "catastrophism" of the prophets and what seemed to the nineteenth century

⁴ *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, pp. 59-60.

the "crude" Messianism of the Old Testament were, in fact, the consequence of the wrestle of a high faith with the problem that the moral recalcitrance of man's collective behavior seemed to refute the idea of a divine sovereignty over the whole of history.

Prophetic Messianism insisted that in some way the injustices of the world must yield to the divine power in the Messianic Age. The course of history certainly did not prove that they would yield out of conscience. The New Testament, by refuting the hope of a triumphant Messiah and proclaiming instead a suffering Messiah who took the sins of the world upon himself, certainly did not substitute for the pessimism of the prophets its own conception of "the inevitability of gradualness." On the contrary, it was more deeply pessimistic about the moral capacities of man than the prophets were. That is why the Christian faith became so easily the ally of conservative politics, for conservatism traditionally rejected the Utopian dreams of the liberals. Christianity was wrongly the ally of conservatism, however, because conservatism never fully recognized that the order in a sinful world, supplied by the rulers of the nations, was always paid for by too high a price in justice.

Thus even when the domestic history of the democratic nations seemed to vindicate the optimism which the social gospel shared with the enlightenment, it certainly refuted the estimate of human behavior upon which that optimism was based. What progress in justice has been achieved has been won by a careful balancing of social forces. Love as "community building faculty" has been operative only as it availed itself both of the calculations of justice and of the mechanics of justice. This is to say that we cannot count on the "moral forces" nearly as much as the social gospel assumed. We must count on the humility of even the best men knowing that they are not sufficiently moral to be just if their power remains unchecked and their policy not under review.

If the optimism of the enlightenment was refuted even in the area of domestic politics where an advancing justice seemed to vindicate it, it has been even more tragically refuted in the realm of foreign policy where it was hoped that history was moving toward "the parliament of man, the federation of the world." We indeed have that parliament in rudimentary form in the United Nations, but we also are involved in a cold war with a despotism built on the Utopian illusions which the enlightenment shared with the Marxist idealists. Nothing in the thought of either the enlightenment or the social gospel even faintly surmised the tragic realities of the day which have become the daily bread of our spiritual existence.

In this situation we can pay our brief tribute to the heroes of another generation who defied malignant power and who tried to rescue the Christian faith both from irrelevance and from a conscious and unconscious alliance with evil, that is, with uncontrolled power. With the tools in their possession they did heroic service. But they were prisoners of their own culture more than they realized and they were, therefore, forced to counter a grave error on the relation of Christianity to the social order by embracing or nearly embracing another error. Fortunately, we have been saved from both errors not by the virtue of the Christian Church or any other virtue, but only by what we must define as providential workings in history.

From these facts we cannot draw the conclusion that we are wiser than they were, though we have experiences behind us which they did not have. Nor can we draw the conclusion that we must not seek to establish relations with a culture because these relations so frequently turn out to be capitulations of the Christian truth to some current illusion. Karl Barth, who has become a symbol for this strategy, has become in these latter days a partial apologist for tyranny. We have to hazard our ventures into the culture of our day and hope that we will not make too many mistakes. We must hazard them particularly when the problem of social responsibility is at stake. For the Christian faith is not otherworldly, it always commits us in a responsible relation to the community and bids us to establish justice.

Yet the long history of the failures of Christian conservatism and Christian liberalism in establishing tolerable justice in the community must prompt us to modesty. Conservatism has been too complacent about the self-seeking of the rulers and the injustices of the powerful. Liberalism, on the other hand, did not see that idealists can be very dangerous the moment they have the power to implement their "ideals" or to mix them with their self-interest.

We must not draw quietistic conclusions from the fact, but it seems to be a fact that in that society which was originally so unjust as to provoke a rebellion of the workers, both freedom and justice have been established despite the power lusts of the rulers and the illusions of the idealists. Thus God "maketh the wrath of man to praise him" and we are reminded that our generation enjoys the benefits of a social order which is more virtuous than the insights of our fathers and our own achievements. To comprehend this is to see that the Gospel's interpretation of the human situation is superior to all realistic or idealistic versions of the Gospel.

A Definition of God in the Light of Twentieth-Century Knowledge

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

I

MY TASK in one sense is impossible, for God alone can define God. Why should a human being presume to tell others who God is? Why particularly should a twentieth-century man dare to do so in terms of his own time? Suppose God had been defined a hundred thousand years ago. What kind of standard would that have been? Suppose someone should define God a hundred thousand years from now. If we may use President Conant's prophecy, even cautiously, to the effect that the next fifty years may see more change basically in thought, especially in scientific knowledge, than the last five hundred years, how ignorant, dull, and primitive may not the thought of our century seem then!

On the other hand, we all have a God inescapably. In fact, there are no atheists or agnostics, but only true worshipers or idolaters. God by definition is whatever is most important and most real. All of us have to have some way of organizing experience and directing behavior. There is no presuppositionless thinking. All of us have some presupposition not only for thinking, but for living, that we cannot prove. If we could prove it, it would no longer be our presupposition. Thus we all have a god of some kind which or whom we cannot prove. He can be proved only in terms of what is more real than he; and then *that* is our God. Yes, we all live by faith, worship some god, and are in this sense unavoidably religious. Religion is non-optional, for it is situational. We must choose some stance, some way of standing, or some direction, some way of walking. Our dominant drive discloses our worship. The question, then, is not: *Shall we believe?* *shall we be religious?* or *can we believe in God?*—but rather: Is our God a private necessity, to help or to hurt, or is God also in some sense public? Is religion merely *existentiell* or also *existential*? Can this

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inescapable faith judgment, or the choice that we must make of presupposition for life and thought, be understood and communicated, and are there any reasons at all why one god can be called better or truer than any other? Reason serves our dominant drive; can it also check its truth and change the drive?

Alasdair MacIntyre of Manchester University, England, has said on the Third Programme of the B.B.C. that for civilization to become meaningful we need a metaphysics. He avers that the modern revolution in philosophy has made metaphysics based on reason impossible (and I agree with him if by reason he means rationalism), that we are now consequently caught in Meaninglessness with a capital M, to the point where men no longer communicate with each other. What he is really saying, I believe, is that we need God, but we do not know how to find him. Is Mr. MacIntyre right? Is *he* speaking for twentieth-century man?

I have said that we have gods inescapably. The real question is, therefore: Can we know at all who God is, who the right God is, and can we know him together? To answer this question I must admit, to be sure, that knowledge can never give us God. At most knowledge can give content to a response that we must make. Knowledge provides us choices for decision. I shall try to show that it can also help check and help change our faith. As knowledge grows, that is, we might be helped by it to outgrow certain immature and inadequate ideas of God. Only because of this fact is our task at all worth while. How then can twentieth-century knowledge help us? How can it inform our existential decision and improve it? How can reason serve faith?

Unfortunately for me, in this task, there is no one twentieth-century man! Some of our contemporaries are scarcely affected at all by modern knowledge. They have fixed their faith in some part of history, in some institution, or in some book. Since faith cannot be forced, only changed from within, what I am to say is not for those who wear dogmatic blinders. Others want to flit around from one shrine of authority to another or from one wilderness of negation to another. My definition, however, is for the sake of those who are intellectually trained in modern knowledge, who dare to see that they have to have some faith-stance or other, and who want their response to reality to be as true as possible.

Such a person, of course, cannot bypass Copernicus. Earth is no longer central to his thinking. Darwin has moved into his home. Man is somehow in some real sense a slow product of the patient ages. Marx has taught him how sociological knowledge is and Freud has introduced him to the

perilous power of the subconscious depths that enter unbidden into man's best thinking.

The twentieth-century man is aware of amazing dimensions of thought and consequently is rightfully wary of all claims of faith. In our century radical changes of thought that once were new and startling have become domesticated and enter into the very presuppositions of modern man's thinking. Added, however, are the facts and implications of atomic science, the messianism of the social sciences, the long tendrils of cybernetic inquiry, and the naked memories of world conflagrations that have unstrung man's moral muscle, unnerved his intellectual fiber, nearly crushed his spiritual backbone, and left him in the main defeatist with a will not to believe as well as with an accumulation of facts for not believing.

The philosophical revolution that Mr. MacIntyre takes for granted, for instance, I believe is mostly due to the incapacity of man to think as a whole. His inner unity is broken. Therefore, he splits knowledge escapistically into logical necessity and existential contingency, even at their most abstract and unworkable poles apart from each other. Thereupon meaningful knowledge of God within this field comes to an end, but not man's personal need and necessity to respond to God nor the need and necessity for God in life and in civilization. The intellectual revolution, so-called, could, however, be constructively fulfilled if there were a will to believe strong enough to dare to see. As it is, the deeply seared conscience of our century tries to cover up its guilt by its outright denial of the God who can be known and, also, of those standards of right and wrong that must be honored for life and community to be real. Confusion, nihilism, and convention, however, cannot take the place of God in any century. And many are beginning to see that this is a fact.

II

How, then, can twentieth-century knowledge give content to faith in God, and what right has it to check faith or to change previous concepts?

In the twentieth century, energy is a basic way of understanding the world in which we live. The sciences deal with energy whether in terms of atoms, molecules, organisms, or galaxies. Sometimes whirl seems to be king and all seems ultimately to be flux. Yes, whirl appears to have killed Zeus and energy to have replaced God. Suppose, however, we employ *spirit*, which suggests potential and active energy, to define God? Nietzsche may not have been right in his claim that whoever first defined God as spirit killed him!

Energy, however, is not what we really observe. We arrive at energy as an abstraction of science and thought. What we do see, rather, is an actual world of interacting and changing phenomena.

Two observations must be made concerning this world: (1) It is a world with enough unity to be called a universe, where diverse aspects like the salinity of the ocean, the laws of gravitation, the speed of light, entropy and life all affect each other. A critical work like L. J. Henderson's *The Order of Nature*, or his *The Fitness of the Environment*, with its strong stress on lack of purpose in the universe, has to admit the basically organic way the world hangs together. The sciences presuppose a dependable universe and predictable relationships; and philosophy presupposes that the rules of entailment are universally valid, not merely arbitrary and unpredictable conventions. Professor Sinnott of Yale has shown in *The Spirit of Biology* how the organicistic drives are unimaginably intense, as, for instance, when a sponge although pulverized through a nearly microscopic screen and thrown into the sea, comes together again in the ocean.

Objectively, then, not only must we respond as total human beings but we must respond, for ourselves and together, to a world which in some sense has the unity of a universe.

Not only does energy thus have pattern and appear in diverse forms, which nevertheless, in the large, surprisingly involve each other; but (2) this unity of the universe, science tells us, has come into being through various stages over billions of years. If we were merely confronted by a ready-made world, we should have the right to say that out of an infinite number of possibilities this world is as likely as any other. But no! We live within a series of becomings, of novelties that insofar as they are genuinely new, cannot be accounted for in terms of previous existence. This series of novelties mounts up to a universe that increasingly reveals its fuller and richer nature. Such a universe cannot have become by chance over such a long stretch of time, unless, of course, no thought counts. It definitely cannot be accounted for from below, or in terms of first beginnings, without denying the whole history of evolution; nor can it be interpreted in terms of present existence without our becoming intellectually presumptuous by freezing the process. Why should this series stop with us?

Our knowledge, therefore, operates with energy, but with patterned and interactive energy, that is with relations that either are organic or are analogous to the organic, with its parts interrelated, like the salinity of the ocean, tides and vegetation. We work also with an accumulative series of novelties, of becoming, unexplainable and unpredictable from below, that

have come together to constitute and increasingly to disclose a unity of a world we call a universe.

Even so, the most important fact is not the mystery of nature or creation. It is history. Man's history is a cosmic *swoosh*, a blitz-emergence within the mystery of creation. Sir James Jeans has compared the time since creation with the height of Cleopatra's Needle, man's existence with a penny on top of it, and man's civilized history with the thickness of a postage stamp. On the scale of three billion years to thirty days, man's history, roughly, is ten seconds. But the next half-second may, at that, show more rapid changes than the last five seconds. Whence this *swoosh*, this blitz-emergence, unless reality is far different from, and more than, our actual world? It looks as though someone had shifted the gears of time from beyond the order of our time!

What of history itself, however? Has this thin edge of time any meaning to suggest? Through man's relation to nature in terms of need and nature's capacity to meet these needs, especially through technology, man has developed ever wider media of community and means of communication. Not through choice or conscious planning has man changed from a food-finding to a food-producing animal and from a localized wanderer through clans, states, empires, and the United Nations to a citizen of the world, in need if not in fact. This lightning-quick change has been due to the push of the process. Man has been driven indirectly by his needs and the history of meeting those needs into ever wider ways of togetherness. At the same time, ideal ways of behaving in, and of interpreting, his environment have grown along with, and in response to, this push of process. Man has been drawn by a pull of purpose as well as driven by the push of process.

History, as Toynbee holds, has been a challenge and a response, a challenge of the push of process and a response in terms of the pull, to whatever extent faltering, failing or prevailing. Thus indirectly, through man's relation to nature, history has been fashioned in accordance with man's conditioned freedom.

Right now we sometimes hear the claim that man through automation has become free from his previous dependence on nature. But on the contrary, nature in the form of nuclear weapons now threatens our destruction unless this particular form of the push of process is answered in terms of an adequate pull of purpose, in terms of the responsible, concerned and co-operative community that lies at the heart of our definition of God and his purpose. Or we may think ourselves free from nature through medicine,

but such power over nature fails to cure the diseases of civilization that involve our minds and spirits. We have, then, a world of energy basically organismic in nature, or analogously so, a unity of a universe due to an accumulative series of becomings that fit into and fulfill what was there before, a blitz-emergence of history as such, and a pattern of history calling for a matching of the push of process by the pull of purpose.

This pull of purpose, some of us believe, has been seen climactically in Jesus. His life, his willingness to forgive and to die in the interest of truth and people, suggest God as the inclusive and unconditional Concern, who is the Ground and the Goal of creation and of history. They point to the God who is the power for the pattern of the process that seeks co-operative community. In Jesus we see exhibited that creative concern for community that constitutes our peak understanding of God.

Our definition of God as the creative and reconciling Love is centered in Christ, but is also definitely suggested by the main direction of knowledge and its incredibly sudden spurt; and it is to be filled in, corrected by and verified by future history. We have but a swift flaming arrow across a dark sky. God is the Spirit of Love and Truth.

III

Since some whole response we must make, I acknowledge that such a God best satisfies my own deepest need both to know and to live. This definition of God, I believe, helps us to find out what is wrong with us, as well as providing meaning to life and to civilization.

The need for mystery is also met. Alfred North Whitehead suggests that not ignorance, but the ignorance of ignorance, is the death of knowledge. Evil is too real and too deep to be ignored with integrity. The shifting of history's gears is perplexing. Time and eternity are too much beyond us for us to have either easy or complete answers. While evil is real and sin is serious, the suffering of the Innocent for the guilty is at least a clue to Love's use of evil. The Cross of Christ fascinates as well as frightens mankind by its truth and finds deep echoes in all religions. Natural evil, on the other hand, can begin to get meaning as God's means to frustrate man's self-sufficiency in sin through the control, indirectly by nature, of the consequences of man's deeds, especially by death.

Of course, if God be this unaccountably great eternal Spirit, our lives here on earth witness only the beginning of his pedagogy. Neither good nor evil can be meaningfully discussed, let alone solved, on man's scale. Only the scale of God's eternity will do. Thus knowledge finds meaning

only within the fuller context of faith. If God is to be real, let alone meaningful, to twentieth-century man, our understanding of God must grow apace.

One more mainly practical suggestion: If God is ultimate Love his true worshipers cannot become fanatical. The more genuine love is practiced, the more identification is made with concrete need. Attitude cannot take the place of needed study nor study of action. Love is a built-in self-correcting pedagogical principle; it employs the true feed-back mechanism! Some American social scientists are saying that this is the generation that has discovered love as basic for life, personal and social. How the concept is being used, for instance, in depth-psychology, sociology, and penology. But most such discoveries, I believe, are yet to be made!

All that I dare to say in the light of twentieth-century knowledge, all the same, is that since some faith we must have, since some God we must accept, the choice for me is God as Love, made known and to be made known in concerned, creative and co-operative community. Non-Christians and Christians can learn together what such a God means to us in the face of an avalanche of new knowledge and a prospective united world. Both church people and so-called secularists can find open communication and increasing community if they will aim at walking the way of nonsentimental and inclusive Love. The way is narrow and long, but I find that it provides enough light and meaning to go by. My experience is that only according to our working faith shall we be given to find existentially who God is; for no one can choose the way of knowledge, in any century that we know, without discovering that the way of faith is a way of darkness as well as of light, a way of trusting beyond our clearest seeing.

The Human Side of John Wesley

FREDERICK E. MASER

I

THERE IS AFOOT TODAY a renewed interest in John Wesley. Not in his theology or churchmanship, but in his human traits and personality. People are interested in John Wesley, the man.

Robert Southey anticipated this demand when in 1820 he wrote the first biography of the English Reformer that obtained literary standing.¹ It is a charming, though at times an inaccurate, portrait.

One of my copies belonged originally to Cardinal Newman. I purchased it at Leary's Book Store in Philadelphia for a mere pittance, although I almost failed to buy it. The clerk in the Religious Books Department greeted me one day by asking, "Aren't you the man interested in John Wesley?"

"That's right," I answered.

"I thought so," she continued. "A copy of Southey's Wesley came in a few days ago."

She took it from a shelf and showed it to me. I saw at a glance that it was an unimportant edition, and I was about to hand it back when a natural curiosity caused me to open it. On the front fly-leaf was a notation by "J. H. Newman." The date of the edition, moreover, placed it in the Cardinal's lifetime.

I purchased the book instantly, and then rushed to an authority on Newman's handwriting. She definitely confirmed it as the Cardinal's notation and signature.

Newman, who was not impressed by Southey's work, had written the following appraisal:

I have nearly finished Southey's "Wesley" which is a very superficial concern indeed; interesting of course. He does not treat it historically in its connection with the age, and he cannot treat it theologically, if he would.

¹ Southey, Robert, *The Life of Wesley; and the Rise and Progress of Methodism*, in two volumes. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, Paternoster Row, 1820.

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I do not like Wesley—putting aside all his exceeding self-confidence, he seems to me to have a black self will, a bitterness of religious passion, which is very unamiable. Whitefield seems far better.

Contrary to Newman's estimate, however, Wesley was an attractive, friendly man and an entertaining conversationalist.

Coke and Moore in their joint biography published in 1792 relate how Mrs. Hall, Wesley's sister, arranged a dinner for Wesley and Dr. Samuel Johnson at the latter's urgent request. Wesley laid aside two hours for the dinner and conversation, at the conclusion of which he arose and departed. Johnson demurred and complained to Mrs. Hall.

"Why, Doctor," said Mrs. Hall, "my brother has been with you two hours."

"Two hours, Madam!" he replied. "I could talk all day, and all night, too, with your brother."²

This side of Wesley is seldom pictured. We think of him as a severe person—preaching, riding, teaching, exhorting—living his life as "a noble monotony"; and we seldom see the man himself.

His artists have aided in deceiving us. They have followed the popular belief that he completely lacked a sense of humor, and they have accented his rigid asceticism rather than his attractiveness and charm. With the exception of Romney, one of whose original paintings of Wesley hangs in the Parkway Museum in Philadelphia, none have drawn the kindly lines and the humorous half-sardonic expression that must have marked his otherwise pious and intelligent features. Even Salisbury's famous work pictures Wesley as a severe, aloof high churchman; meticulous in dress, stern and forbidding in appearance.

In defense of the artists, it must be admitted they are partly right. Humor was not natural to the Wesley family. Certainly Wesley's famous Journal is no book of jokes. At times, however, it sparkles with a penetrating wit, and it is always good reading.

"I went to St. Ewe," he writes. "There was much struggling here at first; but the two gentlemen who occasioned it are now removed—one to London, the other into Eternity."³

"I took my leave of Newcastle, and about noon preached at Durham in a pleasant meadow, near the river's side. The congregation was large and wild enough, yet on a short time they were deeply attentive. Only

² Coke and Moore, *The Life of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., etc.*, second edition. London: G. Parame, 1792, p. 526.

³ *The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., etc.*, standard edition, ed. by Nehemiah Curnock. London: The Epworth Press, 1938, Vol. 3, p. 489.

three or four gentlemen put me in mind of a man at London, who was so gay and unconcerned while Dr. Sherlock was preaching concerning the Day of Judgment. One asked, 'Do you not hear what the Doctor says?' He answered, 'Yes, but I am not of his parish.'"⁴

During one of his tours of Cornwall, Wesley was accompanied by Michael Fenwick whom he describes as "an excellent groom, valet de chambre, nurse, and upon occasion, a tolerable preacher." Fenwick's chief failing was an overgrown sense of importance because of his association with the great evangelist. He was disappointed, moreover, that Wesley never mentioned him in the famous Journal he was issuing in regular installments. Wesley obliged him in the next section. "I left Epworth with great satisfaction, and about one preached at Clayworth. I think none was unmoved but Michael Fenwick, who fell fast asleep under an adjoining hayrick."⁵

In his *Anecdotes of the Wesleys*, the Rev. J. B. Wakeley relates how Wesley "was going along a narrow street, when a rude, low-bred fellow, who had no regard for virtue, station or gray hairs, ran against him and tried to throw him down, saying in an impudent manner, 'I never turn out for a fool.' Mr. Wesley, stepping aside, said, 'I always do,' and the fool passed on."⁶

On another occasion, while traveling on horseback, Wesley overtook another traveler, and they immediately began conversing.

He presently gave me to know what his opinions were, [writes Wesley] therefore I said nothing to contradict them. But that did not content him; he was quite uneasy to know whether I held the doctrine of the decrees as he did. But I told him over and over we had better keep to practical things, lest we should be angry with one another; and so we did for two miles, till he caught me unawares, and dragged me into the dispute before I knew where I was. He then grew warmer, and told me he believed I was rotten at the heart, and he supposed I was one of John Wesley's followers. I told him, no, I am John Wesley himself. Upon this he appeared as one who had unawares trodden on a snake, and would gladly have run away outright, but, being the better mounted of the two, [adds Wesley with sly humor] "I kept close to his side, and endeavored to show him his heart till he came into the street of Nottingham."⁷

Another delicious witticism is related in a footnote in the Curnock edition of Wesley's Journal. He had been visiting a Dr. Wilson, an Episcopal rector favorably disposed to Wesley whom the evangelist de-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 222.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 229.

⁶ Wakeley, J. B., *Anecdotes of the Wesleys: Illustrative of their Character and Personal History*, tenth edition. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1878, p. 200.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

scribes as a "man of very uncommon learning, particularly in the oriental tongues." One morning "shortly after family worship had been conducted by Wesley, Dr. Wilson said to him: 'My wife was so delighted with your prayer that she has been looking for it in the Prayer-book, but cannot find it. I wish you would point it out to me.' 'My dear brother,' said Wesley, 'that prayer came down from heaven, and I sent it up there again.'"⁸

One can almost hear Wesley chuckling in this brief passage from his *Thoughts on the Consecration of Churches and Burial Grounds*: "You say this is consecrated ground? So many feet broad, and so many long. But pray how deep is the consecrated ground?—Deep! What does that signify?—Oh a great deal. For if my grave be dug too deep, I may happen to get out of the consecrated ground. And who can tell what unhappy consequences may follow from this?"⁹

But for those who like their humor served with the subtlety of repressed laughter nothing is better than Wesley's introduction to his own English Dictionary, published in 1753, a year or two before the great work of Samuel Johnson.

I should add no more, [he writes in a closing paragraph] but that I have so often observed, the only way, according to modern taste, for any author to procure commendation to his book, is, vehemently to commend it himself. For want of this deference to the public, several excellent tracts, lately printed, but left to commend themselves by their intrinsic worth, are utterly unknown or forgotten; Whereas, if a writer of tolerable sense will but bestow a few violent encomiums on his own work; especially, if they are skilfully ranged in the title page; it will pass through six editions in a trice; The world being too complaisant to give the Gentleman the lie; and taking it for granted, he understands his own performance best.

In compliance, therefore, with the taste of the age, I add that this little Dictionary is not only the shortest and cheapest, but likewise, by many degrees, the most correct which is extant at this day. Many are the mistakes in all the other English Dictionaries which I have yet seen: Whereas I can truly say, I know of none in this: And I conceive the reader will believe me; for if I had, I should not have left it there. Use, then, this help, till you find a better.¹⁰

Wesley possessed a keener sense of humor than most people realize.

II

There is another side to Wesley's character that is often overlooked—his love for children. It is true that Wesley lacked any sound knowledge of child psychology. His school at Kingswood could hardly be looked

⁸ *The Journal*, ed. Curnock, Vol. 7, p. 503, note.

⁹ *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., etc.*, third edition, with the latest corrections of the author. London: John Mason, 1829-1831, Vol. 10, p. 510.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 14, p. 249.

upon as a guide for educators (a prize understatement of fact). He had heard too often that he who plays as a child will play as a man. Despite these failings, he loved children, and they knew it. He made it a practice, in later years, to keep his pockets full of bright coins to give to his boys and girls; and when children were a part of his congregation he never ignored them.

Dr. Leslie F. Church has written a delightful and illuminating chapter about this side of Wesley in his fascinating book, *The Early Methodist People*. He tells how Wesley when he was older, rather reluctantly, began riding in a chaise rather than on horseback. "It impressed the children, and 'Dave' Hirst of Morely, Leeds, remembered holding the horses, the chaise all painted yellow, but most of all the kindly man who sat within."¹¹

"The same old chaise calls up a more tender memory. Old Mrs. Hughes of Bath recalled that John Wesley used to order his carriage half an hour before he wanted it himself, so that the children might have a few minutes ride, as many at a time as the coach would hold."¹²

"Another little girl, Jane Hawkey, remembered his coming, an old man, to stay at her mother's house. The climax of his visit for her was the moment when he 'dandled her on his knee.'"¹³

That is all very heart-warming, signifying as it does that the old pamphleteer was a man, and a very approachable one. Nor was this love for children an attitude that developed in later years. He had always noticed and loved children. In Georgia, he and his friends established a Sunday School for boys and girls; and, while Robert Raikes is given the credit for beginning Sunday School work among children, the fact remains that long before Raikes started his work at Gloucester, schools and classes for children had been established in many Methodist societies.

At Bolton, moreover, Wesley preached his famous Children's Sermon in "a simple plain familiar style," using no words of more than two syllables.¹⁴ At Whitehaven he established a Junior Society Class, meeting with them again six years later and noticing "the same power was present at the meeting of the children."¹⁵ And Thomas Jackson writes, "For nothing was he so remarkable than his love to children. Often did he lay his hand upon them and bless them in the name of his great Master."¹⁶

¹¹ Church, Leslie F., *The Early Methodist People*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949, p. 240.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

The mystery, however, is why his love for children did not manifest itself in more practical ways. He must have been aware of the horrors of child labor in his generation. J. H. Whiteley in his penetrating study *Wesley's England* says, "In the (mine) pits boys and girls of five sometimes worked eighteen to twenty hours without coming up to the surface." And he records the testimony of "a woman from a brick and tile factory [who] said she made 2,000 tiles a day, the clay being brought to her by 2 little girls who had to climb with it out of a pit thirty feet deep and then carry it one hundred yards."¹⁷ Nor are these isolated cases. They are characteristic of that darkened era.

Not once did Wesley lift his voice against this vicious traffic. He took his pen to champion the cause of freedom, and his *Thoughts Upon Slavery* is a classic condemnation of this evil. But a practice like child labor which all but destroyed the body, narrowed the mind, and warped the souls of the children failed completely to arouse his anger or indignation. In this particular he was a son of the Eighteenth Century.

III

Another priceless item in my collection reflects Wesley, the lover. It is a rather battered copy of Wesley's extract from William Law's *Serious Call to a Holy Life*. I purchased it with several other items from Pickering and Chatto in London. It cost me a few dollars, but I would not part with it for several hundred. It is both a satisfying and a maddening item. Maddening because it is incomplete, satisfying because of its purported association.

It belonged at one time to Luke Tyerman, the great nineteenth-century authority on John Wesley. His large three-volume life of Wesley will always be a mine of valuable information for every subsequent biographer. In his bold handwriting, which I instantly recognized, he had written on an inserted page:

This book originally belonged to John Wesley's sweetheart, the celebrated Grace Murray. The fly-leaf bore her autograph, with the date, 1747—but it has been destroyed at the bookbinders, while the volume was being repaired.

On the inside cover someone else made this notation:

"No doubt this book was given to her by J. Wesley."

¹⁷ Whiteley, J. H., *Wesley's England, A Survey of XVIIIth Century Social Conditions*. London: The Epworth Press, 1945, p. 132.

The whole story of Wesley's love for Grace Murray is a poignant tragedy. She was the widow of a sea captain and a Methodist. Wesley respected her because of her capable, efficient management of the Methodist House at Newcastle. She was a distinct asset also in addressing meetings for women, and she accompanied Wesley's party on more than one of their tours. Wesley proposed marriage to her and understood that after he returned from his next tour she would marry him.

There were, however, several difficulties. Mrs. Murray had been courted by one of Wesley's preachers—John Bennet. Charles Wesley, moreover, was greatly opposed to his brother's marriage. Bishop McConnell describes Charles' part in this tragedy in his usual laconic but humorous style.

For one reason or another Charles did not wish John to marry. Charles never had a high estimate of John's ability to select intimates. He once made the not over-brotherly remark that John had been created for the benefit of fools and imposters. Evidently, he thought of himself as the spring of wisdom created to supply all John's lack of wisdom. As soon as Charles heard of the possibility of his brother's marrying Grace Murray, he took to horse, dashed off the miles to where Grace was at the moment, and said something to her which caused her forthwith to marry John Bennet. What Charles actually said is not known, but he left the impression on Grace Murray that everything was off—that John would not marry her. The uncertainty is whether Charles acted in good faith. Whether he did or not is not especially important. He did not apparently know what he was about. Yet he may have acted with a sound instinct, though he was dealing in affairs which were not strictly any of his business.¹⁸

The effect upon John Wesley himself is revealed in a manuscript in the British Museum. Curnock in his definitive edition of Wesley's Journal outlines the entire episode and includes several facsimiles of this paper.¹⁹ It is endorsed in the following lines:

This Book a Diary of John Wesley, [the words "a Diary" are blotted out, and 'An Account of an Armour' is substituted] the chief of the Methodist Sect—copied by an Amanuensis—, was given to me by Noah Vazille of Stratford in Co. Essex, whose mother had been married to the said J. W. and that the verses at the latter end are besides separate in this book; in the handwriting of the said J. W. Quod Attestor.

Naphthaly Hart, N. Pub. Lond.

June 4, 1788.

I studied this manuscript carefully when I was in London. It is clearly written in John Wesley's meticulous hand, and in his chaste, classical style.

¹⁸ McConnell, Francis J., *John Wesley*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1939, p. 221.

¹⁹ *The Journal*, ed. Curnock, Vol. 3, pp. 417-422.

It is a deeply moving document. An exact transcript of it was published in 1910 by J. Augustin Leger under the title, *John Wesley's Last Love*. Bishop McConnell says the account is "a straightforward putting of the case which commands our respect and admiration quite as much as anything Wesley wrote. There is thorough genuineness of feeling, no weak sentimentalism, deep disappointment."

What Wesley wrote in the British Museum manuscript, referred to above, and reprinted in the Curnock edition of the *Journal*, bears out the Bishop's appraisal.

I felt no murmuring thought but deep distress. I felt the loss both to me and the people, which I did not expect could ever be repaired. I tried to sleep, but I tried in vain; for sleep was fled from my eyes. I was in a burning fever, and, more and more thoughts still crowding into my mind, I perceived if this continued long it would effect my senses. But God took that matter into His hand, giving me, on a sudden, sound and quiet sleep.²⁰

The tragedy, to Wesley, must have been the greater because it was the second time he had experienced a disappointment in love. Slightly more than a decade before, while in Georgia, his romantic relationship to Sophia Hopkey came to an unfortunate conclusion. This, however, was Wesley's own fault. While most biographers disparage Sophia Hopkey, the entire story of her relation to Wesley reveals her as an intelligent, beautiful young woman, far above the average in morality and religious interest, who would have made Wesley a very fitting companion and helpmate. Her story has never been sympathetically written, but when it is, it will present a woman of charm and understanding who captivated Wesley, much against his will, by the sheer goodness, beauty and intelligence of her personality.

I say much "against his will," because Wesley on coming to Georgia had planned an ascetic life, with rigid rules for fasting and prayer, and from which any intimate association with a woman or any thought of marriage was strictly excluded.

Henry Moore says in his biography:

[Wesley] was at that time an admirer of the Mystic Writers, and though he had not embraced the peculiar sentiments of those who were grossly unscriptural . . . yet he still believed that many of the Mystics were, to use his own words, "the best explainers of the Gospel of Christ," chiefly because they taught the necessity of crucifixion to the world." . . . What wonder . . . that he should accede to a proposal [going to Georgia] which seemed at one stroke to cut him off from both the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. 3, p. 439.

smiling and the frowning world, and to enable him to be "dead to the world" and "crucified with Christ"—blessings which he *then* thought could be only thus secured.²¹

Wesley's resolutions, however, were overthrown by an eighteen-year-old girl—one of the most remarkable women he was ever to know. His description of her in the Curnock edition of his Journal pictures a woman in whom all the best virtues of her sex were combined with intelligence, beauty and deep sincerity. It must be read in its entirety to be appreciated. His concluding lines show her as a "friend to human kind. To whomever was distressed she was all sympathy, tenderness, compassion. But to anyone she particularly called a friend her behaviour can only be conceived, not expressed. Such was the spirit of gratitude that ran through it; such the softness, the sweetness of every part of it; yet still preserving in all that yielding easiness, a modesty pure as light."

Such was the woman, [adds Wesley] according to my closest observation, of whom I now began to be much afraid. My desire and design still was to live single; but how long it would continue I knew not. . . . the time she was at my house was spent thus. Immediately after breakfast we all joined in Hicke's Devotions. She was then alone till eight. I taught her French between eight and nine, and at nine we joined in prayer again. She then read or wrote French till ten. In the evening I read to her and some others select parts of Ephrem Syrus, and afterwards Dean Young's and Mr. Reeve's *Sermons*. We always concluded with a Psalm.

This I began with a single eye. But it was not long before I found it a task too hard for me to preserve the same intention with which I began, in such intimacy of conversation as ours was.²²

Most men in this dilemma would have been grateful for the opportunity to wed such a girl. Wesley did the stupidest thing imaginable—he consulted any and all of his acquaintances who would listen to him, asking their advice. The final blunder came when he and his friend Delamotte cast lots to guide Wesley in his decision.

Delamotte was the poorest possible advisor. According to Arnold Lunn, "Delamotte worshipped Wesley and was certainly jealous of Sophy. He loathed the possibility of her breaking up the Holy (and celibate) Club, and he therefore did his best to discourage Wesley's intention."

He finally urged Wesley to decide one way or another without delay. "Wesley decided to invoke the decision of God by drawing lots. . . . Wesley made three lots. On the first was written "Marry," on the second "Think not of it this year," and on the third "Think of it no more."

²¹ Moore, Henry, *The Life of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M., etc., in which are included the life of his Brother, the Rev. Charles Wesley, A.M., etc., and memoirs of their Family*, in two volumes. London: 1824, p. 246.

²² *The Journal*, ed. Curnock, Vol. 1, pp. 291-294.

"We prayed to God to give a perfect lot." Delamotte rose, put out a shaking hand, drew a piece of paper toward him, opened it and in a voice tense with emotion read out the words, "Think of it no more."

"But Delamotte was taking no chances. He insisted that they should draw again to decide whether Wesley should ever hold converse with Sophy again. Delamotte's luck was in. 'Only in the presence of Mr. Delamotte,' replied the oracle, a reply which gave Mr. Delamotte every satisfaction."²³

It is not surprising that Sophy, hurt and bewildered by all this hocus pocus, finally gave her hand to a more reasonable though less worthy suitor.

Wesley's suffering when he heard the news was intense.

I came home, [he writes in his Journal] and went into my garden. I walked up and down, seeking rest but finding none. From the beginning of my life to this hour I had not known one such as this. God let loose my inordinate affection upon me, and the poison thereof drank up my spirit. I was as stupid as if half awake, and yet in the sharpest pain I ever felt. To see her no more: that thought was as the piercings of a sword; it was not to be borne, nor shaken off. I was weary of the world, of light, of life. Yet one way remained, to seek to God—a very present help in time of trouble. And I did seek after God, but I found Him not. I forsook Him before: now He forsook me. I could not pray. Then indeed the snares of death were about me; the pains of hell overtook me. Yet I struggled for life; and though I had neither words nor thoughts, I lifted up my eyes to the Prince that is highly exalted, and supplied the place of them as I could: and about four o'clock He so far took the cup from me that I drank so deeply of it no more.²⁴

This is a far cry from the meticulous self-possessed personality we always associate with the name of John Wesley. This is his human side which is seldom seen and not often pictured by biographers or historians.

It is ironic and yet not unexpected that when years later John Wesley finally married, he was unhappy. He did not marry an eighteen-year-old girl, whom he had learned to love and who was always compliant to his will. He married a mature woman who was a widow, after only a brief courtship. She had nursed him while he was sick.

The reasons for the friction between them are too numerous to relate here. The first breach between the two came over the inconvenience of travel. Bishop McConnell says:

Mrs. Wesley did not like the riding on horseback, and the dirty roads, and the rainy weather, and the poor beds, and the ill-dressed food at the inns; and Wesley did not like finding fault about such matters. In a letter which has recently come to light Wesley said that he had had the itch more than a hundred times—

²³ Lunn, Arnold, *John Wesley*. New York: The Dial Press, 1929, p. 77.

²⁴ *The Journal*, ed. Curnock, Vol. 1, p. 334.

an item of record which may explain Mrs. Wesley's feelings about the hardships of travel. Mrs. Wesley, however, did try to keep up the Wesley pace till she broke down under it. For a woman well into middle age, accustomed to a more placid order of living, she did wonderfully well.²⁵

Added to this was her insane jealousy of Wesley's relations to other women—all very spiritual and platonic, but none the less intimate. The fact is that, married or not, Wesley was human enough to enjoy the company of women, especially women who openly adored him. Mrs. Wesley did not approve, which is understandable.

She finally left Wesley, which was a mistake. She returned to him on several occasions, but made matters worse by opening his correspondence and even interpolating remarks in his letters that were definitely indiscreet. She eventually left him for good, and Wesley was wise enough to let her go. He wrote in his Journal, *Non eam reliqui; non dimisi; non revocabo.* "I have not left her; I have not sent her away; I will not recall her."²⁶ He possibly breathed a sigh of relief that the whole thing was over.

IV

These experiences, however, lead us to another side of Wesley's personality not generally known—his moods of disappointment and depression. While he was an unusually placid and cheerful person, he was affected at times by a deep sense of discouragement and despair.

In June, 1766, for example, many years after his Aldersgate experience, he wrote a letter to his brother, Charles, which follows in part, those sections in parentheses being in cipher intelligible only to Charles himself:

I do not feel the wrath of God abiding on me, nor can I believe it does. And yet (this is the mystery. I do not love God. I never did.) Therefore (I never) believed in the Christian sense of the word. Therefore (I am only an honest heathen, a proselyte of the Temple, one of the God fearers). And yet to be so employed of God! and so hedged in that I can get neither forward nor backward! Surely there never was such an instance before from the beginning of the world! (If I ever have had) that *faith* it would not be so strange. . . . (I have no) direct witness, I do not say that (I am a child of God), but of anything invisible or eternal.

And yet I dare not preach otherwise than I do, either concerning faith, or love, or justification, or perfection. And yet I find rather an increase than a decrease of zeal for the whole work of God and every part of it. I am borne along, I know not how that I can't stand still. . . .²⁷

The letter is not a hasty or careless production. It is written with a logical cogency that implies deep thought and sincere concern. Through-

²⁵ McConnell, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

²⁶ *The Journal*, ed. Curnock, Vol. 5, p. 400.

²⁷ For a helpful discussion of this letter see McConnell, *op. cit.*, chapter 7, particularly pp. 210ff.

out his life Wesley must have been dogged, at times, by a sense of uncertainty and depression which he revealed not even to his most intimate associates, but which he made known to his brother Charles.

It is a human emotion, shared by many, and it is unfortunate that this letter to Charles was not made public as soon as it was written. It would have been a decided help to other Methodists to know that even John Wesley experienced his spiritual depressions, and that there is in each one of us a dying down of the emotional glow. A mountaintop experience is not the daily norm of the Christian life. The early Methodists were often troubled because they did not enjoy a constant buoyant experience of faith—forgetting, or not knowing, that this recession of emotional gladness marked the experience of many great saints, including their own leader, John Wesley himself.

It is not my purpose to trace the possible causes or the type of depression which seized hold of Wesley. Some psychiatrists would feel he needed more time for relaxation, a luxury Wesley never permitted himself. Others might see his abnormal manner of living, his loneliness, his constant travelling under the least favorable of circumstances, or his uncertain health, as the foundation for his darkness and despair. My purpose here is not to diagnose his trouble, but to admit it. Few men, whether saint or sinner, are entirely free from depressions like those which laid hold of Wesley, and it is good that we know it. It helps when we face our own dark night of the soul. Especially when we remember that having passed through these depressions, they went on to more significant spiritual victories.

V

But of all the letters Wesley wrote, the one I would most want to own is a letter of intercession for a Methodist who had evidently sinned as well as fallen into financial difficulties. Telford, in his eight-volume edition of Wesley's Letters makes this notation: "William Shent, the Methodist barber, was in financial straits, forsaken by old friends. Wesley stood by him nobly, as this letter shows. Charles Wesley writes to his brother on April 23, 'I shall be happy to hear you have saved poor William Shent.'"²⁸

Bishop McConnell says, "I wish to express my gratitude for the attention Alfred Lunn has drawn to a letter which seems to me to be one of the highest notes Wesley ever struck. If I were to think one last thought

²⁸ *The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.*, ed. by John Telford, B.A., standard edition, London: The Epworth Press, July 1931, Vol. 6, p. 333.

about Wesley, or say one last word about him, I should prefer above all else to read the letter which I here print in full.”²⁹

To the Society at Keighley

London, January 11, 1779

I have a few questions which I desire may be proposed to the Society at Keighley.

Who was the occasion of the Methodist preachers first setting foot in Leeds? William Shent.

Who received John Nelson into his house at his first coming thither? William Shent.

Who was it that invited me and received me when I came? William Shent.

Who was it that stood by me while I preached in the street with stones flying on every side? William Shent.

Whose word did God bless for many years in an eminent manner? William Shent's.

By whom were many children now in Paradise begotten in the Lord, and how many now alive? William Shent.

Who is he that is now ready to be broken up and turned into the street? William Shent.

And does nobody care for this? William Shent fell into sin and was publicly expelled from the Society; but must he also be stoned? Must he with his gray hairs and all his children be without a place to lay his head? Can you suffer this? O tell it not in Gath! Where is gratitude? Where is compassion? Where is Christianity? Where is humanity? Where is concern for the cause of God? Who is a wise man among you? Who is concerned for the Gospel? Who has put on the bowels of mercy? Let him rise and exert himself in this matter. You here, all arise as one man and roll away the reproach. Let us set him on his feet once more. It may save both him and his family. But what we do, let it be done quickly. I am, dear brethren

Your affectionate brother,
John Wesley.

This letter, especially the closing line—“Your affectionate brother, John Wesley”—speaks more eloquently than I can write of the attitude of Wesley toward his fellow man. This is the human side of John Wesley which to me is more significant than the doctrines he embraced or the sermons he preached. It was for this reason, I believe, that he was loved by his friends, and, in the end, respected by his enemies. This is the secret of his hold upon the Methodist people throughout his long life. To them and to everyone he remained always an “affectionate brother.”

²⁹ McConnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-349.

Once Again: John the Baptist

MORTON S. ENSLIN

I

NOW, SOME OF THE JEWS thought that the destruction of Herod's [i.e., Antipas'] army came from God, and that very justly, as a punishment of what he did against John, who was called the Baptist, for Herod slew him, who was a good man, and commanded the Jews to exercise virtue, both as to righteousness toward one another, and piety toward God, and so to come to baptism; for that the washing with water would be acceptable to him, if they made use of it, not in order to the putting away of some sins, but for the purification of the body; supposing still that the soul was thoroughly purified beforehand by righteousness. Now, when many others came in crowds about him, for they were greatly moved by hearing his words, Herod, who feared lest the great influence John had over the people might put it into his power and inclination to raise a rebellion (for they seemed ready to do anything he should advise), thought it best, by putting him to death, to prevent any mischief he might cause, and not bring himself into difficulties by sparing a man who might make him repent of it when it should be too late. Accordingly he was sent a prisoner, out of Herod's suspicious temper, to Machaerus, the castle I before mentioned, and was there put to death.¹

With these words Josephus introduces and dismisses the man who has long been considered the author—better said, the central figure—of the first chapter of the Christian saga. To the uncritical reader, accustomed to accepting the Gospels as presenting essentially matter-of-fact history, this brief paragraph seems doubly surprising. First, it entirely omits the point which in the Gospel picture is all-important, *viz.*, John's function as the forerunner of his greater successor, Jesus; second, in contrast to the romantic and sensational picture of John's execution, we have in Josephus a very terse and sober bare mention of it.

It is the contention of this paper that the paragraph in Josephus has not been edited or altered in either respect but is good, solid historical reporting, and that the more familiar picture in our Gospels is due to early Christian attempts to bring this figure into a relationship with Jesus which in sober fact did not exist. And by anticipation it may be briefly remarked that this attempt would seem to have been prompted by at least two

¹ Josephus, *Antt.* 18, 5, 2.

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desires: first, to rid themselves of an embarrassing rival by incorporating him in the Christian picture; second, to fulfill the prophecy of Malachi and thus silence Jewish criticism that the Christian claim that the "great and terrible day of the Lord" was at hand was impossible since the divinely appointed precursor had not appeared.

Of the early life of John—as of Jesus—nothing is known. The story of his birth in the lovely chapter in Luke, like the not dissimilar story of the birth of Jesus, would seem the product of later imagination and evaluation, seeking to fill in the intriguing hidden years.

In our four Gospels we have four seemingly consecutive attempts at rewriting the story, with a progressive subordination of the figure of John. In the Markan account, repeated by Matthew and Luke, he appears spectacularly in the wilderness with a message of doom: Repent, be baptized; if you don't, it will be the worse for you. A catastrophe is coming; the axe is already at the root of the tree. Only those bringing forth good fruit will be spared.

In Mark Jesus is represented as one among those listening to this message with its demand for baptism for remission of sins. Like others, he hearkens and is baptized, but there is no hint that John recognizes in Jesus what Mark skillfully causes his readers to sense, namely, that Jesus is the greater successor whom John is foretelling.

In Matthew there are several important changes. John recognizes Jesus and would dissuade him, sensing his own inferiority; but Jesus demands that the act be performed. Quietly Matthew removes the embarrassing words "unto remission of sins" (*εἰς ἀφεσιν ἀμαρτιῶν*),² but not through inadvertence or "to save space." Precisely these words are added by him to the Markan account of the Last Supper.³ It is Jesus' death, not John's baptism, that is "for remission of sins." Then the account continues with the significant change of word by the heavenly voice to "*This is my beloved son*," no longer as in Mark, "*Thou art . . .*," for Jesus has already clearly shown that he is aware of his proper rank.

In Luke this development is still farther advanced. In addition to the slight, but skilled, differentiation between the baptism of Jesus and of the others—"Now it came to pass, when all the people were baptized, that, Jesus also having been baptized . . ."⁴—the additional note is struck. Even before birth they had met; when the two pregnant mothers met,

² Mark 1:4. (Quotations are from ASV.)

³ Matt. 26:28.

⁴ Luke 3:21.

John had leaped in his mother's womb.⁵ Luke is surely unconcerned here with prenatal physiology; what he is saying is, before birth John had recognized and revered his greater successor.

In the Fourth Gospel the story is more fully developed. John is now reduced to a mere voice.⁶ The story of the baptism is utterly recast and is referred to only in retrospect. Mark's dove is present, but not as a witness for Jesus; rather it is to indicate to John the identity of the greater one to whom he is bearing witness: "I have beheld the spirit descending as a dove out of heaven; and it abode upon him."⁷

Thus seemingly before our eyes John is transformed from an independent preacher into the conscious forerunner of Jesus. It is surely proper to raise the question if in this transformation there has not been a similar transformation of his message. It is to be noted that in Matthew's account the message of John and of Jesus is identical: "Repent ye; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."⁸ Nor should other striking identities be overlooked. The phrases and metaphors in John's "preaching of repentance"⁹ and in Jesus' words¹⁰ are worthy of thoughtful attention. The common contemptuous refutation of the claim, "We have Abraham to our father,"¹¹ should also be noted. In this connection the common reference to the responsibility of the one having two garments or sufficient food¹² is also not to be neglected.

I would go a step farther—to some probably a long step. If the contention of many sober critics—to me highly probable—is sound, that the term "Son of Man," while constantly on Jesus' lips, was never intended by him to be applied to himself, but rather to the coming supernatural figure, destined to bring the present age to a close and to preside over the immediately impending final judgment; and that he, Jesus, had been quickened by God to appear as the prophet of this final fulfillment of God's long-awaited promise—if this be granted, is it too daring to consider whether this word of Jesus is not the real source of the Gospel tradition, so unnoticed by Josephus, that John's distinctive message was the prediction of *his* coming greater successor?

Once the disciples have regained their stability, following the dreadful

⁵ Luke 1:41, 44.

⁶ John 1:23.

⁷ John 1:32.

⁸ Matt. 3:2; 4:17.

⁹ Matt. 3:7f.

¹⁰ Matt. 12:33f; 23:32f.

¹¹ Matt. 3:9; John 8:33, 39.

¹² Luke 3:11; cf. Matt. 5:40-42; 25:35f.

day on Calvary, and once the tremendous impress which Jesus had made upon them proves too great to be destroyed by his tragic death, and they begin, at first very simply, that structure which was to loom so large, Christology—the identification of Jesus in answer to the never-ceasing query, “Who then was he?”—it is not surprising that the earliest identification takes place: How blind our eyes, how deaf our ears! He was speaking of himself. He is the Son of Man of whom he so constantly spoke. He is now in heaven and is destined to reappear at any moment to consummate the task he had begun while he was with us.

Thus the most original picture of Jesus—the prophet like unto Moses, raised up and inspired by God to proclaim the impending day, and thus in essence himself the forerunner of his greater successor, the angelic Son of Man—tends to clash with the steadily developing theology and to be dropped from the account. In consequence I would hazard the guess that the real source of the Gospel picture of John heralding a greater successor destined to baptize the nation in fire is actually a reflection of Jesus’ heralding the advent of the Final Judge expected momentarily to appear for this precise purpose.

II

Thus I would suggest that on the basis of a critical weighing of the evidence—both that of the Gospels and Josephus—there is very little ground for the frequently repeated modern contention that Jesus was started by John, became, so to speak, his pupil, did not begin an independent mission until after his teacher’s arrest, and substantially reproduced his preceptor’s message. Instead I would suggest the hypothesis that their paths did not cross and that little or nothing of actual fact regarding the enigmatic John is preserved in the late and completely rewritten accounts which we have in our Gospels; for eventually John was brought into the Christian picture, if not into the Christian fold, and in an increasingly subordinate capacity, and on his lips an essentially “Christian” message was placed.

Nor are the reasons for the shift of this independent preacher to the self-effacing voice hard to see. That John was a hindrance or obstacle to the early Christian preachers appears to me too clear to need extended argument. Certainly it is one of the most conspicuous purposes of the Fourth Gospel to subordinate him. To the insistent “He must increase, but I must decrease,”¹³ is certainly to be added the crystal-clear self-subordina-

¹³ John 3:30.

tion in John 1:19-28. Once again the critic can scarcely fail to hear the word, "The lady doth protest too much, methinks."

We may not safely overlook, moreover, the few but thorny references to disciples of John in the later record. It is not easy to see why, if the common picture be accepted, these disciples had continued after the greater successor had been pointed out. Why did they not flock to his leadership? Instead, we have such frequent references as: "And John's disciples and the Pharisees were fasting . . .,"¹⁴ "Teach us to pray, even as John also taught his disciples . . .,"¹⁵ the mention of the two disciples whom John sent to Jesus from prison,¹⁶ not to mention the references to their continued work in the account in the Fourth Gospel.¹⁷ Certainly all this seems no sign of any defection to the greater one. Nor should the twelve men whom Paul is reported to have met and straightened out in Ephesus, who knew only the baptism of John,¹⁸ be forgotten; or the presence, often exaggerated as it has been, of the Sabaeans in Iraq, still doughty followers of John and far from friendly to their local Christian neighbors.

To these references to the continuance, in some form at least, of the Baptist's movement should be added the evidence of Josephus as to its significance and the indication, evident in the word now attributed to Jesus, of the amazing impression which John had made upon many in the nation.¹⁹ These all suggest a far from flash-in-the-pan movement, but one which seemingly made a great impress and might well have diverted attention from the disciples of the other martyred leader.

Furthermore the famous "testimony of Jesus to John" is on record, with its concluding word, "yet he that is but little in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."²⁰ That these words indicate a still existent cleavage between the two groups does not seem to me possible of denial. Nor am I as convinced as are most critics that the sweeping word attributed to Jesus, "All that came before me are thieves and robbers,"²¹ was not intended by the evangelist who penned it to include this figure, too.

Thus the evidence appears to me to warrant the hypothesis that John has been deliberately incorporated into the later picture to get rid of an

¹⁴ Mark 2:18.

¹⁵ Luke 11:1.

¹⁶ Matt. 11:2; Luke 7:19.

¹⁷ John 3:23ff; 4:1.

¹⁸ Acts 19:1-7; cf. 18:25.

¹⁹ Mark 11:29-33 and parallels.

²⁰ Matt. 11:1; Luke 7:28.

²¹ John 10:8.

embarrassing rival in a way common to the religions of antiquity, and of which Osiris and Anubis, Gilgamesh and Engidu, are clear but by no means solitary examples.

But in addition to the not unnatural desire to be rid of an embarrassing rival there would seem to me evidence of another, this time positive, reason for the incorporation of John in the Christian picture: namely, to undercut Jewish opposition based on a seemingly unfulfilled prophetic demand. In this connection the story told in Mark of the descent from the mount of Transfiguration²² is highly significant. The query of the disciples, "How is it that the scribes say that Elijah must first come?" and Jesus' reply, "Elijah indeed cometh first, and restoreth all things," make perfectly clear the embarrassment faced by early Christians in the face of the Jewish reference to the word of Malachi: "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and terrible day of Jehovah come."²³

Justin Martyr, in the middle of the second century, bears evidence to this same Jewish contention of the fatal obstacle to the Christian claim, the seeming failure of Elijah to appear.²⁴ It is unnecessary in this essay to amplify Justin's argument that here we have conclusive evidence of two coming, and that Elijah *in persona* will appear to prelude the second and still future coming, but that his spirit was in John at the time of the first coming. As often, Justin's reasoning is not such as to commend itself to modern interpreters, but his words do indicate Jewish opposition despite Christian counterclaims to the essential fulfillment of the prophet's word.

Certainly a sober reading of Mark 9:9-13 cannot fail to see that in this account it is clearly suggested that John had not been regarded as Jesus' forerunner, that is, as Elijah, and that in Jesus' reply the identification is for the first time being made. It should also be pointed out that in the concluding word of this section has been detected a problem which has long worried interpreters: "But I say unto you, that Elijah is come, and they have also done unto him whatsoever they would, even as it is written of him."²⁵ It is commonly suggested that here is a seeming reference to an account of Elijah's death at the hands of his enemies, in striking contrast to the biblical account, and that the statement is thus at best very obscure, if not textually corrupt. I would suggest that the obscurity lies in the common failure to read the word as Mark seemingly intended. The clause, "and they have also done unto him whatsoever they would," is apparently

²² Mark 9:9-13.

²³ Mal. 4:5f.

²⁴ Justin M., *Dialogue* 40.

²⁵ Mark 9:13.

parenthetical, leaving the concluding word, "even as it is written of him," to apply not to the parenthesis but to the word, "Elijah is come"; that is, "But I say unto you, that Elijah is come (and they have also done unto him whatsoever they would) as it is written of him."

That this is not arbitrary toying with the Markan text to make it mean what a later critic wants it to mean is indicated by a perfect parallel at the end of this Gospel. The common rendering of Mark 16:7 is surely wrong, for it makes the angel quote Jesus in a quite unreported word. There is no reference in the earlier pages to any word of Jesus that his disciples will see him in resurrected form in Galilee, but there is his word: ". . . after I am raised up, I will go before you into Galilee."²⁶ Surely Mark's word here is to be read: "He goeth before you into Galilee (it is *there*, not here, that you shall see him) as he said unto you." There are many places in this so easily labeled "simplest Gospel" where the author—not nearly so "simple" as many simple people appear to think—seems to have expected more from his readers than they have commonly been able to produce.

With this as a clue, the other word of Jesus is perfectly clear. Elijah has come even as it was written he should, and men have done to him (in the person of John) what they were anxious but unable to do in the days of Ahab.²⁷ Certainly this touch in Mark reflects the lurid tale he has told of the tragic death of this second Elijah at the hands of the equally vicious and more successful second Jezebel.²⁸

Thus it appears to me far from improbable that the incorporation of John, originally an utterly distinct and independent wilderness preacher, into the Christian picture as the divinely sent forerunner of his greater successor, is due to various causes, two of which were: first, the desire to be rid of an embarrassing rival and to realize a consequent merging of the two movements; and second, the desire to still opposition raised by the traditional interpretation of the concluding word in the rolls of the prophets.

III

To be sure, this is hypothesis; but it may be fairly said, so is the other view, namely, that the similarities are to be explained by reversing the situation and seeing Jesus as the docile early disciple of John. This latter hypothesis has been frequently repeated with an ever-increasing assurance but with no new evidence. To the contention that the latter view

²⁶ Mark 14:28.

²⁷ The Greek in this clause is self-evident in its deft shift from the aorist, "they did" (*ἐποίησαν*) to the conative imperfect, "they wanted to (but were unable to) do" (*θέλοντο*).

²⁸ Mark 6:17-29.

would at least tend to explain what started Jesus, drew him into his later role—an argument which would have scandalized earlier investigators, ancient and modern alike—it may surely be remarked, that if this is so imperative, it but thrusts the problem one stage farther back, with the equally thorny question, What started John? Perhaps without realizing their aid at this point, some of the more vociferous interpreters of the Dead Sea Scrolls are now easily answering—but, of course, with no slightest shred of evidence or even sober probability—that John was an Essene who had been quickened into all sorts of prophetic fervor in the monastery at Khirbet Qumran, where they seem to feel themselves so amazingly at home. In contrast to this somewhat bedizened newly rediscovered identification, the hypothesis I have suggested would seem to me at least to possess the merit of seeking to explain materials and problems actually in hand instead of inventing the materials necessary for the resultant proof.

Thus, as I see it, the Gospel stories, including that of the baptism of Jesus by John—this latter singularly difficult in the face of Jesus' seeming utter silence about the so-important rite until after his death—may be soberly and plausibly explained although the tangents of the two prophets never crossed. The question recorded in Matthew and Luke as rising in John's mind, now that he is imprisoned, "Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?"²⁹ need not be regarded as a cooling of John's ardor now that he has fallen on evil days—a solution always awkward to orthodoxy, even if beloved by the psychiatrists and other fascinated probers of the subliminal—but rather as a halfway step in the rapprochement of the two originally completely distinct movements. It need not be thought that John was brought into the Christian picture at one fell swoop.

Once John is in the Christian picture it is easy to see the rise of the legend regarding his arrest and death. It is surely no longer necessary to argue about the many historical slips in the basic Markan account of that event: Herodias was not the wife of Philip³⁰ but of another son of Herod the Great, Herod (not called Herod Philip, as earlier harmonizers insisted) by another of the father's wives, Mariamne, daughter of Simon; Philip was the tetrarch of the territory to the north and east of the Sea of Galilee and husband of Salome, here depicted as the dancing girl. Since John was (certainly) imprisoned at Machaerus, at the southern tip of the Peraea, and since (presumably) Herod's birthday party was held in his capital, Tiberias, it must have been a pretty long dancing party to allow the messenger to

²⁹ Matt. 11:3; Luke 7:19.

³⁰ Mark 6:17.

make the necessary 175-mile round trip. Nor does the casual promise of "half my kingdom" seem too realistic in the mouth of a Roman governor—for that is what Antipas really was—tipsy though he may well have been. But it is strongly reminiscent of the promise to Esther³¹ after Vashti has refused to do what the daughter of Herodias so willingly did. Nor again does the picture of Antipas terrified, or even greatly disturbed, at the criticism of his marital morals seem too realistic. Had Herod or any of his sons been particularly thin-skinned in that respect, their lives must indeed have been troubled.

In contrast to these difficulties—and those mentioned are far from exhaustive—the sober account by Josephus that Antipas feared the results of the popular movement which John had produced and promptly sought to stop it awakens far more confidence. But in Christian eyes, once John was in the picture, such an explanation would have been far from acceptable. Always aware of the danger of being charged with subversive tendencies—a "kingdom" implied a "king," and that was dynamite despite persistent explanations of what sort of king and kingdom they were preaching; already too many of their number had been executed by Rome as troublemakers—it is not surprising that with the Elijah-Jezebel story before their eyes they found this other explanation far more attractive: a second Elijah perishing because of his moral integrity at the hands of an even more formidable modern Jezebel.

Nor is it to be overlooked that, were a precise parallel to be wanted, the story chronicled by Dio Cassius of an event which occurred in Rome in A.D. 75, about the time and place in which this our earliest Gospel was being produced, was at hand:

Berenice was at the height of her power and consequently came to Rome with her brother Agrippa. The latter was granted praetorial honors, while she lived in the palace and cohabited with Titus. She expected to be married to him and acted as his wife in every way. But he, perceiving that the Romans were displeased at this situation, sent her away; for all sorts of rumors were being noised about. At this time, too, some sophists of the cynic school contrived to get into the city. First came Diogenes into the theatre when it was full of men and denounced them in a long and abusive speech; for this he was flogged. Heras followed him, and showing no greater intent of being obedient, uttered many senseless yelpings in a genuine cynic [i.e., dog-like] wise; for this behavior he was beheaded.³²

I would not press unduly this parallel, interesting and suggestive though it appears to me to be. I would conclude, however, that the stories

³¹ Esther 5:3.

³² Dio Cassius, *Hist. Rom.* lxvi, 15.

we have about John, regardless of their value for an understanding of later Christianity and its problems, throw far less light than has often been imagined upon the one popularly supposed to have designated and quickened his greater successor.

History and Theology in the Synoptic Gospels

S. MACLEAN GILMOUR

I

EARLY IN THE NINETEENTH century two methods of interpreting the Gospels vied with one another. The supernaturalists held that everything in the Gospels was fact because it was supernatural fact. The rationalists held that everything in the Gospels was fact because it could be rationalized by proper exegesis. In his *Life of Jesus*, published in 1835, David Friedrich Strauss attempted to resolve this conflict by the application of Hegelian dialectic. According to him the Gospels are neither the record of supernatural fact nor of rational fact. They are mythological.

Strauss did not dispute the historicity of Jesus, but he did reduce the historical residue in the Gospels to microscopic proportions, and his work paved the way for more radical successors. In his *A Critique of the History of the Synoptists*, published in 1841, Bruno Bauer carried Strauss's ideas to their logical conclusion. The letters of Paul are pseudonymous products of the second century. The Fourth Gospel is a theological treatise with no historical content. The Gospel of Mark, the basis on which both Matthew and Luke are constructed, is likewise the product of theological reflection. The figure of Jesus is the creation of faith. Christianity had its origin in Rome or in Alexandria as a second-century synthesis of Stoic ethics and Jewish messianic hopes.

There were various later versions of Bauer's thesis. In 1904 Albert Kalthoff, a German pastor distressed by the dominant individualism of the German Christianity of his day, attempted a Marxist interpretation of Christian origins. The Christian religion was a socio-religious movement of the underprivileged masses in Rome during the second century of our era. The oppressed proletariat combined the best of contemporary ethical idealism with Jewish messianic expectations, read its own experience of exploitation and persecution into the past, and produced its literature to

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give that projection a semblance of historical reality. The figure of the suffering, dying, and rising Christ is a myth of the Roman proletarian experience of suffering and martyrdom. In the same year, 1904, Peter Jensen tried to account for the origin of the Christ myth as a Jewish version of the Babylonian Gilgamesh epic. In 1911 B. W. Smith attempted to explain primitive Christianity as the development of a Jewish cult of a dying and rising deity, modeled on such Oriental prototypes as those of Attis, Serapis, and Mithra.

In his *Christ Myth*, published first in 1910 and again in a revised edition in 1925, Arthur Drews presented a potpourri of ideas taken from all his radical predecessors. Christianity is the outgrowth of a Jewish mystery cult centering about the Old Testament figure of Joshua. The Gospels are early attempts to represent this mythical being as a historical figure. Paul knew no historical Jesus. His Christ was a Hellenized version of the Jewish Joshua divinity. Astral speculation about a solar god contributed to the development of Christianity. Christians should abandon the notion that their religion is based on an historical individual and his teachings. It is the embodiment of ideas, not facts.

All the mythologists made much of the paucity of references to Jesus and his teachings in the early non-Christian literature. Even the few that exist were questioned. Pliny the Younger, governor of Bithynia, wrote a letter to the Emperor Trajan about A.D. 110 in which he referred to a religious sect in his province whose worship included a "hymn to Christ as to a god." Mythologists claimed that this letter is a Christian forgery. In his *Annals*, written about A.D. 115, Tacitus has a passage referring to the accusation of Nero that Rome had been set on fire by Christians, whose founder (Tacitus says) had been executed by Pontius Pilate. Mythologists asserted that this passage is a Christian interpolation. In his *Life of Claudius*, written about A.D. 120, Suetonius refers to the expulsion of Jews from Rome about A.D. 49 because of riots over a certain Chrestos. It is a legitimate question whether the Chrestos of Suetonius' reference is a corruption of the Greek word "Christ." According to the mythologists the Roman riots were instigated by some otherwise unknown agitator.

There are very few references to Jesus in early Latin literature, but there was also little occasion for any. Christianity was a small minority movement and remained so for at least two hundred years. Responsible estimates of the proportion of Christians in the empire even as late as the time that Constantine accepted Christianity run from a low of four per cent to a high of twelve. Until the middle of the second century most Romans

who were aware of its existence at all would regard Christianity as a sect of Judaism. Most converts to early Christianity were drawn from the lower social and economic groups—wage-earners and slaves—and their beliefs and practices would be of little concern to Roman men of letters or to the constituency for which they were writing.

It is more difficult to explain the absence of any account of Jesus and of Christianity from the writings of Flavius Josephus. The one reference that appears to be authentic, the statement that James, a brother of Jesus who was called the Christ, was stoned to death about A.D. 62, indicates that Josephus had some knowledge of Christianity. He gives an informed and not unfriendly account of John the Baptist. Perhaps the best guess is that Josephus, aware of the strife between the synagogue and church at the time he was writing, decided to omit any reference to the contentious subject of Christianity.

Paul's letters presented a stumbling block to mythologists from the beginning. Testimony to the historicity of Jesus that dated from not much more than twenty years after his ministry was not easy to dismiss. Compelled to concede that most of the letters in the Pauline corpus are genuine, efforts were made to excise the few passages, particularly in First Corinthians, that imply a familiarity on Paul's part with events in the life of Jesus; but no reasonable grounds for regarding these paragraphs as interpolations were adduced, and the argument has long since been abandoned.

II

When in 1841 the hypothesis was first proposed that Mark was the earliest Gospel and that the authors of Matthew and Luke had based their accounts on Mark, this solution of the Synoptic problem was welcomed by Bruno Bauer. To demonstrate the unhistoricity of the tradition in the Synoptic Gospels, all that now was necessary was to discredit the authority of Mark. Bauer's enthusiasm for the hypothesis of Markan priority delayed its general adoption both in Germany and in English-speaking countries. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century it had won wide acceptance, and interest turned to a study of the sources Mark had employed. Attempts to distinguish Petrine and non-Petrine elements in Mark got nowhere, although they still enjoy sporadic revival. No real progress was made until after the First World War, when a number of German scholars, notably K. L. Schmidt, Rudolf Bultmann, and Martin Dibelius, adapted certain techniques of classical research already widely employed by students of the Old Testament, to an analysis of the tradition in the Gospels.

Through their efforts "Form Criticism," or "Tradition Criticism" as Dr. F. C. Grant has happily renamed it, has taken its place by the side of historical and literary criticism as a tool of research.

With all its limitations and aberrations, the study of the pre-literary history of the narrative and hortatory material in the Gospels has made an important contribution to our understanding of early Christianity. Mark was not an author in any strict sense of the word. He arranged and edited the tradition about Jesus current in the church of his day and locality. This tradition was preserved and given form and emphasis under the influence of the evangelistic, didactic, and liturgical interests of the early church. Mark's Gospel may date from plus or minus A.D. 70, but the bulk of the material it incorporates can now be traced much earlier. The passion narrative, which occupies more than one-third of the earliest Gospel, was the main vehicle of the message that God had come into human history for man's redemption in Jesus Christ, and it appears to have assumed much its Markan form while the proclamation was still under the control and criticism of "eyewitnesses and ministers of the word." Various other sermonettes that enforced the faith of the passion story can also be distinguished. Sayings that were useful to early teachers in directing and disciplining the life of Christian individuals and the Christian community were remembered, arranged in forms and sequences, and ultimately collected in catechisms such as Matthew and Luke appear to have known and used.

The existence of a few references to Jesus and to Christianity in early Greco-Roman literature, the failure of certain schools of thought in Holland and in Germany to impugn the authenticity of Paul's letters, the dating of Mark about A.D. 70, the evidence that Matthew and Luke made use of an early collection of sayings of Jesus in addition to Mark's Gospel, and the indication that much of the matter in Mark had an earlier history—partly oral and partly literary—have all combined to demonstrate that Jesus was an historical figure and that Christianity cannot be dismissed as a second-century myth.

At the same time, it is more generally conceded today than it was fifty years ago that the Synoptic Gospels, as well as the Gospel of John, are primarily sources for a knowledge of the life and thought of early Christianity rather than of the mission and message of Jesus. The church had its origin in the faith that the Jesus who had been crucified and buried had been raised from the dead and declared Lord and Christ. The passion and resurrection narrative were central in the earliest proclamation of the gospel. Only those narratives of Jesus' life that illustrated or illuminated the faith

of the church were told and transmitted, and only those sayings of Jesus that served to direct and discipline the life of Christians as individuals and as members of a believing community were recalled and preserved. Much that Jesus said and did cannot be recovered, and much of the information we do possess has been interpreted and applied in the interests of early Christian faith and practice. Furthermore, not only has history in the Synoptic Gospels often been sublimated in theology, but there is occasionally reason to believe that theological interests, as well as preserving, formulating, and adapting pericopes, have also created them.

In responsible circles today there is little denial of the historicity of Jesus or of the historical origins of Christianity. From the current literature with which I am familiar, however, there would appear to be two approaches to a study of early Christianity. On the one hand, it is assumed in many circles that all that we can recover—and all that matters, so far as that is concerned—is the faith of the early church, primarily as it is expounded in Paul's letters and in the Gospel of John and secondarily as it is reflected in the Synoptic tradition. That is all we know, and that is all we need to know. Rudolf Bultmann, for instance, devotes only some fifteen pages of his *Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting* to the proclamation and teaching of Jesus, out of a total of something over two hundred. The Jesus of history and the religion Jesus professed are practically irrecoverable, and even if we could any longer distinguish them from the precipitate of faith they would be of little consequence to the Christian. On the other hand, there are those who are convinced that we are in a better position today than at any time since the apostolic age to recover a historical picture of Jesus and of the message he proclaimed, and that early Christian thought can rightly be understood only as the interpretation of the meaning of the life that Jesus lived and the gospel he preached. One group would hold that Christianity is Christology. The other would maintain that Christology itself is an articulation of the church's experience and its interpretation of history, and that it is properly understood only in the light of research into Gospel origins.

III

Let me turn from such generalizations to a specific discussion of some aspects of my subject, dealing in the first instance with the narrative tradition, and in the second with the didactic.

1. K. L. Schmidt's demonstration that the references to time and place in the Earliest Gospel are artificial and stereotyped, and his conclusion that

Mark imposed a chronological framework and a geographical setting on the traditional pericopes, can be accepted without discarding the Markan outline as historically worthless. That Jesus was baptized by John; that one of his first undertakings was to gather an intimate group of disciples and associates; that his early ministry centered about Capernaum and was carried on in Galilee and contiguous areas to the north and the east; and that a visit to Jerusalem resulted in his arrest by the Roman authorities on charges of subversive activity and his crucifixion as a messianic claimant—all this is consistent with what we know from incidental references to Jesus' ministry in Paul's letters and in the speeches credited to Peter in the early chapters of *The Acts*, and can be used by the historian with some measure of confidence. At some points the Markan account needs correction from the alternate tradition in *John*: a longer ministry than Mark appears to presuppose; a ministry in Judea prior to the final and climactic visit to Jerusalem; and crucifixion on the day before the Passover rather than during the course of it. But the general outline that Mark gives us appears to be historical.

2. Passages from the Old Testament that the church interpreted messianically have influenced the formulation of parts of the Synoptic narrative, particularly in the passion story, but do not appear to have created any substantial portion of it. Matthew regarded Jesus' entry into Jerusalem as a fulfillment of the prophecy in *Zechariah* 9:9, and it is probable that Mark also believed this to be the case, but Bultmann's claim that the Gospel account has been spun entirely out of the Old Testament prediction falls short of demonstration. Much the same could be said of the relationship of the story of the cleansing of the temple to the quotations from *Isaiah*, chapter 56, and *Jeremiah*, chapter 7, that are now included in it, and of the story of the crucifixion to passages in *Psalms* 22 and 69. The early church "searched the Scriptures" to find ways and means of understanding and interpreting what had taken place, but churchmen rarely invented a story to give fulfillment to a text.

3. Christological reflection is apparent in the development of the birth and infancy tradition. When *Mark* was written the church's concern with Jesus began with his baptism and the opening of his public ministry. From *Mark* we could learn only that Jesus' father and mother were Joseph and Mary, that his father belonged to the artisan class, that he was the eldest of a family that included five sons and at least two daughters, and that his childhood and young manhood had been associated with Nazareth in Galilee. The preservation of the genealogies in *Matthew* and

Luke indicates an early interest in establishing Jesus' descent from David, presumably in support of messianic claims being made on his behalf. The birth narratives of Matthew and Luke assert that Jesus' messiahship began, not with his baptism or his transfiguration, as earlier speculation had assumed, but with his supernatural conception. The infancy tradition in Luke belongs in the main to the category of poetry—an expression of the love and wonderment of the church at the birth of its Saviour; that in Matthew, more to the category of conventional legend.

4. St. Paul's account of the church's faith in Christ's resurrection, as he gives it in I Cor. 15, makes it clear that the resurrection faith had its origin in visions of the risen Lord vouchsafed to former disciples of the Galilean teacher, in the first instance to Cephas. The Lukan narrative of the experience of the unnamed disciples on their walk to Emmaus is an example of such early apologetic in the Synoptic tradition, as is the story of the Transfiguration, if it is correctly understood as originally a part of a resurrection cycle. The other resurrection stories now in Matthew and Luke have been influenced by the secondary apologetic argument based on the tradition of the discovery of the empty tomb.

5. Christological reflection has influenced the form of the baptism narrative, in Matthew and Luke even more than in Mark, but such Christological matter can readily be recognized as an overlay. It is more difficult to make a distinction between history and theology in the instance of the temptation narrative, which in its "Q" form is a commentary on Jesus' mission as seen from the vantage point of the early church. The task is really formidable when we turn to a story such as that of Jesus' ordeal in Gethsemane.

The account must be based on some historical reminiscence. I can think of no interest in the early church that would have invented the story that Jesus, at the very end of his ministry, should still have been uncertain about its course and have wrestled in prayer with his doubts and fears. It is significant that the author of the Gospel of John omits any reference to this incident. It was not in accordance with his idea of the way the Son of God would have behaved at any time in his ministry. Furthermore, there is an account of the ordeal also in the Letter to the Hebrews, apparently quite independent of that in Mark: "In the days of his flesh, Jesus offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him who was able to save him from death, and he was heard for his godly fear. Although he was a Son, he learned obedience through what he suffered; and being made perfect he became the source of eternal salvation to all who obey

him" (Heb. 5:7-9, RSV). At the same time, the differentiation of the inner circle of Peter, James, and John from the larger group appears to have been imposed on an earlier form of the story; the account now reads like an acted parable or narrative version of the Lord's Prayer; and the statements that Jesus' disciples were all asleep as he sought in prayer for guidance and that they all fled at his subsequent arrest make it difficult to understand how the incident in Gethsemane could have become known. An answer to this last objection might be found in the assertion by the author of the Letter to the Hebrews that Jesus offered up prayers and supplications "with loud cries and tears" and in the likelihood that Mark's emphasis on the failure of the disciples to watch one hour with Jesus is due, in part at least, to dramatic exaggeration.

Incidents out of the life of Jesus and, above all, the story of his passion and resurrection were told and retold and ultimately committed to writing in order to convert unbelievers and to confirm the faithful. In its selection of material and in its formulation and application of it, the early church has left the mark of its Christological and evangelistic interests on the Synoptic tradition. Nevertheless, that tradition was given its present form while its proclamation was still under the control of "ministers and eyewitnesses of the word," and myth-making proclivities were kept under restraint. To illustrate what could happen when such constraints were removed, one needs only to turn to the tissue of absurdities that pervades the so-called "Infancy Gospels" of later centuries. Theology in the Synoptics is still operating with the stuff of history.

IV

Let me turn now from the narrative to the didactic tradition.

1. The Gospel of Mark contains relatively little of Jesus' teaching. The author appears to presuppose a familiarity on the part of his readers with Jesus' message and to have been content with a general summary of it. The burden of Jesus' gospel was the imminence of the kingdom of God. Entrance into the kingdom would be difficult, particularly for those with riches. However, since entrance into the kingdom is equivalent to entrance into "life," no sacrifice is too great to achieve it. Jesus warned against the dangers of wealth, praised the generosity of the poor, expressed confidence in the power of prayer, and asserted that man's obligations to God take precedence over the rights of Caesar.

Theological interests can be discerned in Mark's incredible theory of the purpose of parables, in his representation of the conflict between church

and synagogue in his day as already an issue between Jesus and certain scribes and Pharisees, in his doctrine of the messianic secret, and in his adaptation of Jesus' teaching on divorce to a situation that existed under Roman law. The greater part of the teaching he records—also the most difficult for the historian to evaluate—consists of Jesus' words about himself, or of allusions that the Evangelist believes Jesus meant to be references to himself. That these are primarily sources for an understanding of Christological beliefs in Mark's day may be readily admitted. To conclude that we cannot recover any understanding from them of Jesus' own consciousness of mission seems to me to be unwarranted skepticism.

2. At an early date steps were taken to assemble suitable sayings of Jesus as catechisms. One such collection appears to have been used by Matthew and Luke. It began with an account of John the Baptist and his teaching. It included a commentary on the mission of Jesus in the form of a temptation narrative; Jesus' instructions to the twelve; a sermon that opened with Beatitudes and that concluded with a parable of Two Houses; exhortations to watchfulness and faithfulness; and comments on the urgency, the cost, and the rewards of discipleship. It ended with an assurance that God would shortly intervene in history with the catastrophic but triumphant "day of the Son of man."

The content of this "Q" catechism can help us visualize life in the early church. Jesus' commission to his first disciples has been adapted to the missionary problems that confronted early evangelists. Nevertheless, the historian has access in "Q" to trustworthy source material for an understanding of Jesus' teaching.

3. No doubt collections of Jesus' sayings comparable to "Q" were also made in other parts of the church. Luke drew most of his special tradition from one of them. It contained half a dozen stories about Jesus and certain women whom he had met in his ministry; a wealth of parables; teaching concerning stewardship; illustrations of Jesus' love and compassion for sinners and outcasts; and much similar matter. The bulk of the tradition in this special Lukan source has as much claim to authenticity as that in "Q." However, this can hardly be said of the matter peculiar to Matthew. This latter tradition tends to represent Jesus as a teacher within the fold of orthodox Judaism and is often at variance with what we find in other sources. It may reflect the special beliefs and concerns of the early Christian community in Jerusalem, but more probably Matthew's own interests as an editor and compiler are enough to account for it.

4. A comparison of Matthew with Mark indicates that Matthew has

heightened the eschatological emphasis already in the earlier Gospel and had added new matter of a similar tenor. A comparison of Matthew's use of "Q" with Luke's shows that Matthew has organized the didactic tradition more explicitly as a new law. Many of Jesus' sayings are presented as antitheses, commands, and prohibitions; the bulk of Jesus' teaching is arranged in the form of five books or "sermons"; and numerical groupings are frequently employed to facilitate memorization. Allegorical interpretations appended to several parables that relate them to disciplinary problems that had arisen in the early church and paragraphs that deal specifically with such issues combine with the features already noted to give Matthew's Gospel the character of an ecclesiastical manual. In it a churchman has reworked his source material, but his genius was that of an editor, not an author. Matthew often adapted early didactic tradition to later church situations, but rarely created it.

5. While Luke stresses the concern of Jesus for the poor and underprivileged and emphasizes the universal implications of the gospel Jesus preached, he appears to have employed his sources with considerable caution and respect. We can observe that this is true in the case of matter taken from Mark. We can reason that it is true in the case of "Q." We can assume that it is true in the case of the special source.

That some of the didactic tradition in the Synoptic Gospels had its origins in a situation later than Jesus' time must be acknowledged; that much of it has been adapted by the church to a situation different from the one that existed in Jesus' day is apparent; but that the bulk of it reflects the creative genius of the herald of God's kingdom and God's righteousness seems to me to be indisputable.

Christ in Every Man

The Doctrine of the Incarnation and Ethics

JAMES L. PRICE

I

ACCORDING TO THE GOSPELS Jesus spoke of his self-identification with his disciples. Their lives and fortunes were his very own; in some sense he would continue to live in and through them.

For instance, in Matt. 10, among other sayings of Jesus concerning "his twelve disciples" and their mission, the following words are reported: "He who receives you receives me, and he who receives me receives him who sent me" (v. 40). Then, in the same context, this saying is recorded: "Whoever gives to one of these little ones even a cup of cold water because he is a disciple, truly, I say to you, he shall not lose his reward" (v. 42).

It has been suggested that an intelligible background for both sayings lies in the principle of rabbinic Judaism that the *shaliakh* (messenger or emissary) is as the one who sends him. From this notion expressed in verse 40 stems the thought which follows, that the smallest sort of courtesy extended to an emissary is, in fact, a courtesy to the sender and as such deserves that latter's acknowledgment.

It may be that these sayings in Matthew can be explained in this way. Yet there is reason to wonder if the rabbinical principle exhausts their significance. In any case, there is other evidence in Matthew that such sayings as these found in chapter 10 constitute a principal element in the Evangelist's interpretation of the mystery of Jesus' presence in the world.

Matt. 18:18-20 reads (in the RSV):

Truly, I say to you, whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven. Again I say to you, if two of you agree on earth about anything they ask, it will be done for them by my Father in heaven. For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

Questions concerning ecclesiastical authority which this saying has

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evoked should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, whatever its original context and its present applications, the basic idea of this saying closely parallels that of Matt. 10:40. The disciples stand for, or represent, Jesus. And since Jesus is the Christ whom God has sent, his "Father in heaven" endorses the action of those with whom Jesus has identified himself.

The beginning and ending of Matthew reveal that in this passage, as in the other noted, we touch upon a central theme of the First Gospel. Jesus' birth is interpreted according to the sign "Emmanuel (which means, God with us)" (1:23). In and through "a Son" God comes to men and dwells in their midst. The final statement of Matthew's Gospel stresses a corresponding conviction: in and through his disciples Jesus the Christ comes to men—in the Father's name and invested with his power. Indeed Jesus will abide with his disciples, whom he sends into all the world, at all times "even unto the end of the age."

These observations have an important bearing upon the interpretation of the so-called "Parable of the Last Judgment" reported in Matt. 25: 31-46. This "parable" is in fact a little apocalypse containing the typical stage properties of such. However, its principal teaching has to do not so much with "last things" as with the present time. At least it is the present moment which is fraught with ultimate significance. Each time some wretched "brother" is helped, it is the "king" of glory who is served; when one in need is neglected, it is the "Son of Man" who is being rejected.

It is true that those persons to whom judgment is meted out in the "parable" hold a conventionally Jewish view of the Last Judgment. At such time they expect to be confronted by someone they had never seen before. It is because of this that the protest is raised on every hand: "but when saw we thee hungry?" etc. In the face of this, the "parable" teaches that every man is finally destined to encounter, as judge, a person whose unsuspected presence has been with him throughout the whole course of his life.

In view of the fact that Matthew teaches that it is Jesus the Christ who is this "Son of Man" (or else the one who is destined to be this Son of Man), the mystery which this little apocalypse reveals may be summarized as follows: As the Son of Man who is to come, Jesus voluntarily identified himself with his "brethren." On several important occasions, and in full awareness of his approaching death, Jesus had expressed the faith that he would continue to live in his "brethren," in them all—even in one of "the least of these."

It may therefore be stated that two principles of interpretation are

balanced in Matthew, viewing now the Gospel as a whole: As God was present in the world in Jesus the Christ so, by analogy, Jesus is present in his disciples.

Perhaps one is justified in speaking of the above passages in Matthew as affording the "raw material" for a Christology which is not unlike the Christology of Paul, who taught that the disciples of Jesus Christ formed his "Body" in the world. Matthew as well as Paul may be said to teach, by implication at any rate, that the Church is an extension of the incarnation.

It is not the purpose of this article to develop the possible interconnections of thought between Matthew and Paul, if indeed the application of a principle of equivalence does not obscure significant differences. It is rather my purpose to ask whether Matthew has faithfully preserved Jesus' teaching concerning the nature of his self-identification with men. To this question the next section is devoted. In a final section brief reference will be made to Paul's understanding of his Lord's teaching on the same subject.

II

An important variant of the saying found in Matt. 10:40, to which attention was given at the beginning of this article, is recorded in Mark 9:37: "Whoever receives one such child in my name receives me; and whoever receives me, receives not me, but him who sent me."

In Mark's context it is clear that *Paidia* is taken to refer to the little children which, according to 9:36, Jesus took into his arms. In Matt. 18 this same incident is reported, and it seems evident that the First Evangelist has drawn his account from Mark. The substance of Mark's words "concerning greatness" is retained and a saying about humility in children is appended, an editorial practice which is characteristic of Matthew. Then the first clause, and the first clause only, of Mark 9:37 is recorded. Did Matthew recognize this saying as a variant of the one he records in 10:40, where the second clause is reported? This is very probably the explanation for the shortened form of Mark 9:37 which Matthew reproduces here.

The important point with respect to the question that has been raised is that Matthew, by retaining this much of Mark's statement, bears witness to an aspect of Jesus' teaching which goes beyond the thought of a self-identification of Jesus with *his disciples*. Surely the *Paidia* of Matt. 18:5, as of Mark 9:37, cannot be Jesus' "disciples," at least not in the sense of persons authorized to be his emissaries! It would appear then that Matthew has wished to apply Jesus' teaching concerning his self-identification with man more narrowly than Jesus himself did.

It is, of course, obvious that by identifying himself with the fortunes of all men, Jesus taught that he would continue to live in the life of his disciples. I do not mean to deny that Jesus himself on occasions spoke of his conviction with special reference to the "twelve disciples." At the same time, by restricting Jesus' teaching to the disciples, or almost so, Matthew tends to obscure something of the inclusive sense of solidarity with the life of every man which Jesus claimed, an identification with the smallest and most helpless child.

That this conclusion is warranted finds some support in Matt. 25: 31-46. In view of the above discussion of the "parable" it may be said that the reader of Matthew's Gospel would doubtless take the "my brethren" in verse 40 to refer to Jesus' disciples. Yet it is noteworthy that there is nothing in the "parable" itself to suggest that these "hungry," "thirsty," "naked," "sick," etc., are only the disciples of Jesus, or that he had them chiefly in mind. The Son of Man himself acknowledges that any wretch is his "brother," the least and most miserable of all. The protestations of those on the "right hand" and on the "left" are only plausible in view of the fact that those needy folk, who were the objects of charity or of neglect, appeared to no one to have any connection with Jesus at all!

We conclude, therefore, that Matthew's emphasis, whatever its immediate and continuing value, diverts the reader from an aspect of Jesus' teaching which is important for a Christian doctrine of the incarnation. As a consequence of this, the ethical implications of Jesus' gospel have been to that extent obscured.

III

In conclusion brief notice may be taken of a somewhat parallel situation with respect to the epistles of Paul. Students of Paul's thought have long recognized that he taught that Jesus Christ had become in some sense the representative of that community of men brought into being as a result of the Cross and Resurrection. Believers are described as being "in Christ" or, conversely, it is claimed that Christ lives in them. Paul, like the First Evangelist, believed that Jesus had identified himself with his disciples. Matthew stresses the immanence in the disciples of the Son of Man. Paul speaks of the immanence in believers of "the Man of Heaven," whose "image" they are destined to bear. That the symbolism of the Son of Man, as the chosen representative of "the saints of the Most High" (Dan. 7), is patent in Matthew's teaching and latent in Paul's, few have doubted.

In line with the interest of this study, it is pertinent to ask: does Paul

in this teaching do justice to the conviction of Jesus concerning his self-identification with all human beings?

There is some evidence which supports an affirmative reply. As, for example, Paul's words to the church at Corinth:

For the love of Christ controls us, because we are convinced that one has died for all; therefore all have died. . . . *From now on*, therefore, *we regard no one from a human point of view*; even though we once regarded Christ from a human point of view, we regard him thus no longer. Therefore *if any one is in Christ, he is a new creation*; the old has passed away, behold, the new has come. (II Cor. 5:14-17)

The parenthetical clause, about Paul's regard for Christ, is not the principal one in this declaration although it has attracted the most attention. Is not the main point Paul's affirmation that the believer in Christ comes to regard everyone as bearing Christ's image?

In Paul's gospel this inclusive faith is proclaimed: every man is a man in Christ, potentially so, at least, for Paul confesses, "as in Adam all die; so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (I Cor. 15:22).

The above passages from Paul's Corinthian correspondence raise many questions which cannot now be adequately discussed. What is the force of the "if" in II Cor. 5:17: "if any one is in Christ"? Does Paul's claim that "all" shall be made alive "in Christ" receive from him no qualification? What of those persons whose subjective dispositions reveal an absence of faith or stand as its denial? Did Paul believe that in them Christ, or the Spirit of Christ, lived? To what extent does the teaching of Jesus, concerning his self-identification with all men in their wretchedness and need, come to expression in the indicatives of Paul's gospel?

These questions are not easily answered. Yet I believe that in one element of Paul's teaching it can be seen that the Apostle, no more than Matthew, fully grasped or appreciated this mystery of the incarnation. I refer now to the imperatives of Paul, to passages in which Paul considers the ethical implications of the gospel.

Jesus' command to love one's "enemies," as reported in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, seems to be wholly consonant with his view that in all persons, whatever their subjective dispositions or outer actions, God dwells. To love the neighbor in need, or to love the needy as a neighbor, is to love God. Moreover, Jesus' imperative to "do good to all men"—with its accompaniment, a promise of reward—seems to presuppose the same background of ideas having to do with self-identification which is explicitly taught in the sayings of the Gospels quoted above.

But when one turns to certain passages in Paul's epistles which echo these ideas, if not the actual words of Jesus, what do we find? Take, for example, Paul's command to the Roman Christians: ". . . if your *enemy* is *hungry*, feed him; if he is *thirsty*, give him drink . . ." Can you imagine Jesus adding, as Paul does, "for by so doing you will heap burning coals upon his head"? Paul's sanction is scriptural and proverbial, but who would say that it represents "the mind of Christ"?

Put alongside these words the exhortation of Paul to the Galatians: ". . . as we have opportunity, let us *do good to all men* . . ." Would Jesus have made the following qualification as Paul did, "and especially to those who are of the household of faith" (Gal. 6:20)? Do such words as these bespeak for Paul a living awareness of the presence in every man of the Son of Man and of God himself?

Perhaps it is a salutary thing to perceive a fault in the greatest of the saints, lest we exalt human nature overmuch. There is a sickening pathos in the words attributed to the French playwright, Jean Anouilh: "Everybody has hate in his heart. Only the tenderhearted reserve it for their enemies." Could it be that the *only* exception is Jesus, the Christ of Nazareth and of God? Could it be that no humanitarianism can ever overcome this radical evil in human nature except it be grounded in a belief in the reality of the incarnation—extended to the least of these, Christ's brethren and ours, whom God loves and in whom God lives?

The Literature of the Lutherans in America

HERBERT H. SCHMIDT

THE PREVIOUS ARTICLES in this series on the literature of the Protestant denominations in America have had to be comprehensive works in compressed form. This Lutheran bibliography is no exception. The similarity of the series is not due to prescribed pattern, or to the lack of variety and originality of materials, but to the proximate aim of the articles and the delimiting of an extensive literature in each case.

It is difficult to make any estimate of the total number of titles concerning Lutherans in America. A figure of 30,000 has been advanced for specialized materials ranging from the simple tract to the full volume, but none for general materials and manuscripts which of themselves would embrace a much larger number. Furthermore, the bulk of materials being produced is growing at an ever-increasing tempo. The assembly of the Lutheran World Federation which met in Minneapolis, August, 1957, made the first attempt to assemble a display of Lutheran literature published currently. The books alone numbered seven hundred. (To be sure, the exhibit ranged beyond the Lutheran Church in America, being based on what Lutherans throughout the world "believe and do" today.) Diversity in form and phase of Lutheran subject matter also complicates the bibliographic process. This highly diversified literature is one of the results of the variety in Lutheranism in its American environment extending back to 1621.

Failure to cite certain titles highly regarded by a particular body of any one of the nine major branches of the Lutheran Church in America is not due to provincialism, or bias, but the result of broad coverage. Works of primary value for special interest groups within American Lutheranism will be found in most cases in the bibliographies of the primary works contained in this article, this being one of the factors influencing choice of titles. A few of the divisions in American Lutheranism could compile a

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bibliography of their own containing as many entries as this general one, so voluminous are the writings. When bodies of Lutherans unite, the new organization gives rise to its unique literature which likewise swells the total mass. *Totum in minimo* must therefore be one of the governing policies of this bibliography. The main canons of selection for the listings which follow are: (1) to cite basic materials which will guide any person interested in the Lutheran Church in America to the area of his interest, (2) then to suggest related works as keys to unlock the interpretation of the framework items, (3) and to list sufficient titles with bibliographies to launch on the most direct course the researcher who would probe more deeply. Wherein this attempt is realized the following will apply, "*Wer das kleine tut als sei es etwas grosse.*"

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The detailed and extensive bibliographical coverage of American Lutheran materials is virtually nonexistent. The few systematic efforts toward a full bibliography occurred before the close of the last century and are out of date except for the period covered. The only work approaching this form of compilation, but having a twentieth-century imprint, is O. M. Norlie's *Cumulative Catalogue of Lutheran Books in the English Language* (Iowa, 1924). H. P. Beers' *Bibliographies in American History* (New York, 1938) lists but five titles which supply material of bibliographical precision, and these include Morris and Norlie (p. 179). The need for a good single source on Americo-Lutheran literature was felt by an able bibliographer more than three quarters of a century ago, John G. Morris. Writing about this lack, especially as it concerned materials in the last century, in the *Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. XIV, April and July, 1895, pp. 165-186, under the title, "Sources of Information on the History of the Lutheran Church in America," he states: "Twenty years ago I published a list of books, pamphlets and manuscripts which related to the history of the Lutheran Church in this country. It was a new feature in our Church, and it was greeted with approbation by the few scholarly men who took pleasure in such pursuits."

He was referring to his *Bibliotheca Lutherana: A Complete List of the Publications of all the Lutheran Ministers in the United States* (Philadelphia, Lutheran Board of Publication, 1876). In the preface Dr. Morris wrote, "I have studiously tried to be correct, and to secure the title of every publication; and if I have omitted any it is because I was not aware of their existence." The major part of the book is an alphabetical author

list with the titles of books, articles, published sermons, etc., of each person listed under his name, but not in any definite order. Another section of the book attempts a full exhibit of the periodical press of the Lutheran Church in America, listing all church papers extant as well as those which had been discontinued to 1876. The periodical publications are arranged first by language (English, German, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian), and then chronologically under each linguistic division. The compilation is very serviceable up to the point of its limitations—such as its restriction to writings by Lutherans in the United States only, its omission of any contributions by Lutherans to the weekly press, and the time span, "a Centennial document." Outside of the effort by Norlie, to my knowledge nothing like this has been attempted for Lutheran literature as a whole in the twentieth century.

Referring once more to the Morris article mentioned above in the *Lutheran Church Review* (p. 165), attention is called to the fact that this article revises his list of 1875 by the addition of Scandinavian writings treating of American church matters, and five other classes of source material. These cover books dating before 1800; books, pamphlets, review articles, after 1800; old manuscripts, history of congregations . . . church trials, colleges, orphan houses, etc., which have appeared in print; biographies of Lutheran ministers besides those given in Sprague. Taking into account the several books (probably those of Nicum, Graebner, Wolf, Jacobs, Roth, and Lenker), Morris wrote, "The scholar who hereafter may write the history of the whole or of any portion of our Church in America, will here, and in several other books, find the titles of all the writings on the subject up to this period. . . ."

Morris also referred to a publication he and Charles A. Hay edited earlier, *Catalogue of the Lutheran Historical Society's Collection of Books, Pamphlets, Manuscripts, Photographs, etc.* (Philadelphia, 1890). Citing its own limitations, the catalogue postscript has this: "The foregoing catalogue will show to a very great extent what our Church in this country has accomplished in literature . . . yet it does not embrace all that our writers have produced." The listings were purposely much abbreviated, the design being merely to identify the items. A similar list of the Society's holdings had been issued in 1877. These catalogues and the works by Morris are invaluable, even though dated, because there is nothing comparable in Lutheran materials.

Roughly a half-century later a joint effort by Lutheran publishers produced a catalogue of sixty-eight pages, *Lutheran Publications*, which

lists only books published by all of the official Lutheran publishing houses, and currently available at the time the list was printed. The effort was designed "for complete lists of Lutheran books," with all lists brought within a single alphabetical arrangement by author. Books published after June 1, 1949, are not included. Entries carry full ordering information except for dates of publication.

Two non-Lutheran references which supply minimum lists in the source field on Lutheranism in America are: *The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1910), Vol. VII, pages 93-94; and P. G. Mode, *Source Book and Bibliographical Guide for American Church History* (Wisconsin, 1921); but these are dated.

There is a dearth of complete bibliographies on Lutheran materials of American origin (there are none at all to compare with the work of William Warren Sweet on the Methodists, or Edward C. Starr, *A Baptist Bibliography* . . .). Where primary and secondary sources have been completely accounted for, the compilations have been for a definite period, or around a special subject within American Lutheranism. Such works are very helpful for the area covered, and are sections or subdivisions ready-made for a major bibliography on the Lutheran Church in America. As many as possible of the items chosen throughout this article were included because they possessed a helpful bibliography, in many cases an extensive one for the subject covered.

Further bibliographical directions, as well as suitable material on specialized aspects of a topic, are to be found in doctoral dissertations. In addition to the listings to be found in *Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities* (Since 1934), attention is called to the initiation in 1954, at the conference of Lutheran Professors of Theology, of an effort to make available in microtext a select list of fifty-two of these works of Lutheran interest. A random selection will provide some idea of the continuing research and study in American Lutheranism and resultant bibliographies. Richard C. Wolf, *The Americanization of the German Lutherans, 1863-1929* (Thesis, Yale, 1947); Harold A. Dunkelberger, *Symbols in the Service: A Study of Symbolic Functions of Liturgy in American Lutheranism* (Thesis, Columbia, 1950); Harold C. Fry, *Union Churches in Southeastern Pennsylvania* (Thesis, Temple, 1937); Richard Klick, *The Female Diaconate in the Lutheran Church in America* (Thesis, Temple, 1949); Maude Lucille Lindquist, *Efforts Toward Lutheran Union in the United States, 1860* (Thesis, Minnesota, 1949); Paul C. E.

Nyholm, *The Americanization of the Danish Lutheran Churches* (Thesis, Chicago, 1952); Gerhard S. Ottersberg, *The Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Iowa* (Thesis, Nebraska, 1949); Robert H. Thurau, *A Study of the Lutheran Sunday School in America to 1865* (Thesis, Pittsburgh, 1946).

At this writing there is in preparation a project begun in 1952 as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago by Robert Wiederanders which is to be a comprehensive microfilm Corpus of books and periodicals of English-speaking American Lutheranism from 1754 to 1854. This Corpus is designed to bring together widely scattered source material of primary significance for the formative period in American Lutheranism. Some idea of the enormity of the task can be gathered from the fact that the Corpus will consist of five to seven sections composed of 4,250 to 5,000 pages per section. Six sections are now available, and the seventh is to be released in March, 1958.

HISTORY

The complicated story of the Lutheran Church in America has to be gathered mainly from its indigenous primary materials: addresses, almanacs, biographies, board productions, catechisms, church records, church trials, conference material, congregational publications, cyclopedias, dissertations, devotional literature, diaries, dictionaries, directories, essays, handbooks, histories of various types, hymnals, institutional records, lectures, letters, manuals, manuscripts, minutes of all kinds, official documents, periodicals, pamphlets, poetry, proceedings, reports, sermons, tracts, and yearbooks.

From such a corpus have come nine histories which deal with the Lutheran Church in America as a whole, but only the more essential ones will be listed here. Significant are the histories of the Lutherans on this Western continent which weld the findings from the sources into a panorama without losing a sense of the underlying continuity within a setting of national diversity and change. These histories of broad scope will furnish both an introduction to the Lutheran Church in America, and supply, in most cases, bibliographies. Chronological succession determines the order of listing.

Being older than the American republic, and of the same age as the American people, Lutheran history in America permits the year 1685 to be included in an account of this church's life. Ernest L. Hazelius, *History of the American Lutheran Church, from Its Commencement in the Year of our Lord 1685, to the Year 1842* (Zanesville, Ohio, 1846). This first

effort to survey at any length the history of the Lutherans in America is of limited perspective because of its early date.

It is hardly to be expected that every historian writing about his own church will be strictly objective, but the next work to be listed among works setting forth the whole of the history of the Lutheran Church in America is characterized by an impartiality which was uncommon in the period the volume appeared. Edmund Jacob Wolf used an eloquent style combined with abundant pictorial illustration to set forth the history of the Lutheran Church as it was conceived sixty-five years ago in his volume, *The Lutherans in America. A Story of Struggle, Progress, Influence and Marvelous Growth. With an Introduction by Henry Eyster Jacobs* (New York, J. A. Hill, 1889).

For many years the best narrative dealing with the facts of the Lutheran Church in this country, and the interpretation of them sixty years ago, was Volume IV in the *American Church History Series* entitled *A History of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States* (New York, Christian Literature Co., 1893), by Henry Eyster Jacobs. An eight-page selective bibliography up to the date of the book precedes the text proper.

An account of the Lutherans in America which differed in its approach purposely because of the previous studies by Wolf, Jacobs, and Fritschel, is *A Brief History of the Lutheran Church in America* (Burlington, Iowa, Lutheran Literary Board, 1934), by J. L. Neve. The first edition appeared in 1903, revised and enlarged, and was revised again for the third edition in 1934. Dr. Neve wrote that his purpose was to present the materials interpreted variously and previously by others "simply from the viewpoint of organization and growth."

A shorter work, stemming from the earlier labors of another chronicler in the field, Dr. Graebner (mentioned above), is the little volume of F. Bente, *American Lutheranism* (St. Louis, Concordia, 1919). Volume I deals with the "Early History of American Lutheranism and the Tennessee Synod." Volume II, which appeared the same year, dealt with The United Lutheran Church. The proposed Volumes III and IV have not appeared. The viewpoints represent the Concordia school of thought on matters Lutheran.

A monograph which treats the antecedent movements in Europe in relation to the factors which affected the Lutheran Church in its American environment is the one by Paul W. Spaude, *The Lutheran Church Under American Influence; a Historico-philosophical interpretation of the Church in its Relation to Various Modifying Forces in the United States* (Burl-

ton, Iowa, Lutheran Literary Board, 1943). A bibliography of primary and secondary sources is appended.

The historiographer who has been able to compendiate the fissiparous nature of the vast field of American Lutheran literature from the earliest events to the main trends in 1954 is Dr. Abdel Ross Wentz. His *A Basic History of Lutheranism in America* (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1955) is the latest and most comprehensive of this family of histories. Special attention is called to the bibliography in this volume. Although headed "Selective Bibliography" the listings cover twenty-five pages. There is a certain amount of repetition of titles due to the fact that the entries are related to the chapters of the book and the works cited in it, but compendia of this type in Lutherana are scarce. In a number of instances annotations guide the student interested in specific subject areas to more complete bibliographies along special lines. The 1955 edition presented on a larger and more detailed scale the previous work by the author, *The Lutheran Church in American History*, and also brought the narrative of the Lutheran Church in America to the period of its current events. Dr. Wentz's effort to relate Lutheran historical data to the social and political environment in which it grew up appeared in 1923 under the title, *History of the Lutheran Church in America*. Even though the handling of denominational history in these three works represents a gradual departure from the institutional church approach, the historiography of the Lutheran Church in America has not reached the maturity of a full-scale social and intellectual history.

More recent trends affecting the Lutheran Church in America are dealt with by the following, but are not limited in coverage to these titles: *The Union Movement among Norwegian-American Lutherans from 1880-1917* is a definitive work dealing with the formation of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (the name, since 1946, of the third largest general Lutheran body in America), and was presented to the faculty of Yale University in 1952 as a doctoral dissertation by E. Clifford Nelson. Efforts at inter-Lutheran co-operation among the major bodies, with the exception of Missouri Synod, are recorded by Osborne Hague, *Lutherans Working Together. A History of the National Lutheran Council, 1918-1943. With a Supplementary Chapter, 1943-1945*, by Ralph H. Long (New York, 1945). Also there is *Lutheran Churches of the World* (Minneapolis, 1957) published under the auspices of the Lutheran World Federation. For a recent and general account in digest form of the Lutheran Church in America consult the section of this volume, "Churches of North America,"

by E. Theodore Bachmann. For other aspects of Lutheran unity see M. J. Heinecken, *Christ Frees and Unites* (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1957).

A distinguishing trait of the Lutheran Church in America came to be the formation of numerous independent synods. In due time many of these bodies published accounts of their life and work, and thereby furnished many local studies which must not be overlooked as sources of considerable information. Whether as geographic areas or ethnic groups the synods meet in convention and this gives rise to official records which are primarily source materials later printed as minutes. Neve in his *History* lists thirty-one synodical histories; Wentz adds five more in his bibliography, plus twenty-five references to this special interest material in Lutheran periodicals. Both of these historians employed only the more substantial works of this type, and periodical materials pertinent to their theses. Authors and presses have been busy in this area of Lutheranism in America, and there is much more of this type of Lutheran record in existence than is suggested by selective bibliographies. Space forbids mention of titles.

One gains an insight into the bibliographer's task in this connection when he consults the *Lutheran World Almanac* for 1931-33 (Vol. VII, pp. 108-137) and finds listed there flash histories for 151 synods; but this does not imply that each synod results in at least one volume of history. O. M. Norlie compiled the list and arranged the brief sketches of the synods in alphabetical order under the title, "Outline History of the Lutherans in America." The value of this reference work is multiplied because the entries are accompanied by annotations on each of the synods from their organization dates to 1932, plus some bibliographical references. From 1932 to 1957 information of this type in capsule form on the general bodies and synods in the Lutheran Church in the U.S.A. may be found in *The Lutheran Churches of the World* (Minneapolis, 1929; Geneva, 1952; Minneapolis, 1957), especially the volumes for 1929 and 1952. This highly selective section would not be complete without Robert Fortenbaugh, *The Development of the Synodical Polity of the Lutheran Church in America to 1829* (Thesis, Philadelphia, 1926); C. S. Mundinger, *Government in the Missouri Synod* (St. Louis, 1947).

The life of the congregation is related to the life of the church at large, so also is the history of each one. Histories of congregations are numerous, uneven in quality, and vary in format from the minor anniversary pamphlet to the substantial volume. It would be superfluous to list individual titles here, but from the historical and bibliothecal standpoints

their existence must be recognized. With the exception of being far fewer in number, the statement above is germane to the histories of Lutheran educational institutions in America, while keeping in mind that the reciprocal relationship between the denomination and its schools is recorded in sources beyond the published accounts of the institutions themselves.

The fund of information in the historical area is considerably extended by Lutheran periodicals (in addition to non-Lutheran ones carrying occasional articles about this denomination). Although the literature of this type has been enormous, a few suggestive references must suffice. E. F. Giese wrote about "The Chasm Between the German and English in the General Synod" in *The Lutheran Church Quarterly*, Vol. VI, Oct., 1887, pp. 296-324. J. W. Richard traced "The Confessional History of the General Synod" in *The Lutheran Church Quarterly*, Vol. XXV, Oct., 1895, pp. 458-490. "The Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church in America," by E. Norelius, appeared in *The Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. V, Jan., 1886, pp. 24-44. R. Fortenbaugh's "The Representative Lutheran Periodical Press and Slavery, 1831-1860" was carried by *The Lutheran Church Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, April, 1935, pp. 151-172. Sam Rönnegård, "The Religious Movements in Northern Sweden a Hundred Years Ago and the Augustana Synod," is in *The Augustana Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, July, 1948.

Something of the nature of Lutheran periodicals in America in an earlier era can be gleaned from the illustrated article (republished as a separate) from *The Lutheran Quarterly*, April, 1912, by Frederick G. Gotwald, entitled "Pioneer American Lutheran Journalism, 1812-1850." Currently the only periodical in Lutheran circles in America exclusively devoted to its history is *The Concordia Historical Institute Quarterly*, but this is predominately Missouri Lutheran in coverage and editorial slant. Lutheran theological journals also devote some space to church history. Indices for materials in the Lutheran periodicals category, especially publications which had a short life, are wanting in most cases. The literature on the history of the Lutheran Church in America awaits the compilation of a bibliography beyond the scope of anything which has yet been done.

BIOGRAPHY

For the earliest volume of collected biographies of American Lutherans, one must turn to a biographer outside the Lutheran family, William B. Sprague, *The Annals of the American Pulpit*, New York, Robert Carter and Brothers, 1856-1869, in nine volumes. Volume nine (1869) carries

this title page: *Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of Various Denominations, from the early settlement of the country to the close of the year eighteen hundred and fifty-five. With historical introductions.* The section on the Lutheran divines is the first one in Volume IX, which is shared with the Reformed Dutch and three other groups in American Protestantism. Although this work is well known I give the title in full because the material on the Lutherans was published separately in 1869 by Carter and Brothers with a slight change in the wording of the title page, ". . . Distinguished Clergymen of the Lutheran Denomination in the United States . . ." The spine has "Annals of the American Lutheran Pulpit." Sprague made free use of a long series (fifty-four out of eighty-four) of biographical articles of Lutheran ministers published in a Lutheran periodical, *The Evangelical Quarterly Review*. Volume XXI, the last number of this periodical, appeared in 1870, and contained an index of these "Reminiscences of Deceased Lutheran Ministers." J. G. Morris, in the 1895 issue of *The Lutheran Church Review* (page 186), has a list of twenty-nine Lutheran ministers beside those given in Sprague, 1734-1892.

Next in point of time is J. C. Jensson, *American Lutheran Biographies: or, Historical Notices of Over Three Hundred and Fifty Leading Men of the American Lutheran Church, from its Establishment to the year 1890. With a Historical Introduction and Numerous Portrait Engravings* (Milwaukee, 1890). This substantial volume is selective to the extent that a large proportion of the space is given to Scandinavian-American Lutheran ministers and history. There is some overlapping of Sprague and Jensson, with the latter giving biographical treatment to fifty-four individuals also included by Sprague. Eighty-two Lutherans are delineated in the *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York, 1928-1937), twenty-one volumes, only thirteen of which are in Sprague and sixty-three in Jensson.

To bridge the gap from the turn of the last century over the early decades of the twentieth in collections of American Lutheran biographies, one must consult the cyclopedias, certain almanacs or their successors, anniversary volumes of institutions, etc., even though these may supply only sketches. One regular source for biographical information on Lutheran leaders and pastors is the necrology section in *Synod Minutes*. There is no comprehensive index in existence, or in prospect at the moment, for these widely scattered biographies of Lutherans in America. The Lutheran Church in America needs more volumes which perform a function in this area, such as Peterson, Lysnes, Giving, *A Biographical Directory of the*

Evangelical Lutheran Church (Minneapolis, Augsburg, 1952). The volume has 2,600 biographies with photographs for this E.L.C. body of American Lutheran ministers from 1928 to 1952. A previous volume published in 1928 listed pastors in Norwegian Lutheran synods, 1843-1927.

Other works which perform the function of delineation in the galaxy of biographies are a blend of history and biography. A few examples must suffice. I. O. Nothstein, *Lutheran Makers of America. Brief Sketches of Sixty-eight Notable Early Americans* (Philadelphia, 1930). This work and others like it deal with Lutherans in the colonial and revolutionary period in American history. *Lutherans in Colonial Days* (Philadelphia, 1926). J. W. Richards, *Penn's Lutheran Forerunners and Friends* (Columbus, 1927). J. W. Mann, *Life and Times of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg* (Philadelphia, 1887). P. Anstadt, *The Life and Times of Dr. Schmucker* (York, Pa., 1896). D. W. Clark, *The World of Justus Falckner* (Philadelphia, 1946).

Biographies of various descriptions covering founders, and acknowledged leaders of the various movements within American Lutheranism, are to be had in goodly number for the years 1776-1917. No attempt will be made to draw up a specimen section because to select one biography would be to omit another. Suffice it to mention the coverage of one who was both "saddlebag preacher" and "patriarch of the Lutheran Church in America," Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, 1711-1787. Frick (1902), Mann, (1887), Seebach (1934), Stoever (1856), have prepared single volumes about Muhlenberg. Many others have written about him in connection with other subjects. In addition to "the family portrait" by Paul A. W. Wallace, *The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, U. of Pa. Press, 1950), there is the bibliography by Felix Reichmann, *The Muhlenberg Family: A Bibliography Compiled from the Subject Union Catalog, Americana-Germanica of the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation* (Philadelphia, 1943). This enlarged extract of a union catalog on seven members of this distinguished family is in lithographed form, but its forty-three pages are not an exhaustive bibliography. Memoirs and journals of Lutheran stalwarts such as Muhlenberg supply an excellent source for biographical material, although original journals often have lacunae which need to be filled out. *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg* (Philadelphia, The Muhlenberg Press, 1942) are being translated by Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein. Two volumes of this extensive three-volume work have been published, volume 3 is expected this fall.

American Lutheranism awaits a skilled limner of character, and some agency headed by an indefatigable compiler, to work this wealth of source material into a Dictionary of American Lutheran Biography.

DOCTRINAL AND CONTROVERSIAL WORKS

To know the Lutheran Church aright her doctrines and principles must be studied. Following the canonical Scriptures, and the three ecumenical creeds, are the symbolical books to which the major Lutheran bodies in America are pledged. An early edition of these official doctrinal writings by a famous press in American Lutheran history is *The Christian Book of Concord; or, Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church; Comprising the Three Chief Symbols, the Unaltered Augsburg Confession, the Apology, the Smalcald Articles, Luther's Smaller and Larger Catechisms, the Formula of Concord, and an Appendix*. To which is prefixed an Historical Introduction. Translated from the German. Second Edition, revised. (Newmarket, Virginia; Solomon D. Henkel & Brothers, 1854.) The first edition had appeared in 1851.

From the prolific pen of Henry Eyster Jacobs came two editions of the symbolical books. Still standard is his *The Book of Concord; or, The Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Philadelphia, G. W. Frederick, 1882). Volume 1 contains the Confessions, volume 2 has the historical introduction, notes, appendices and indices. In 1911 Jacobs edited the People's Edition of *The Book of Concord; or, The Symbolic Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Translated from the Original Languages, with Analyses and an Exhaustive Index*. (Philadelphia, General Council Publication Board.) The Concordia Publishing House issued a reprint of the English text of the *Concordia Triglotta* under the title, *Concordia, or Book of Concord* (St. Louis, 1922); and a reissue of the *Concordia Triglotta* (St. Louis) in 1956. A "companion volume" with a brief bibliography to the *Book of Concord* is by Willard D. Allbeck, *Studies in the Lutheran Confessions* (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1952).

Lutheran writers have produced many works centering about one or all of the symbolical books. This is instanced by a few titles: C. J. I. Bergendorff, *The Making and Meaning of the Augsburg Confession* (Rock Island, Ill., Augustana, 1930); J. L. Neve, *Introduction to the Symbolical Books of the Lutheran Church*, second revised edition (Columbus Lutheran Book Concern, 1926). A work concisely and popularly presented is C. H. Little, *Lutheran Confessional Theology; a Presentation of the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord* (St. Louis, Concordia, 1943). More

recent are: Stanley E. Carnarius, *What Lutherans Believe; with the Catechism of Martin Luther* (Philadelphia, 1951); John Schmidt, *The Lutheran Confessions; their Values and Meaning* (Muhlenberg, 1957).

Many factors beside ethnic and personal ones, during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, converged to form a period of internal discord (1830-1870) in the life of the Lutheran Church in America. A controversial literature of enormous bulk resulted from these antitheses between historical conservative Lutheranism and "American Lutheranism." Because the latter was a modified form of Lutheranism, care must be exercised lest the two words be used as a generic term for Lutheranism in America. The spirit of faction which moved men to hurl such inverted compliments as "head Christians," "catechism Christians," "croaking old Lutherans," and "anti-symbolists," also moved them to voluminous support of their confessional distinctions in periodicals, pamphlets, and books. Much of it is in the German and Scandinavian tongues. Only a few of the more prominent titles can be mentioned here. A valuable work on the whole subject, with an appended bibliography replete with detail and numerous quotations from minutes and periodical literature, is Vergilius Ferm, *The Crisis in American Lutheran Theology. A Study of the Issue between American Lutheranism and Old Lutheranism* (New York, 1927). A work by J. W. Richard contains a section on this subject as part of *The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church* (Philadelphia, 1909). Auxiliary material in this area is supplied by C. H. Little, *Disputed Doctrines* (Burlington, Iowa, Lutheran Literary Board, 1933).

One of the prominent advocates of "American Lutheranism" in his later years was Samuel Simon Schmucker. Three of his many writings are: *Lutheran Manual on Scriptural Principles; or, The Augsburg Confession Illustrated and Sustained . . .* (Philadelphia, 1855); *American Lutheranism Vindicated, or, Examination of the Lutheran Symbols, Including a Reply to the Plea of Rev. W. J. Mann on Certain Disputed Topics* (Baltimore, Kurtz, 1856). The third work, published anonymously (although later S. S. Schmucker admitted being its author), was labeled by opponents as a "revised Augsburg confession," and was entitled the *Definite Platform, Doctrinal and Disciplinarian, for Evangelical Lutheran District Synods: Constructed in Accordance with the Principles of the General Synod* (Philadelphia, Miller & Burlock, 1855). Second edition, 1856. A work which could well serve to indicate a wide effort put forth over just one debated issue of the many troublesome questions once abroad in Lutheran history in America is the large volume by G. H. Schodde on

predestination, *The Error of Modern Missouri: Its Inception, Development, and Refutation* (Columbus, Ohio, 1897).

At times the theological debate tended to move from the base of the Confessions to matters not covered by them, and these also served to uncover the talent of able theologians in the major branches of the Lutheran Church. Conspicuous were three authors whose works were widely circulated and studied: Charles Porterfield Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology* (Philadelphia, 1871); Henry Eyster Jacobs, *Summary of the Christian Faith* (Philadelphia, 1905); Theodore E. Schmauk and C. Theodore Benze, *The Confessional Principle and the Confessions of the Lutheran Church* (Philadelphia, 1911). The Krauth volume has bibliographical footnotes; and the one by Schmauk and Benze, a full bibliography and detailed reference for an extensive body of information in periodicals and special works.

The interest of Lutherans on the American scene in doctrine is evident from the dogmatic works produced. Prominent in this *corpus doctrinae* are: Henrich Schmid, *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church* (Philadelphia, Lutheran Publication Society, 1899), translated by Hay and Jacobs. A substantial two-volume work by M. Valentine, *Christian Theology* (Philadelphia, 1906); A. L. Graebner, *Doctrinal Theology* (St. Louis, 1898), a thetical compend with "orthodox Lutheran doctrines" in 185 paragraphs; Joseph Stump, *The Christian Faith, a System of Christian Dogmatics* (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1942), primarily a textbook and copyrighted in 1932; J. T. Mueller, *Christian Dogmatics* (St. Louis, 1934), a complete and authentic Missourian treatment of the subject; E. W. A. Koehler, *Summary of Christian Doctrine* (St. Louis, 1938) with title similar to the volume by Jacobs, but a Concordia publication; C. J. I. Bergendorff, *The Doctrine of the Church in American Lutheranism* (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1956).

A compilation which presents in brief yet comprehensive form the doctrinal standpoints of the various general bodies of the Lutheran Church in America went through three editions, and was published by the Lutheran Board of Publication: *The Distinctive Doctrines and Usages of the General Bodies of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States* (Philadelphia, 2nd edition, 1893). A fourth edition thoroughly revised was issued in 1914.

Despite diversity and acrimonious controversy, Lutheran constituencies had problems in common which served to draw them together, and this in turn has led to the literature of conference, organization, merger, and co-

operative action. Several General Bodies met unofficially in 1877 and in 1878 to consider urgent doctrinal and practical problems of the hour; their published proceedings and essays were entitled *First Free Lutheran Diet in America* (Philadelphia, 1878). The second Diet was reported in a similar volume, 1879. Twenty years later these Bodies made official provision for these general meetings under the name "General Conference." *The First General Conference of Lutherans in America* (Philadelphia, 1899) is the title of the published account of its proceedings and papers. Similar volumes were printed for the conferences held in 1902 and 1904. H. E. Jacobs was the editor of all these Proceedings.

Over twenty years ago the Missouri Synod historian Theodore Graebner included an essay on the history of Lutheran efforts to join their common life in his book *The Problem of Lutheran Union and Other Essays* (St. Louis, 1935). A fuller account of the Missouri Synod position is to be found in a joint account by T. Graebner and P. E. Kretzmann, *Toward Lutheran Union* (St. Louis, 1943). Reference has been made to Osborne, *Lutherans Working Together*, a history of the National Lutheran Council, but it is mentioned here as indicative of a practical expression of co-operative relations among various Lutheran bodies. The regional and synodical walls which must be surmounted for national seminars and joint undertakings among Lutherans can be gathered from *Doctrinal Declarations. A Collection of Official Statements on the Doctrinal Position of Various Lutheran Synods in America* (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing House, 1952). For the official text of the several declarations, statements, and clarifications, one must turn to the minutes of the respective synods and bodies concerned in each case.

The Lutheran periodical press has been a considerable source of information for these developments in times past and currently is the main medium for material on the process of Lutheran unification. Important doctrinal statements, especially for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are found in the *Augustana Quarterly*, *Columbus Theological Magazine*, *Concordia Theological Monthly*, *Evangelical Quarterly Review*, *Lehre u. Wehre*, *Lutheran Church Quarterly*, *Lutheran Quarterly*, *Lutheran Witness*, *Lutheraner*.

A prominent leader in transcending national and linguistic boundaries on the American Lutheran scene was Nicolas Lenker (1858-1936). His landmark book was *Lutherans in All Lands* (Milwaukee, Wis., 1893). Lenker was the editor of the first extensive (fourteen volumes) edition of Luther's Works in English. Only twelve of the proposed twenty-four

volumes of the "Standard Edition" appeared: *The Precious and Sacred Writings of Martin Luther . . .* (Minneapolis, 1903-1909). The "Philadelphia Edition," *Works of Martin Luther, with Introduction and Notes . . .* (Philadelphia, A. J. Holman Company, 1915-1932), in six volumes, is in print, but contains only forty-nine of the Reformer's works. Currently in process of publication in modern English is the monumental fifty-five-volume edition of Luther's *Works* (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing House, 1955-date), J. Pelikan, editor; a joint undertaking by the publishing houses of two Lutheran bodies, the U.L.C.A. and the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Four volumes have appeared to date, but when completed this will be the largest and most authentic English edition available anywhere.

LITURGY AND HYMNODY

Sound conclusions about a denomination cannot be reached without a consideration of its faith as exhibited in liturgy and hymnody. Early Lutheran congregations in America had to depend on hymnals of foreign publication, or American reprints of the same, for their congregational singing. The dominant hymnal was in all probability the Marburg book with its historic lessons and choral texts. One by a famous colonial press carries this title page: *Vollständiges Marburger Gesang-Buch . . .* (Germantown, Christoph Saur, 1770). Muhlenberg mentions in his journals ordering the "Freylinghausen," *Johann Anastasii Freylinghausen . . . Geistreiches Gesang-Buch . . .* (Halle, 1741). The *Psalmodia Germanica; or the German Psalmody. Translated from the High Dutch . . .* (New York, reprinted and sold by H. Gaine, 1756) is the only book in English in this pre-synodical period. The first Lutheran order for worship on the North American continent drew upon existing orders in Europe, and was prepared in 1748. Henry Melchior Muhlenberg and two other pastors prepared the outline of worship. It was carefully copied by hand forty times, but it was never printed, although it was the only authorized order of service for American Lutherans for forty years. A materially altered form was published in 1786, *Erbauliche Lieder-Samlung . . . Vereinigten Evangelisch Lutherischen Ministeriums* (Germantown, Leibert and Billmeyer, 1786).

There were times of high tide and low tide in the liturgical development in the Lutheran Church in America. Many liturgical efforts after 1748 resulted in some forty different liturgies originating in various quarters of the Church during less than a century. The first synodical hymnbook in English was *A Collection of Hymns and a Liturgy . . . Published by order*

of the *Evangelical Lutheran Synod of the State of New York* (Philadelphia, Billmeyer, 1814). In 1828 the General Synod issued *Hymns, Selected and Original* (Gettysburg). This work went through fifty-six editions and several revisions. In 1849 the Ministerium of Pennsylvania issued *The Deutsche Gesangbuch* (Philadelphia, Wollenweber, 1849) to replace the 1786 book. Two years earlier the Missouri Synod issued its official *Kirchengesangbuch* (St. Louis, 1847). Several hymnals were published under private auspices such as the *Church Hymn Book*, by Paul Henkel (New Market, Va., Solomon Henkel's Printing Office, 1816). A harbinger of higher liturgical attainment possible was the development reached by Lutheran liturgical scholars and liturgical tastes as manifested in the *Church Book* prepared by the Pennsylvania Ministerium (Philadelphia, 1868), and the "Washington Service" prepared and adopted by the General Synod (Philadelphia, 1869).

The high point in liturgical achievement in the Lutheran Church since Muhlenberg's liturgy came with the completion of *The Common Service* (1888), and its immediate wide acceptance on the part of five major Lutheran bodies including the English Missouri Synod. Some evaluations in its day rated the *Church Book* as one of the best English hymnals in use in America.

The Common Service Book and Hymnal (Philadelphia, 1917) marked the third milestone in American Lutheran liturgical history, especially of the United Lutheran Church in America. The Common Service has been incorporated in the service books of other Lutheran bodies until it has become "the most typical order of American Lutheran worship."

A more complete account of Lutheran liturgy and hymnody in America would include developments in the other major bodies of Lutherans, and add to this specimen section such titles as *American Lutheran Hymnal*, *The Concordia Hymnal*, *The Lutheran Hymnal*, *The Wartburg Hymnal*, plus a large number of miscellaneous works.

Liturgical trends, developments in the field of church music, and the formation of larger bodies in the American Lutheran Church, require a revision of the Lutheran liturgy and hymnal. A Joint Commission on Liturgy and Hymnal, representing eight bodies, has labored fourteen years to produce what should be a fourth milestone in the liturgical development of the Lutheran Church in America. The new publication dated 1958 is to be an order for worship better than any previously produced in this country. The pre-print booklet, *Liturgical Music from the Service Book of the Lutheran Church in America* (1957), has already been circulated.

Six hundred thirty-five thousand copies of the new *Service Book and Hymnal* are being printed.

Besides the numerous articles on the liturgy and hymnal to be found in Lutheran periodical literature, attention is called to *Memoirs of the Lutheran Liturgical Association*. Vols. I-VII, 1898-1907. *Essays From the . . . Institute of Liturgical Studies* (Valparaiso, Ind., Valparaiso University Press, 1950-53). Also the periodicals, *Sursum Corda* and *Una Sancta. An Explanation of the Common Service*; with Appendices on Christian Hymnody and Liturgical Colors, and a Glossary of Liturgical Terms, revised and enlarged (Philadelphia, United Lutheran Publication House, 1941). P. A. Strodach, *A Manual of Worship*, revised edition (Philadelphia, 1946). A volume containing both history and an extensive bibliography chosen from a vast number of published sources in this field is *A Study of the Common Service of the Lutheran Church in America* (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1947), by Luther D. Reed. The Missouri Synod has issued through its Concordia Publishing House two volumes auxiliary to its *Lutheran Hymnal*. The first was compiled by W. G. Polack, *The Handbook to the Lutheran Hymnal* (St. Louis, 1942). The second is a word index compiled by E. V. Haserott, *Concordance to the Lutheran Hymnal* (St. Louis, 1956).

CYCLOPEDIAS AND YEARBOOKS

Lutheran history, biography, and many other types of information germane to this Church, are served by its cyclopedias and yearbooks. The *Lutheran Cyclopedie* (New York, Scribner, 1899), by H. E. Jacobs and J. A. W. Haas, contains 752 pages giving "A summary of the chief topics comprised in the doctrine, the life, the customs, the history, and the statistics of the Lutheran Church." Similar information, with special interests of Missouri Lutherans in mind, is presented by editors L. Fuerbringer, Th. Engelder, and P. E. Kretzmann in *The Concordia Cyclopedie* (St. Louis, 1927). Under Missouri Synod auspices a revised, enlarged, and up-to-date version of this reference volume appeared under the title, *Lutheran Cyclopedie* (St. Louis, Concordia Publishing House, 1954), Erwin L. Lueker, editor-in-chief. The volume offers information on 7,550 religious subjects including contemporary biography, some bibliography, and gives special emphasis to Lutheranism in America.

A standard source book in this category is *The Lutheran World Almanac and Annual Encyclopedia* (New York, National Lutheran Council, 1921-31/33, 34/37). More comprehensive than any of its kind in

Lutheran literature, the work attempts to gather and compile all the information concerning the various Lutheran bodies, and is fullest for the Church in the United States. The 1931-1933 edition features a cumulative index covering the content of volumes I-VI. The successor to *The Lutheran World Almanac* is *The Lutheran Churches of the World* (Minneapolis, 1929). A. R. Wentz was the editor of the 1952 volume (Geneva, 1952), while the 1957 edition was the work of seven authors under the auspices of the Lutheran World Federation (Minneapolis, 1957). Each of these furnishes in a comparatively small, compact space, historical and current information in keeping with the title, the Lutheran Church in America included; but lacks the infinite detail and other features of its predecessor in lieu of narrative survey and interpretation.

For detailed parochial and institutional statistics, pastoral directory, necrology, and the usual yearbook type of information, one must consult official minutes and reports as well as the various almanacs and yearbooks of the Lutheran bodies and synods in America. A great variety of these works has appeared, and each major body continues to fill this storehouse of information. For its voluminous official proceedings the United Lutheran Church in America published a *Comprehensive Index to Biennial Convention Minutes, 1918-1952*, (Philadelphia). Space prohibits listing these highly specialized volumes which serve many purposes in addition to contributing to more comprehensive studies such as *A Statistical Handbook for the Lutheran Churches in North America* (New York, 1950). This useful handbook concerning the National Lutheran Council and its constituents was prepared by the Council's Department of Statistics of the Division of Public Relations. One of a series of factual studies on the United States, directed by E. W. Mueller, draws from nine synodical yearbooks, plus some other statistical reports, and the 1950 U. S. Census Report, for its numerous profiles and maps. The Study is *A Profile of the Lutheran Church in the United States* (Chicago, Division of American Missions of the N.L.C., 1954).

LOCATION OF MAJOR COLLECTIONS

One of the most complete collections of Lutheran historical literature in America dates from 1843, with the organization of the Lutheran Historical Society. Its depository at the Theological Seminary in Gettysburg lists more than 9,000 volumes relating to all Lutheran bodies, besides manuscripts, thousands of pamphlets, numerous fugitive materials, and the archives of several synods. Following a gradual decline in activity in

recent decades the Society was described officially as "dormant" in 1952. Its functions are perpetuated in part regionally by the development of working collections on the part of Lutheran colleges and seminaries, particularly where they hold the archives or in other ways serve their constituencies; and by the files of official bodies, as well as private libraries of historians.

The Krauth Memorial Library, Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, has another of the major collections on Lutheranism in America, especially material dealing with its origins in the Eastern states, and source materials in liturgics. Here are preserved the journals of Muhlenberg and other valuable manuscripts, the archive collections of the Ministerium, the Slovak Zion Synod, and the United Lutheran Church in America.

Both "extensive" and "comprehensive" describe the resources to be had on the history and doctrines of the Lutheran Church in the two collections on the campus of the Concordia Seminary, St. Louis—the Pritzlaff Memorial Library and the Library of the Concordia Historical Institute. The latter is the official depository for the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and has under way a well-planned microtext program to extend its coverage of American Lutheran documents and source materials well beyond the Missourian nucleus. Concordia Seminary campus will also become the location for the library which is to house the materials collected by the recently incorporated Foundation for Reformation Research. Headed by a board of leading scholars, the Foundation will concern itself with collecting and collating originals or micro-reproductions of all important sources, primary and secondary, dealing with the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation as well as related areas of history. The library and research center is to be a central clearinghouse and catalog of sources available in this country.

The Martin Luther Library, in the Lutheran Brotherhood Home Office, Minneapolis, is of recent origin, and contains a beginning collection on Martin Luther and the Church.

The National Lutheran Council headquarters in New York City has a collection of 1,800 volumes with special reference to the American Lutheran Church and Lutheran foreign missions.

The *multum in parvo* rule accounts for many of the limitations apparent in this bibliography. Not included was any treatment of American Lutheran materials in such areas as synodical histories, home and foreign missions, social work, homiletics, Sunday School and catechetics, official and

semi-official publications of the denomination's agencies. Of the numerous Lutheran periodicals only a few of the major titles were cited and they were listed with their respective subject fields. Not every item of value in Americo-Lutheran literature has been included under the headings developed; the hiatus in each is quite apparent to the writer. Many other excellent works exist which have not been mentioned (such as works in the German and Scandinavian tongues), and a more comprehensive synthesis would be incomplete without them. The huge literature of each division of the Lutheran Church in America compelled broad representation. The selection problem touched many loyalties and crossed a maze of organizational boundaries in order to avoid chalking any line that separates. Scholarly moderation affected final choice of titles in some cases even though breadth of field, rather than depth, was a major objective in compilation. The design was not to make this bibliography an end in itself, but a means of guidance to the general user, and a challenge to definitive effort in this direction by Lutherans qualified for the attempt.

Commentary

TO THE EDITOR OF RELIGION IN LIFE

Dear Sir:

The provocative article by Carl Michalson, "Faith for the Crisis of Suffering," in the Summer issue, said much that the present writer would like to underline. "Much of our suffering is self-inflicted." But regarding the suffering that isn't, there are a few points that bother me.

(1) "In the Christian faith . . . this mystery is unveiled: *we can know that God does not intend our suffering*" (p. 410). How does this unveil the mystery? Dr. Michalson has already said that suffering is a mystery, "which cannot lie wholly open to us"; also that it is wrong to identify suffering with evil, since it may at times be a good (p. 404). If it is not evil as such, why labor so hard to dissociate God from it? Some suffering which at the time seems meaningless later takes on meaning; how, then, can we be sure in advance which sufferings God did not intend?

There is an impressive body of testimony through Christian history that the solution to the deepest crises of suffering is found by accepting it as given by God. Paul accepted not only persecutions due to discipleship (which Dr. Michalson rightly admits become meaningful and sacramental) but also his thorn in the flesh as from God—mediated by Satan, yes, but fulfilling a specific divine purpose. When Calvin wrote of suffering as the "third sacrament," he may have meant primarily suffering due to discipleship, but did not clearly delimit it. Roland de Pury, a Swiss pastor imprisoned by the Nazis in World War II, wrote a poignant little book, *Journal From My Cell*; in it he says he found he could endure his prison experiences only if he accepted *everything* as from God's hand—"God's left hand"—meanwhile (or therefore) being equally sure of approaching deliverance.

I agree with Dr. Michalson that such indignities are *not* from God's hand. But we have to account somehow for the settled conviction that they are, which has emerged from the experience of many who suffered profoundly. Both "sheer paganism" and "sheer sentimentalized Christianity" (p. 408) are singularly infelicitous terms for it. Such testimony indicates that *something* in all this pain, including the most meaningless and involuntary, really was from God's hand. There was a thread running through all these experiences which God did intend, for which God could be thanked, with which the sufferer had to follow along and co-operate in order to keep from breaking—a line of hidden loving intention which led the sufferer to God himself.

That God did not intend many human sufferings to be as grim as they actually are—often too horribly great and long sustained, so that they twist or break the spirit instead of building or disciplining it—I can well believe. Dr. Edwin Lewis' doctrine of "the Discreative," the Adversary beyond God's control, seems much more credible than traditional doctrines of God's complete sovereignty. But this view can claim only partial biblical support. The biblical tradition regarded Satan as a *created* force, his power ultimately subject to God. Luther knew the devil pretty well, yet even he was able to say that Satan was only the dung with which the Lord fertilized his vineyard. Such testimonies warn us to leave the question open. We

may well hope, however, that there are certain evils which neither God nor man create—but none which God cannot redeem.

(2) Dr. Michalson says that when a Japanese poet, a leper, accepts "a vision of His cross" as giving meaning to an otherwise meaningless affliction, "the sentiment is false" (p. 409). To me it is Dr. Michalson's statement that rings false. True, the New Testament does not extend the concept of "carrying the cross" to the whole realm of sufferings that are the daily lot of the great majority of mankind. Since the daily lot of this present age was not expected to last long, it was not then a problem. But millions of Christians since, especially Pietists and Roman Catholics, have been taught that to carry the common burdens of their lot and the special burdens of their individual conditioning is to carry their cross. And where the involuntary sufferings are real, deep, lasting for years or perhaps a lifetime, the sense of fellowship with Christ's sufferings has been the mainspring of their lives. There has even been the teaching that one may offer up those sufferings which are not the result of one's own sins toward the salvation of other souls, and thus share in the great work of salvation which Christ initiated. Most Protestants, no doubt, could not go along with this; but I wonder if any modern sophisticated theologian has the right to tell such sufferers that they are living by an illusion.

Others besides Dr. Michalson recently have hammered on this point that if you are not an all-out disciple, i.e., if you are not such a free, heroic, adventurous soul that your sufferings are the result of your own free choice to serve sacrificially, you do not belong with St. Paul and the martyrs in "the fellowship of Christ's suffering." If you are hampered from such personal effectiveness for the Gospel as to invite persecution; if you are physically or temperamentally handicapped or not enough of an extravert or have too many family obligations that prevent heroism, then you are excluded. Strictly this may be correct, but must one believe that everyone who courts persecution is included in the august fellowship of redemptive pain, while those whose suffering is inward, invisible, and great (even some not consoled by Christian faith!) stand outside it? Jesus did not say only "Blessed are the persecuted," but also "Blessed are they that hunger" (Luke) and "Blessed are they that mourn" (Matthew). While some New Testament commentators now give special limited meaning to the word "mourn," there is no record that Jesus did.

For most people in this present life, frankly, I do not see how full discipleship is possible at all. There is suffering from that very fact, if one has ever glimpsed the possibility. Dr. Michalson admits of a "practical solution": "We can use suffering as an occasion for discipleship, testifying to God's reality in the patience and radiance with which we bear our meaningless suffering" (p. 410). But to whatever degree one can do this, to that degree one actively chooses the suffering as a "way," becomes a disciple, and to that degree a cross-bearer! This way, or cross, is thereby recognized as God-given, as sacramental.

Even if God is limited by "the Adversary," it is still true that, loving the great potentials of human life, He chose to create us under conditions in which atrocities unintended by him can happen; and in that sense he is still responsible even for these events. But the one sure testimony of Christian sufferers is that God is also *both* powerful enough and loving enough to heal us of all the damage done, provided we open ourselves to the healing.

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Book Reviews and Notices

Resurrection and Historical Reason. By RICHARD R. NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957. viii-184 pp. \$3.95.

The vexed and vexing questions regarding reason, history, and the resurrection of Christ have typically been approached in abstraction from each other. Accordingly, the faith which has been reconciled with reason has often borne little resemblance to the historical faith of the church, and the history which has been embraced by supposedly faithful reason has often had nothing to do with the resurrection. It is an initial merit of the treatise here reviewed that such abstraction has been consciously repudiated. Addressing the questions in their interpenetration and coalescence, Richard R. Niebuhr (of Harvard Divinity School) makes a most impressive if somewhat exasperating contribution to the deepest concerns of modern theology. His revamped (Yale) doctoral thesis is highly relevant in many contemporary directions.

Because of its centrality of focus, the book must invoke many special disciplines from the philosophy of nature to technical New Testament research, and in one way or another it illuminates all of them. There are innumerable insights of great penetration and suggestiveness, and these would doubtless be more fully grounded and elaborated than they are if the published version had not required condensation. Even so there is a certain obscurity in the writing, deriving mainly from the subtlety and the real profundity of the thought. Dr. Niebuhr shows himself already a theologian's theologian, able to comprehend and interpret the essential structure and the historical situation of Christian thought from a perspective that is individual, original, and thoroughly sophisticated. His work is not popularization and it is not apologetics. It is *fides quaerens intellectum* in the sense Barth gave the phrase in his book on Anselm: that is, faith seeking first of all, very candidly and fundamentally, to understand itself from its own basis and in its own terms. But in a way that seems quite un-Barthian, Niebuhr wishes to take seriously the order of creation or at least the order of history.

In his own words, the book "represents an attempt to understand the connection between the biblical proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the order of theological thought" (p. v). This describes the project, carried through in intimate conversancy with the main lines of modern Protestant thinking. The content of the argument is manifold. Primary is the thesis that the resurrection stands as the essential historical foundation of the faith. In relation to this are reviewed the failures of the two main nineteenth-century substitutes for the resurrection kerygma: the "Jesus of history" of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, and the symbolic God-man of the speculative Christology. The first of these rightly clung to history but tailored it to fit natural science, while the second withdrew from history into idealistic metaphysics. Neither recourse could preserve authentic Christian faith. (In a longer review, one might pause to argue a bit here, but the thrust of the thesis seems justified.)

As the critique comes to bear on the present scene, the efforts to develop an independent theological method by Barth, Bultmann, and Knox are incisively examined. While appreciative of Barth, Niebuhr points out that his strain of Christomonism has tended to foreclose the problem of history by simply ignoring it, lapsing

into a transcendental idealism which makes the Christian consciousness as supra-historical as it makes Christ himself. Partly responsible for driving Barth toward this transcendental ultra-objectivism, Niebuhr suggests, is Bultmann's equal and opposite subjectivism which tends to divorce faith from any connection with history, nature, or society. John Knox has avoided both extremes by conceiving the Christ-event and the church in indefeasible interdependence and mutuality; but so far, it is felt, he has not provided sufficiently against the assimilation and immanentizing of the Christ-event by the church.

What is really necessary, Niebuhr feels, is a thoroughgoing "critique of historical reason" (p. 89) which will not seek the conditions of biblical history in either natural science or idealistic metaphysics (as the nineteenth century tended to do and many still tend to do), "but rather in the answer to the distinctive question, how do we know historical events?" (which question tends to be overlooked by the contemporaries mentioned above). The positive side of the argument, then, is the attempt to lay the groundwork of such a critique, which would modify the insupportable dichotomy of pure and practical reason bequeathed to modern thought by Kant. The attempt is a very significant one, though limitations of space preclude anything like an adequate analysis in this review.

On the one hand, Niebuhr rejects the abortive notion of *Heilsgeschichte* which (as in Barth) tends to transcendentalize the Christian foundation into a superhistory unrelated to real history. On the other hand (and on the other "side" of the problem, so to speak), he subjects the idea of nature to sharp criticism, seeking to liberate history from rigid bondage to natural necessity and uniformity. His hints concerning the contingency and even the fallenness of the natural order (whereby death comes to appear as natural, necessary and final, while in the essential order of being it is not really so) seem somewhat inconclusive. However, his effort to put natural law in a perspective which will allow and provide for the spontaneity and arbitrariness of singular events is carried through cogently.

Others, such as Dilthey and Collingwood, have sought to emancipate history from natural science and to establish it upon its own ground. In contrast to them, and also to the philosophy of process which influences Knox, Niebuhr stresses the transcendence of the historical event, its power critically to stand against and redemptively to transform present and future. This is salutary, but while guarding the integrity of the event, has Niebuhr accounted for how the event may become the object of systematic critical study? That is, has he left a basis for any kind of objective historical science, even a theological one? He does not appear to recognize here an ontological and critical reason which is neither merely natural nor merely historical. Yet his reluctance to do so makes it difficult to see how his procedure would really differ from Barth's in the actual handling of historical materials.

Somewhat exasperating is the failure of the essay to define early enough or adequately what is meant by the resurrection. In the preface, to be sure, there is implied disdain for the "allegorizing" and "volatizing" of the resurrection, and it is soon made clear that its speculative transmutation into symbol is not regarded as legitimate. But what is and what is not allegorizing and symbolizing? Only within the last ten pages of the text are we told ". . . it is time to give recognition to the problems raised by such phrases as 'resurrection of the body'—problems having to do with the objectivity or independence of the risen Christ" (p. 172). It seems clear that Niebuhr would insist upon only so much "objectivity" as would provide a hypo-

theoretical basis for the "recognition" of the disciples that the Jesus they knew had surmounted the grave. (Cf. Tillich's "restitution theory," which seems to differ mainly in being less definite about the individual survival of Jesus.) Apparently we are to think of the first witness as being encountered by a more objective presence than that which (normally) encounters Christians today, although Niebuhr also holds that through the common memory of the church the apostolic experience of the resurrection may become so transparent that we too can "recognize" in a way that surpasses mere memory.

Richard R. Niebuhr's book cannot be said to be a model of clarity in all respects, but it certainly is an excellent and admirable work, powerful critically, constructively helpful and full of promise.

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Christ and the Christian. By NELS F. S. FERRÉ. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 253 pp. \$3.75.

Nels Ferré continues his series of theological works in this book on Christology. As in the earlier books of the series, he seeks to unite faith with reason, using the philosophical method to analyze the relation of the divine to the human in Christ. He argues that the proper starting point for the understanding of Christ is neither our individual and collective experience nor the historical interpretation of Christ in the Bible or the creeds. If we start with subjective experience we cannot arrive at objective reality, and the diversity and fallibility of the historical interpretations of Christ require a critical although appreciative attitude toward them. The correct starting point is with Christ himself as Agape, the primary "motif" of the New Testament. Ferré insists that this is not the same thing as starting with the historical Jesus, since it is the divine Agape manifested in him rather than the details of his life and teaching which is important. Despite this distinction he makes full use of the Gospel accounts of Jesus, affirming that we can obtain from them a substantially true picture of him.

One of the most appealing things about Ferré's treatment of Christ is his strong emphasis upon the full humanity of Jesus. He attacks every tendency to deny or minimize the human nature, e.g., the Apollinarian heresy and the theory of an impersonal human nature. He argues in a most forthright manner both that the Virgin Birth stories are untrustworthy and that they imply a denial of the full humanity of Jesus. He even has the courage to challenge the traditional claim that Jesus was always sinless, citing his rebuke of the Syro-Phoenician woman and the reference in Hebrews 5:7-9 to his fear of death. Ferré's stress upon the real Incarnation is obviously motivated by his concern throughout for the relevance of Jesus' victory over sin and death for the Christian life.

Although he regards the traditional interpretation of Christ in the creeds as basically true, he deals with it very briefly, since his main concern is to reformulate the doctrine of two natures in one person in more modern terms. The category of "substance" or "nature," he thinks, is adequate to describe things but not persons and their relations, and the traditional assumption of an absolute qualitative difference between the divine and the human "natures" makes it impossible to understand the intimate relation between them in Jesus. The category of "organism" is more

adequate for this purpose but it cannot do justice to the transcendence of God, the organicism philosophy viewing him only as "the mental pole in a process of *creativity*" rather than as the Creator. Therefore it is necessary to use the categories of "person" and "spirit" and to use them together.

As the Chalcedonian formula affirms both the distinctness of the two natures in Christ and the unity of his person, we must combine an emphasis upon the "encounter" of Jesus and God as a transcendent *personal* Being with a recognition of the "coinherence" of God in him as an immanent *spiritual* Being. Ferré holds that "if we start with the personal category as ultimate, we arrive at a doctrine not of Incarnation, but only of confrontation and of moral union" (p. 130). To avoid this danger of a "Nestorian" division of the person, he prefers to start with the category of "Spirit." He conceives of the Incarnation not only in terms of personal "confrontation" but also in terms of "coinherence" of the divine Spirit as "co-Subject" in the human spirit or the "interpenetration" of the divine and the human. The essential thing is to affirm that the Son of God as "personal Spirit of Love" took the initiative and was met by the faithful response of the Son of Man. The result was the "God-man" or, as Ferré likes to say, the "Godman."

Another distinctive thing in Ferré's Christology is his strong conviction that Christians can also become "sons of God" or "Godmen." Although Christ is "the summit and the summary of human history," he is not "wholly other" than our selves. "The uniqueness of Jesus is the uniqueness of a historic fact, not of a relation to God inaccessible to anyone else" (p. 213). Even his Resurrection, which Ferré strongly affirms as the "fitting and proper climax of earthly Incarnation," is unique only in this sense. "We see once more that the uniqueness is not a relation to God whereby Jesus differs from us, but a historic concrete Event into which we are invited to enter" (p. 217). Whether this conception of Jesus' uniqueness will satisfy most Christians is dubious, but Ferré can cite in its favor passages such as the reference in I Corinthians 15:20 to Christ as "the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep." Also, he maintains in the spirit of the Logos Christology that only through the eternal Son of God who was incarnate in Jesus can men be saved, although it is not essential that they know Jesus of Nazareth.

In a chapter on the Atonement, Ferré makes a strong defense of "substitutionary" or "vicarious" atonement. He bases this upon an analysis of man's "actual living on and off other lives" and "the sacrifice of life for other life." Although he is tantalizingly brief in his references to traditional theories, it is obvious that he does not accept a mechanical substitutionary theory, since this tends to minimize man's own moral responsibility. Indeed, he emphasizes the participation of men in the process of reconciliation through vicarious suffering, just as he insists that they can become "Godmen." Thus, his use of the term "substitution" is only a way of stressing the necessity of God's initiative as sacrificial Love in the process of Atonement. Moreover, while he rejects "moral influence" theories as inadequate and insists that only through sacrifice by God himself can men receive the power for new life in fellowship, he also maintains that "atonement involves our walking even as Jesus walked in obedience, faith, humility, and love" (p. 175).

Despite its brevity, its (at times) difficult terminology, and its silence on many points, this book is a fresh and stimulating treatment of the doctrine of Christ. It combines traditional truths with modern interpretations in a mediating theology. Above all, it shows that the faith that "God was in Christ reconciling the world to

himself" can be understood in such a way as not to deny the humanity of Jesus and relieve the Christian of the responsibility to follow him in the practice of love and fellowship.

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The Death of Christ. By JOHN KNOX. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 190 pp. \$2.75.

The first thing to be said about this book is that it fully measures up to the very high standard set by John Knox's earlier books. This standard welds together diverse qualities: lucidity and felicity of style, personal humility and intellectual honesty, and an unerring sense of direction. The second thing to be said is that this is by all odds the most controversial treatise by the author. It merits the most searching scrutiny and the most forthright criticism. Unfortunately, theological debate is today stalled in the doldrums. Easy eclecticism is mistaken for irenicism and controversy is shunned as bad manners. Therefore the book will probably slip into library shelves without challenge by the author's peers. This ought not to be so. To prevent it, let me indicate some of the areas where extended debate is urgently needed.

Professor Knox raises and answers three questions, the first of which is: What can we know about the circumstances and causes of Jesus' death? The answer: Crucifixion in or near Jerusalem at the Passover season by the hand of Romans under the authority of Pilate. Anything more than this is hidden in a Guignebertian uncertainty. But for those who wish to recover the inner meaning of the death, "a knowledge of the external circumstances is not decisive and often not even relevant" (p. 30).

The second question concerns the meaning of death to Jesus himself. The evidence, admittedly meager and ambiguous, is interpreted to show that the meaning to Jesus was very different from its subsequent meaning to the Church, very different from the convictions of the Gospel writers. Jesus, in fact, did not apply to himself, either separately or in merged form, the concepts of Messiah, of the apocalyptic Son of man, of the Suffering Servant. To posit any messianic claim by Jesus would create psychological difficulties so grave as to imperil his sanity, normality, and humanity. Faith would in fact be served well by rejecting the use by Jesus of any messianic category. "The Gospels are largely irrelevant, or only indirectly relevant, to the task of trying to recover Jesus' sense of vocation" (p. 110). We can trust them this far: they show on the part of Jesus a prophetlike sensitivity to "the uniqueness and urgency of the crisis in the midst of which he stood" (p. 122). But to follow them to the point of ascribing to Jesus "definite ideas about his own nature and office . . . may even burden and obstruct [faith in Christ]" (p. 122).

The third, and to the author the most important, question deals with the meaning of the death to the early Church. This is actually the decisive question because the cross becomes the *Cross* only in the context of "a divinely creative event which only the Church remembers" (p. 127). Before answering the first two questions, the historian must accomplish the *fission* of history and interpretation, showing how far were the original facts from the Christian understanding of them. But by contrast, before answering the third question, the historian must achieve "the *fusion* of history and interpretation" (p. 128) because faith had a part in creating

the Cross. Faith can make this death the Cross because the Church "is itself the embodiment of the Resurrection" (p. 133). The event is much more inclusive than the death. The death "is an incident within the event," albeit giving to the event "its actual and symbolic center" (p. 142). The death discloses God's love, but this disclosure "lies in the realm of result (an incidental consequence) rather than of purpose" whether the purpose be God's or Christ's (p. 145). The *consequence* may be described in terms of God's victory over the devil or of Christ's sacrifice for man's sin. But to describe the *purpose* in these same terms would be contradictory, untenable and impossible "for modern man." Nevertheless, as dramatic descriptions of the results embodied in the life of the Church, these traditional doctrines become both true and necessary. We can therefore know this result, but we can never know "why this particular event had this particular result" (p. 157).

The above paragraphs represent a summary, all too brief and sketchy, of the author's conclusions. Behind each point lies a subtle and complex argument. Readers who disagree with the conclusions will be forced to challenge the conceptions of community, of history, of event, and of hermeneutical method upon which the conclusions ultimately rest.

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The Doctrine of the Trinity. By CYRIL C. RICHARDSON. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 159 pp. \$3.00.

This is a most stimulating book. Its effect upon the reader is in part due to its English style, which in spite of the intrinsic difficulty of the subject is as clear as a mountain stream. Chiefly it is due, however, to the valor of the book's author, who takes the field against the entire army of Christian theologians who have defended the dogma of the Trinity—almost twenty centuries of them—without once lowering his arm.

Dr. Richardson knows his authors, antique and modern, at firsthand, and so far as possible lets their own words speak for them. Anselm, Aquinas, Arius, Athanasius, and Augustine, Baillie, Barth, William Adams Brown, and even Dorothy Sayers—they are all there and all found wanting.

The author treats his subject for the most part systematically rather than historically, though he early has an illuminating chapter on the New Testament matrix in which the elements the theologians later assembled into Trinitarianism are found. In subsequent chapters he describes the various forms which the Trinitarian idea has taken: the Trinity of Mediation, the Trinity of Love, the Trinity of Revelation, and the Trinity of God's activity.

Dr. Richardson's contribution to contemporary theology by no means leads in the direction of Unitarianism, either of the Socinian type, built about the first Person of the Trinity, nor of the type that has characterized so much of the thought of the World Council of Churches, built about the second Person. It may fairly be called binitarian, however, since the only aspects of God which the author believes need to be taken seriously are two: his absoluteness and his relatedness to his world. These two modes of God's being constitute a basic antinomy, which human thought cannot overcome but must allow to stand as they are, in paradox. No *tertium quid* is to be introduced in an attempt to resolve them.

Dr. Richardson's book gives the reader so many rewards that it seems ungracious

to call it in question at any point, but part of its live quality lies in its challenge.

There will be those who will criticize Dr. Richardson for allowing his philosophical terms to blunt the edge of his religious apprehensions. The term "God's relatedness," for instance, can hardly do duty for the phrase "the Christ of God." God is related to the world, to be sure, but he is related in a particular individual, in Christ. Individuality is in fact lost in the vaguer word. Similarly, the philosophical terms, "the Beyond," "the Unrelated," never quite include all the meaning of "the heavenly Father": the individual quality of God seems again relinquished in favor of an abstraction. For this loss, however, I doubt if we should hold the author responsible, since his essay is philosophical by intent, and philosophy is notoriously deficient at this point.

I am more inclined to feel that Dr. Richardson's description of the Trinity is not accurate even philosophically. If the Trinitarian formula is meant to indicate, as he says it is, God's Beyondness, his Relatedness, and a Principle of Union between the two, then the arguments of the book dispose of it. But this, I think, is not a good philosophical description of the real Trinity. One of the reasons that Christian thought swept away the absolute "God of the philosophers" was because the word "Father" had in it more than the thought of beyondness: it meant primarily Creator, but did not shut out the connotation of Redeemer and Witness to himself. "Son" is not merely relatedness: it is a word that can hardly be improved upon as the name of one who represents the Father and draws forth the witness of the Spirit. "Holy Spirit"—what better phrase has history produced to describe God as he confirms his Fatherhood in the Son? The Holy Spirit is more than a principle of union. Dr. Richardson's categories do not suit the facts felt in revelation.

That theology which holds that an essential threeness characterizes every complete apprehension of God's revelation of himself, would seem to survive Dr. Richardson's assault. God is (first) the author and disposer of all things; but (secondly) to know him as such we must see him revealed in history; but (thirdly) we cannot see him so revealed without the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum*. Our author argues against this last on the ground that every revelation would require its own witnessing Spirit and so necessitate a multitude of persons in the Godhead. But no: the Holy Spirit's testimony is not *externum*: it is not attached, as it were, to the revelation. It is *internum*: it acts upon the human mind, and since there is unity of human thought, there is unity in the Spirit.

One can hope that this book will be widely read. It is as refreshing as it is penetrating. Though Dr. Richardson has lost track of the third person in the Godhead, I think that that Person had something to do with his writing so engaging an essay.

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Jesus in His Homeland. By SHERMAN E. JOHNSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957. ix-182 pp. \$3.75.

The Gospel From the Mount. By JOHN W. BOWMAN and ROLAND W. TAPP. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957. 189 pp. \$3.75.

Here are two books rather different in their interest and appeal. The former, by Dean Johnson of the Episcopal Church Divinity School of the Pacific, is addressed

to the ordinary reader; the latter, by two well-known New Testament experts, is for the reader interested in the more specialized field of New Testament research.

1. *Jesus in His Homeland* was, for the most part, delivered as lectures at Virginia Seminary and elsewhere; the last chapter was originally a radio address. The book, therefore, has a remarkable popular appeal, combined with careful and accurate scholarship. Essentially it is concerned with Jesus seen against his Jewish background, with due account of material lately recovered for us in the Dead Sea Scrolls. This latter fact explains some of the special interest the book possesses, for here we are given in straightforward language and with all the resources of competent scholarship the facts . . . not the highly elaborated theories of such outlandish eccentrics as the late A. Powell Davies in his cheap little paperback, nor yet the recondite discussions of the new series of studies being brought out in England, but a considered and careful evaluation of the material as it bears on the life of our Lord.

The conclusion of the matter is that Jesus spoke, taught, acted, lived, as what he was, a Jew of the first century. His genius was in his selectivity; he was able to see the basic point in Jewish religion and to emphasize this in his teaching. He was, of course, influenced by the thought of his time—what man is not?—but he was not simply the reflection of popular ideas. He made his selection and added his own new insights. And the total result of his whole personality, including his teaching and his healings, was such that men were confronted by a demand to accept the Kingdom of God and live in its light.

As to our Lord's divinity, Dr. Johnson speaks with conviction and with sureness of touch. He makes it clear that this divinity is not something *against* humanity; it is not something *intruded into humanity* from the outside. It is, rather, the fact that "everything he did and said as a man was at the same time the word and activity of God" (p. 164). That this is the truth about him can be known only to faith; and so our author undercuts the positions both of those who think that Jesus' deity was a matter of empirical observation (but how can God *ever* be known in that way?) and of those who think that because he was a Jew of his own time, although with the especial genius which was his, he cannot, therefore, be divine. The discussion of the resurrection is a case in point: "It is a solid historical fact that the disciples believed that they had seen the risen Christ, but only faith can say that they were right in their belief" (p. 174). Therefore "in one way the Christian faith was different from all others. Though its fundamental affirmation was a matter of faith, not historical or philosophic proof, it was an interpretation of an actual historical person much of whose teaching and activity was remembered and recorded" (pp. 176-177); it was not "faith without fact" but "faith based on fact."

This book is to be commended without reserve as one of the best books of its kind; and we may be grateful that not only the clergy but any layman who can read will be able to understand and profit by it.

2. Although *The Gospel From the Mount* was delivered as the Norton Lectures at Southern Baptist Seminary in Louisville in 1957 and is, as Dr. Bowman says in his preface, "an endeavor to popularize interpretations of the Sermon on the Mount that have been given over a period of some thirty years to students on three continents," it is a book with considerable technical material and is likely to appeal especially to the New Testament scholar. On the other hand, any thoughtful pastor and well-equipped layman could read the book with profit—and the former might well find it useful in the preparation of a series of sermons on "The Sermon on the

Mount." Dr. Bowman is the author of the work, although he had the assistance in preparation of notes and in other ways of his research colleague Dr. Tapp. The book has all Dr. Bowman's usual verve and the discussion of the significance of the "Sermon" is vivid and clear, despite its scholarly precision and careful use of technical materials.

The main thesis is that the "Sermon" is a *gospel*—that is, it is a proclamation of the Kingdom of God and the requirements which our Lord asserted to be the way to entrance into it. "Through commitment to the will of God and through the suffering which one making that commitment must be prepared to undergo in an imperfect and sinful world," the "true disciple" is formed into the "image of God" (p. 23). But this is not possible save by dependence upon the grace of God—and it is here that we begin to see that the "Sermon" is essentially *gospel*. Dr. Bowman explicitly rejects the "consistent eschatology" school's interpretation of the "Sermon" as "intended for a short period during which Jesus' immediate disciples should await the coming of the Kingdom of God" (p. 172); he believes that in the highly poetic structure of the several parts of the "Sermon" there is, as he argued in earlier works and especially in *The Intention of Jesus* (1943), a recognition by our Lord that "his historic activity was the culmination of the redemptive-revelational process" (p. 173). It is this which gives Jesus' words that pointed, imperative, and challenging quality upon which Dr. Bowman insists.

In sum, the "Sermon" as gospel is another way of affirming the demands of Jesus for decision, for effort, and at the same time for dependence on God's grace. Scholars will find at many points that they disagree with the interpretations; but in the main, one may say that this is one of the most illuminating discussions of the subject we have had for a long time.

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The Gospel of the Incarnation. By GEORGE S. HENDRY. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1958. 174 pp. \$3.75.

The Meaning of Christ. By ROBERT CLYDE JOHNSON. Layman's Theological Library. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1958. 96 pp. \$1.00.

These two books have much in common. The general theme is the same, the meaning of Christ, with special attention to the doctrine of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Each concludes with a challenge to rededication to Christ in the light of his significance as expounded in the book.

Both authors are concerned to avoid the pitfall, characteristic of certain current trends, of an approach which neglects the human life of Jesus. This is the basic aim of Hendry's treatment of the subject. He takes the position that the canonization of the Synoptic Gospels should remind us that the history of Jesus contained elements which were integral, and not just peripheral (cf. Dodd), to the earliest proclamation of the gospel. This leads to the thesis that, if we are to overcome the fragmentation which plagues Christianity today, due to a one-sided and exclusive emphasis upon a single element of the total gospel, we must view the historical life of Christ as the connecting link between Bethlehem (Incarnation) and Calvary (Atonement). Johnson brings out the same emphasis in portraying the meaning of God which we discover through the window that is Jesus, that is, the combination of *holy* love, making

an inexorable claim upon us, and *gracious* love, offering salvation by means of unconditional and undeserved forgiveness.

In each volume the center of action is seen as God's action in history in Jesus as against a book, a system of ideas, an ethical code, or mystical experience. The uniqueness of Christianity is the uniqueness of a Person, a Teacher as well as the teaching, the significance of whose death is not that *it* was unique, but that *the One* who died was unique.

Each author points to experience as leading to the development of doctrine, and each challenges the reader to a serious personal response to Christ. Johnson emphasizes the rhythm of repentance and faith, the latter viewed as God's gift which does not enable us to become fully virtuous, but which, because "with God all things are possible," offers us the opportunity of becoming Christian. Hendry interprets the extension of the incarnation, not statically, but dynamically; it is the church witnessing to the reality of pardoned men who have developed the habit of practicing forgiveness.

The differences between the books are governed largely by the audiences addressed. Johnson speaks in a more popular way, with many an apt and illuminating analogy, to laymen; Hendry addresses himself, with equal skill, to the more advanced thinker. The latter's treatment is more comprehensive and detailed in its historical reviews and in its analyses.

One wonders about certain statements in Johnson's book, such as the one that Jesus "repeatedly forgave sins . . . by his own authority" (p. 64); and he finds it hard to agree that the difference between Jesus and Churchill is that one requires allegiance while the other doesn't (p. 19). This carries the difference-in-kind argument to absurd extremes. Nonetheless, both books make important contributions to the subject, especially as they appeal to us to take seriously the significance of the historical Jesus in facing the challenge of Christianity both to thinking and living.

DONALD T. ROWLINGSON

Professor of New Testament Literature, Boston University School of Theology, Boston, Massachusetts.

The Religious Dimensions of Personality. By WAYNE E. OATES. New York: Association Press, 1957. 320 pp. \$4.50.

The Meaning of Persons. By PAUL TOURNIER. Translated by EDWIN HUDSON. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 238 pp. \$3.75.

1. "Man," writes Wayne Oates, "from his conception to his death, experiences himself both as a *being self* and as a *becoming self*, as an actual and as a potential person." This dynamic quality of man's pilgrimage toward identity is "in focus" throughout Professor Oates' comprehensive and synoptic study of personality theory and its relevance for Christian faith. Man's restlessness and his ultimate dependency are the only fixed reference points in his journey through crisis toward self-discovery. And though many are called, few are chosen who in the deepest sense come to know themselves as the Sons of God. Why? Because in one way or another man uses his philosophy, his way of life, yes, even his religion, as a means of amputating the religious dimension of personality. He prefers to remain a spectator, to "interpret" his life rather than live his life; and when he becomes "spiritual" his body remains as the source of his embarrassment. In short, he forgets that the glory of his body (as of his being) is that he is the bearer of the image of God.

The work of biblical theology and particularly the recovery of the biblical view

of the self is paralleled in the emerging holistic and dynamic theory of personality in contemporary psychology. Professor Oates makes full use of this simultaneous development. Rudolf Bultmann, for instance, is cited frequently in his conclusion that body (*soma*) is the "most comprehensive term for the total personality of man." With remarkable unanimity the biblical theologians are insisting that man does not merely *have a body*. He is a body! The implications for psychosomatic wholeness in this recovery of the biblical mode of thinking is made explicit in this summary statement: "The Hebrews had no word for personality. Nor did they have a word for body. . . . In Hebrew thought, the *nephesh* is the inner aspect of the body, and the body is the outward form of *nephesh*. . . . *Nephesh* refers to the 'self' and stands for personal pronouns—I, Thou, or He."

Professor Oates' work is more than a synoptic summary of personality theory. It is also a schematic approach to personality organization. His work makes it possible at every level to compare the religious with the secular view. Hereditary, developmental, structural and disorganizational aspects of man's psychic life are related in their biological and ontological functioning. The "revelatory power of the encounter" at every point is emphasized. The spiritual dimension of this way of looking at personality is evident in these paraphrased words of St. Augustine: "The personhood of man, therefore, is an interinvolvement of rich intracommunication or dialogue. Man, though he feels lonely, is always in encounter with himself. The more he presses this dialogue of the self, the deeper he goes into the self itself. Sooner or later, he encounters the totally other within the self."

Wayne Oates has read deeply in personality theory and in theology. Aside from the recently published volume by Hall and Lindzey (*Theories of Personality*), I know of no other place where this material has been brought together in such concise summaries. But there are gaps in his reading—particularly in the area of child psychiatry. So far as I can tell there are no references to the work of Erik Erikson, Anna Freud, Melanie Klein or Jean Piaget. This is a serious omission. If the communication of meaning is as crucial as Professor Oates seems to imply in his discussion of the "spiritual goals of man's becoming," he has ignored pivotal matters in the area of language and the acquisition of meaning in the child's development. If only those willing to "turn and become like children" are to enter the "Kingdom of heaven," we need to know more about the *being* and *becoming* of children!

The strength of this book—its comprehensive scope—is also its weakness. There is simply too much raw, undigested material for adequate interpretation within the allotted space. In 305 pages there are over 400 citations and numerous other references. The result is an encyclopedic impression, a remarkable accomplishment, but a vague uneasiness that one is still left with unanswered questions as to what the author means to say about the religious dimensions of personality. As a syllabus for a prospective course, this book would attract many students, but more by way of assimilation and reinterpretation would be expected (and given, I presume) in Professor Oates' classes.

This impression of an unfinished interpretative task also leaves one with uncertainties about the author's theological critiques. In general, he brings the findings of biblical theology to bear upon psychological formulations. This is a strength. But when he refers to "the love that knows no barriers" which "characterizes man's redemption" (as on page 159), one is often left with the question: Whose love? Man's or God's? Or again, "maturity" seems too quickly and uncritically identified

as a secularized form of sanctification. Can we turn this around and say that sanctification is a religious version of "growth toward maturity"? I do not think so. Professor Oates relates psychological and religious categories by placing them in juxtaposition. But more is required. A crucial question which prospectors in this field must ultimately answer is whether therapeutic measures are more relevant to the order of redemption or to the order of creation. If psychiatry is engaged in the business of restoring man to his humanity—to himself—he is restored as a fallen creature whose uniqueness lies precisely in his capacity for freedom and for sin. He has yet to choose redemption!

In *The Religious Dimensions of Personality*, Professor Oates has opened new horizons in the relations of psychology and religion. His work sets a high standard for future explorations in this field.

2. Paul Tournier is a Swiss psychiatrist who is not ashamed to confess his faith in every page of *The Meaning of Persons*. Indeed, he moves so adroitly from treatment to prayer, from confession to healing, that one is left with a vague uncertainty as to whether he has been in a doctor's office or at the midweek prayer service. This is a book about the difference between the masklike *personage*, lost in "automatism," and the *person* whose freedom and genuine selfhood is called out by faith through dialogue. "Grace," the author explains, "gives us the victory over our nature; it restores the flow of life which sets us free." But the reminder of St. Thomas Aquinas "that grace does not suppress nature" is coupled with the pastoral observation that "complete freedom" lies "only beyond death and resurrection." Some may wonder if the radical confrontation of God's grace with man's sin is adequately accounted for in these neat distinctions.

As a therapeutic practitioner, Paul Tournier is convincingly certain that the personage is the clue to the person. By attention to the masks, the automatisms displayed, we get glimpses of the person. The doctor has learned to discover the man, himself, in his style. Why do the patients in a sanatorium choose a particular costume for the masked ball? The mask which hides the face reveals the person! When one has come to recognize his own mask he no longer needs its protective screen. But one does not discover himself entirely alone. The person is revealed in dialogue, at heart a dialogue in which God himself confronts the person.

Speaking of style, the manner of this book should be familiar to churchgoers. It is sermonic. Religious experience, the author's and his patients', come naturally into the discussion. We learn a great deal about the author himself, his orphaned youth, his continuing struggle with the lure of becoming a "personage," and his personal witness to the power of faith. This confessional aspect plus a capacity for apt illustration makes for absorbing reading.

But where our appetites are whetted, our palates are disappointed. The solid meat is missing. The book lacks organization. We applaud the author's insights, but when we grant his premise, i.e., that to become a person is a human act rather than a mechanical process, we expect some concrete help, and find only one illustration piled on another. The book itself needs to become a person, with integrity and structure! We never come to the clinical evidence nor the specific steps involved in moving from a personage to a person. We must be content in being told that it happens. But we have a right to expect more: the relation of the ego (biologically conceived) to the person, and whether the self of contemporary dynamic psychology is equivalent to Dr. Tournier's concept of the person.

Even with these disappointments in mind, this is a book which is strongly recommended. It is important evidence that the medical community (particularly in Europe) is disturbed by its overemphasis on therapies which have not helped the patient become a person.

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Preface to Pastoral Theology. By SEWARD HILTNER. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 240 pp.; notes, index. \$4.00.

A conceptual orientation to the task of Christian shepherding and its auxiliary or cognate concerns of communicating and organizing the word and work of the Christian gospel is the main concern of Seward Hiltner in this his most recent book. He was thrust upon the search for this conceptual orientation by the same anxiety which has gripped all who have studied the various sciences of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, as they have impinged upon the witness and work of the Christian community, especially as it is epitomized in the task of the pastor. That anxiety is put into plain language by Hiltner at the very outset when he says that "we have not had up to this point a fundamental and unifying theory that would enable us to do justice to these modern contributions while relating them critically and explicitly to the theological tradition." Therefore, he adopts just this as his objective.

Throughout the book, therefore, he works assiduously at "homogenizing" a systematic, thoroughgoing theological concern with the claims that suffering human beings lay upon the minister. He is convinced that a conceptual orientation to the problems of people and our relation to them must have both an empirical and a contemporary dimension, and that we must pay attention to both the activity and the content and methodology of Christian shepherding if we are to develop any "general comprehensive principles worthy of the name 'pastoral theology.'" On the basis of the presuppositions, Hiltner defines pastoral theology as "that branch or field of theological knowledge and inquiry that brings the shepherding perspective to bear upon all the operations and functions of the church and the minister, and then draws conclusions of a theological order from reflection on these observations."

Essentially the result of Hiltner's approach is what could be called a "perspectival" understanding of the work of the shepherd, both in its preliminary and its ultimate concerns. In accomplishing this Hiltner defines the task of the pastoral theologian in relation to his other duties, the focus of the pastoral theologian in his concern for persons, and the tradition of the pastoral theologian in the context of history. Interestingly enough, he draws his case history material from a nineteenth-century pastor's recorded case material rather than from a more contemporary setting. The work of one Ichabod Spencer forms the whole clinical footing of Hiltner's construction. In a remarkably refreshing manner he takes the work of a committed and effective minister of the past as illustrative material for burgeoning out a comprehensive understanding of the over-all theory of pastoral theology. Here is how he systematizes the discipline.

Hiltner sees the content of the shepherding task as composed of healing, sustaining and guiding. These are the central concerns of the Christian shepherd, any one of which will lead to its integral unity with the other two when pushed to its deepest implication. These are the central tasks which have been faced historically by all

Christian shepherds, and which always call into existential encounter whatever living theological presuppositions the pastor may have. Theological conversation is implicit in these tasks, and whereas the mere practice of these concerns can never take the place of doctrinal or systematic or biblical theology, neither can these other branches of theological enquiry forsake the pastoral theologian's discipline without becoming other than the central intention of the Gospel calls for. Hiltner analyzes the character and relationships, the intention and directions of healing, sustaining, and guiding—demonstrating his basic hypothesis at each step of the way, using Spencer's case material illustratively.

In the concluding part of the book, Hiltner submits the "cognates" of a comprehensive pastoral theology, "communicating" and "organizing," to the same probing analysis. In discussing communication, he says that it has a threefold character: (1) learning, understanding, or instructional; (2) realizing, deepening, or edifying; and (3) celebrating, reminding, or commemorating. He says that the organizing of the fellowship of the church involves (1) nourishing, feeding, or aiding its development; (2) protecting or purifying from threats within or without it; (3) relating it, positively or negatively, to other fellowships.

Hiltner has faithfully examined the character of pastoral theology in its general and its specific aspects. He has tackled a task not unlike trying to find a tent big enough to hold a Billy Graham crusade meeting, so many, varied, and confused are the different individual concerns of the church which have been loosely herded into the catch-all topic of "pastoral theology." But I want to be the first to say that he has done it with the foresight of a Noah getting everything represented on one ark! He has given us precise distinctions to use as teaching instruments and as pastoral compasses for years to come.

I must confess, however, that his distinctions are at times forced for system's sake, but this is the limitation of any system. Likewise, Hiltner has invited the loneliness of most systematizers in that his sharpest distinctions—valid in most ways for all of that—may have meaning for him that they have for but few others. But this in itself makes the book both prophetic, in that in Hiltner we have a "seer," and courageous in that it takes courage to articulate insights that do not get an immediate cheer from the populace. Other books of Hiltner are helpful and useful in many ways, but in this he has written a prophetic as well as useful book.

WAYNE E. OATES

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Inherit the Promise. By PIERSON PARKER. Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1957. x-243 pp. \$4.25.

It is the purpose of the author of this book to speak to the minister and the inquiring layman. He undertakes to explain what Christianity is by giving a clear presentation of the essential nature of New Testament religion. Since he is committed to the scientific method of historical study, he is concerned to tell the Church where such study leaves the Christian. Is the Bible true? This question has been answered in several different ways in the last few generations, and Parker lists and describes eight of the answers; each of them contains some aspect of truth, but each is open to criticism as giving an inadequate or distorted view of the truth. Noting with approval the new interest in biblical theology, Parker shares its concern for finding

and stating the biblical message, and sets out to state what the New Testament writers saw and how these ideas can be translated with the least distortion into our modern language and thought forms.

No one idea or word will sum up the New Testament message. So Parker has chosen to present "Six Keys to New Testament Thought." The quoted words form the subtitle of the book. The six keys are: "The Idea of the Covenant"; "The New Age"; "The Law"; "Truth by Contraries"; "Physical and Spiritual"; and "The Man." Attention is given to the background of these leading ideas, especially in the Old Testament. Something of the course of events in the New Testament story finds expression. But the main interest is in the presentation of the New Testament thought; the aim is to make the New Testament theology clear, to show the vital meaning of the ancient forms of expression, and to restate the truth whenever possible so that it does not seem remote from the life of the Christian and the Church today.

While the outline gives six keys instead of one, there is naturally one theme that unifies the series. A first look at the outline might suggest that Jesus Christ comes into the picture only in the last of the six divisions. This is not the case. The discussion of each key leads the author to point to Christ. The covenant theme leads to "Christ our Passover." The study of eschatology comes to a focus in a chapter on "Jesus and the Future." The discussion of "The Law" finds in the work of Christ the needed light on "What the Law Could Not Do." The examination of key paradoxes of New Testament thought concerns mainly the Kingdom of God and the Son of Man. The consideration of "Physical and Spiritual" gives a less direct look at Christology, but the look is there, nonetheless. So the sixth section, "The Man," is the climax of what has been the main theme all along.

The book thus has a good outline, good material, a will to understand what bothers modern Christians when they look at the New Testament, and a concern to serve the Church. It is useful not as a pathfinder in technical scholarship but as a presentation of what New Testament scholarship has to say to the Church today.

FLOYD V. FILSON

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Understanding the New Testament. By HOWARD C. KEE and FRANKLIN W. YOUNG. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957. xviii-492 pp. \$7.95.

The need for a good introduction to the New Testament and a study of the beginnings of Christianity is unmistakable. Particularly is this true of books for use in introductory courses in New Testament on the college level. It is with high hopes that one examines a book like this, written at the request of the Projects Committee of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education and purporting to be an introductory guide. The book itself does not give a clear statement concerning its intended public. It refers vaguely to the "modern reader." Presumably, it was designed mainly for the college classroom.

In regard to format, this book has many attractive features. Its fifty-six illustrations give a visual understanding of some of the physical features of the culture of the times. The eleven maps are a great improvement over most books of its kind. The production job is exceptionally good but is perhaps lavish beyond necessity.

The scope of the book is inclusive. It covers a wide range of the usual subjects

—background, life and message of Jesus, work of Paul, the church after Paul. It includes some detail on each of the books of the New Testament. An attempt is made to place these books in the community setting out of which they were written and present them as records of a living faith. Information coming from recent scholarship, such as the studies of the Dead Sea Scrolls, is notably utilized.

Some "modern readers" undoubtedly will find the book helpful and informative. However, with all of its excellent features, it fails, in the opinion of this reviewer, to measure up as an acceptable introductory textbook.

For the person with traditional knowledge of the New Testament, or very little of any kind, the language is more technical than appears at first glance. Terms like "kerygma," "myth," "evangelist" and the like have a technical meaning not clearly explained by the authors. In addition, the style is often indirect and cumbersome. I seriously doubt that any but an exceptional beginning student would find it clear and reasonably intelligible.

Far more serious than vocabulary and style is the arrangement. The study of Christianity begins with the Christian community following the resurrection. This rests on the assumption of a special historical reliability for the early chapters of Acts and a lower rating for the Gospels. To a reader unfamiliar with the book as a whole and the assumptions on which it is based, chapter 2 ("The Community and Its Convictions") would make very little sense. The problem of order of topics in introducing early Christianity is admittedly difficult. The priority given to the first part of Acts, characteristic of one type of "biblical theology," seems to me an especially unhappy solution. From my viewpoint, a preliminary discussion of the nature of the New Testament records is imperative. Following this, there is no better place to begin than with the life and teaching of Jesus.

In this book we have an introduction to a currently popular type of biblical theology before being introduced to the New Testament. Thus, we know what to look for—if indeed it is necessary to look. I do not believe that the reader of this book would feel strongly impelled to go to the New Testament for a firsthand contact with the personalities and ideas.

The "faith that provided the dynamic for the early Christian community" receives strong emphasis in this study. But it is too one-sided to represent the fullness of the New Testament teaching. At this point the most glaring defect, as I see it, is that the moral demands of the "new life of the kingdom" receive inadequate treatment. This is true in connection with the contents of Jesus' teaching, in the exposition of Paul's letters and in the discussion of other books. The "faith" of the authors often extends only grudgingly to the historical reliability of the records. They seem to me somewhat too free in stating that certain passages have no foundation in fact even where this is inconsequential.

The central emphasis on *community*—pre-Christian and Christian—serves as an organizing center. However, the idea becomes a bit strained and artificial at times. In the section on "The Community Expands" there is a chapter entitled "The Message for Gentiles." This is essentially an exposition of excerpts from Paul's writing, especially the early part of Romans. Yet there were apparently some Christian communities known to Paul who had serious differences of opinion concerning his version of the message to the Gentiles.

Evidently, several types of books designed to introduce the student (and general reader) to early Christianity are required if the varying demands are to be satisfied.

This one had a special opportunity and will have its admirers. For others of us, the need still remains for an introduction which really introduces.

M. WARD REDUS

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The Book of Revelation—A Commentary for Laymen. By THOMAS S. KEPLER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 232 pp. \$4.50.

Many books on the meaning and significance of the Apocalypse have appeared in recent years. The church's revived interest in eschatology, as evidenced by the theme of the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches in 1954, has grown in part out of the rediscovery by New Testament scholars of the centrality of eschatological motifs in the New Testament and out of the tragic events through which the world has passed in the last fifty years. The biblical message seems to get a hearing when men lose faith in their own ability to save themselves.

The present book arose out of the author's experience in lecturing to ministerial groups across the country. He found the area of keenest interest and greatest confusion to be eschatology, particularly apocalyptic eschatology as represented by Daniel and Revelation. His hearers urged him to put his interpretations into writing.

The book is divided into two parts: introduction and commentary. The latter comprises about five-sixths of the whole. The former discusses the general characteristics of apocalyptic writings, the authorship, date, place, and purpose of Revelation, ways of interpreting the book, problems of canon and text, and the plan of the work. Of special note is the helpful tabular comparison of prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology, in spite of the fact that there are some oversimplifications.

The commentary section proceeds to expound the text of Revelation in the R.S.V. Portions of the text are followed by comments in running form on key words, phrases, and verses. Since the comments center in selected phrases and verses, one must maintain close contact with the text in order to understand them. This is good, for it keeps the text constantly before the reader.

The point of view is that now dominant in New Testament studies. The writer's identity is unknown, though it is evident that he was a Jew with imperfect knowledge of Greek. He was a prominent church leader, certainly not an eyewitness of the events of Jesus' life. His book is an appeal for fidelity to Christ on the part of the church in view of the demands of Domitian for worship as "Lord and God." It was written about A.D. 95. The beast of Rev. 13 is the Roman Empire with its deified emperors. The number 666 stands for Nero, who is expected to return in demonic form. The proper approach to the book is the "religious-historical." The symbols must be interpreted in the light of the historical context and "demythologized," so that the underlying religious truth may become apparent.

Laymen will find much help here. However, they will have to draw out the relevance of the successive passages by themselves. The author sticks almost exclusively to exegesis. Ministers may wish to compare Dr. Kepler's interpretations with those of Martin Rist in Vol. XII of *The Interpreter's Bible* and laymen will be helped in practical application by the comments of Lynn Harold Hough there.

Dr. Kepler's book is to be heartily welcomed as a valuable aid in unraveling the mysteries of this strange but wonderful apocalypse.

EDWARD P. BLAIR

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The Last Book of the Bible. By HANNS LILJE. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957. 286 pp. \$4.50.

Just as the Book of Revelation was written during dangerous times, when Christians were forced to worship the Emperor Domitian or lose their lives, so this volume by Bishop Hanns Lilje was written while he was a prisoner in the hands of the Gestapo, an era when German Christians were being forced to pay homage to Adolf Hitler or suffer imprisonment or death. The author has thus found a continuing value in the "last book of the Bible" for a twentieth-century life situation.

Dr. Lilje sees value in literary criticism, in form criticism, and in the history-of-religions approach to the Book of Revelation. Yet he sees more in this great apocalyptic book than critical methods can obtain, since he sees its contemporary religious value. "No interpretation of the Apocalypse can be accurate which does not take note of its numerous allusions to contemporary history." The Book of Revelation furthermore gives us an understanding of history. It is not a view which stresses progress in history, nor a cyclical, deterministic interpretation of history; rather it sees the meaning of history solved in a "region beyond history." The Apocalypse of John as the "Gospel of the Risen Christ" gives true meaning to history, since "world history has only one theme: the manifestation of the glory of Jesus Christ." "The end of history is thus just as real an event as the whole of saving history (*Heilsgeschichte*) which precedes it, and is like all God's historical dealings with this world, i.e., history as a whole. . . . If there is no last day, then the earthly day of Jesus Christ upon earth is lost in a mist."

This volume is written with a dramatic style; the reader feels Bishop Lilje's deep personal appreciation of the great themes of the Apocalypse as they are mediated through the symbols of the chapters. Sprinkled throughout the devotional language of the writer are helpful interpretations of the symbolism and references to the historic times out of which the book is written. While it is difficult to accept the author's view that John the Apostle is the author of Revelation—and it is just as hard to accept Bishop Lilje's interpretation of eschatology, which breathes the influence of European crisis theology—the volume nevertheless possesses a power and a dramatic appeal which will help the reader to feel the tremendous spiritual depth of the "last book of the Bible." Revelation is a wonderful Christian book, full of deep Christian understanding of the moral universe in which we live. Certainly the greatest of all apocalypses, it deserves to have a larger place than it has sometimes held in Christian circles, usually among those who make of it a confused timetable for historical events in every century! This volume will aid readers to feel the sincere and profound value of the book in its original setting, as well as its continuing power for twentieth-century readers.

Olive Wyon has done an articulate and artistic translation of the volume from the German into English.

THOMAS S. KEPLER

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Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization. By JOHN U. NEF. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. xv-164 pp. \$4.00.

In this small volume, Professor Nef of Chicago University distills and com-

presses conclusions gained from thirty-five years of historical research in "the origins of the industrialized world in which we find ourselves." The vast array of specific knowledge undergirding the work, which is based on the 1956 Wiles Lectures at Queen's University, Belfast, gives a depth and authenticity to the author's penetrating discussion. One is inevitably reminded of the scope and insight of a Toynbee in dealing less with details of conventional specific history than with the vast canvas of civilization itself. For the "cultural foundations" are broadly conceived developments which the average person would scarcely relate, without such scholarly guidance, to industrial civilization as we know it. This is a book which asks for a second reading; the earlier chapters are illuminated by the light of the whole.

The period in which Professor Nef finds industrial society's roots is chiefly from about 1570 to 1660, even though the latter date is over a century removed from Watt's steam engine, and the earlier date precedes by nearly 250 years Arkwright's spinning jenny and the first industrialism of the textile factory.

In viewing industrial society's growth through the glass of economic history, Professor Nef believes, we have lost sight of the bigger context. Perhaps one might say that economic history forms the visible roots of today's industrial flowering, but neither root nor stem could develop without the rich nourishment of the soil in which they germinated. It was in the earlier period that men were preparing the cultural seedbed. For this was a period of "revolution in the ways human minds work," a period in which the climate of civilization itself was changed, when man became more humane and sought new spiritual realization in temporal life. To interpret the author freely, economic development of a raised standard of living by mass production required a concern for the masses and their standards as well as economic incentives. The age he discusses is the transition period from a day of violence, disregard of life, religious wars, and inhumane harshness to concepts of the dignity of men, the worthiness of women, and the love of God as designed to be reflected in temporal and human life.

Specifically, there was a new realization of precision, reflected in the development of mathematical refinements, in early economic statistical concern, in the spread of double-entry bookkeeping, in the Gregorian calendar which was three hundred times as accurate as the Julian. In science, the work of Copernicus and his contemporaries had relied on art and theology to show falsely that "heavenly bodies can move only in perfect circles"; Tycho Brahe and Kepler only a half century later broke into a new scientific outlook and method. In religion, the vindictive Wars of Religion gave place to new humane tolerance, emphasis on charity, and growing awareness of man's relation to man as well as to God. The Renaissance "cult of delight" took on a greater ethical content and clarity, the *salon* made its appearance, quality and refinement received new importance.

In short, man became more humane and civilized, and the way was prepared for motivation to a higher standard of everyday life. There had to be a concern for people, for bettering the life of the masses with cheaper and better material things, before men went on to produce them. The incentive had to be there, the incentive of improvement of humanity, generated by a refinement of "the human spirit." To that "human spirit" religious leaders contributed—François de Sales, Puritan influences, the ideal of infusing "the message of Christ into the lives led in the temporal world," a new concept of love among persons reflecting divine love. In short, the roots of industry are tied to religion more deeply than we have realized.

Today, concludes Professor Nef, we need to rest the future on again cultivating "those sides of our nature which are, in terms of immediate productivity and success, almost entirely useless. . . . [We need] to build a society based on the spiritual resources which Christ revealed to man. . . . We must find man again. That is the only way we can lead him to God."

CLAIR M. COOK

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The Tragic Vision and the Christian Faith. Ed. by NATHAN A. SCOTT, JR.
New York: Association Press, 1957. xxii-346 pp. \$4.50.

Theology and literary criticism are derivative disciplines which comment upon religion and art. Though necessarily abstract, they are most effective when continually referring to the concrete primary materials. The present volume clearly demonstrates the advantages of working closely with texts, and the dangers of undue abstraction.

The clue to the excessively abstract character of Professor E. LaB. Cherbonnier's lead article is found in his constant reference to the *idea* of tragedy and to biblical *philosophy*, where the title of the book speaks of *The Tragic Vision and the Christian Faith*. In his essay the fecund vitalities of both perspectives are reduced to two neatly contrasted soteriologies. The salvation offered by tragedy is salvation through knowledge—knowledge which consists of a bifurcated vision that enables one to appreciate human ambitions but to see them within the framework of a necessary cosmic order whose indifference renders them meaningless. The goal is reconciliation to the totality of existence in which the truth inheres. It can be attained only through an esthetic detachment which maintains the delicate balance between the finite perspective of human purposes and that cosmic vantage point which reduces them to foolishness. Tragedy is anti-humanistic, involving inevitable conflict between human vitalities and the forms of existence—where both are conceived in naturalistic, amoral terms.

By contrast, the biblical perspective is unambiguously moral. Through the notion of God as Creator we arrive at a world which is a proper habitation for man. Therefore, "Men . . . need not apologize for applying all-too-human conceptions to God," who demands of them the response of moral commitment rather than that of esthetic detachment. Salvation in the biblical philosophy is understood as active partisanship for the good on the finite level of human experience.

Thus the biblical view stands in flat contradiction to the idea of tragedy. No doubt it does—if one accepts the formulations of Professor Cherbonnier. By reducing the multifarious expressions of biblical faith to a rigid anthropomorphism that begs all philosophical issues (a reduction justified by passing reference to a number of carefully selected authors who have reintroduced fundamentalism into biblical scholarship through the sophisticated obfuscation of concepts such as *Heilsgeschichte* and anthropathetism), he succeeds in demonstrating its incompatibility with the tragic vision—which he has reduced to a gnostic idea.

This view would, of course, be unable to encompass Shakespearian tragedy, where man is set against the foibles of his own character rather than those of nature. It would also fail to allow for the power of Job breathing defiance at God for his failure to rule the world in moral terms. According to this scheme, the first would not be real tragedy, the second would not be genuinely biblical. The distinctions

proposed by Professor Cherbonnier are neat enough, but exclusion by definition is not too helpful when dealing with realities as complex and individuated as art and religion. Indeed, he is himself too sensitive an observer to miss this altogether. His distinction between the biblical mode of expression and that of a morality play is based on the fact that evil is never exhaustively explained within the biblical view. By exploring the implications of this insight he might have come to a more open-ended, less ideological formulation of the relation between Christian faith and tragedy.

Hyatt H. Waggoner's piece on Faulkner stands in sharpest contrast to Cherbonnier's essay. By careful consideration of a number of novels he shows that the concrete earthy symbolism of the literature is closer to the Christian message than is the vague idealizing of Faulkner's explicit credos. Similarly, the implicit symbolism of many of the novels is more relevant to Christian insights than the explicit allegorizing of *The Fable*.

Roy Battenhouse is superb at demonstrating the limitations of much Shakespearean criticism, especially of "Christian" interpreters who know very little about Christianity. He is less convincing when drawing analogies between biblical and Shakespearean themes, e.g., between the tomb in Romeo and Juliet and the empty tomb in the New Testament, but he was admittedly pressed for space.

In addition, excellence is found in some of the studies of nonliterary figures. Paul Holmer's brilliant essay on Kierkegaard demolishes many of the clichés that have distorted his message and manages to say something important about the theme of the book in the process. John E. Smith provides a penetrating interpretation of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*, while leaving its relation to the Christian Faith largely to inference.

Ample bibliographies are provided for further study of each topic. All in all it is a stimulating and useful book.

MALCOLM L. DIAMOND

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Faith for Personal Crises. By CARL MICHALSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. vi-184 pp. \$3.50.

It is refreshing to have a book of pastoral counseling—not *about* pastoral counseling—avowedly devoted to drawing men to Christ, not merely to an exercise in amateur psychiatry. The crises confronted are those of anxiety, guilt, doubt, vocation, marriage, suffering and death. All are handled concretely, with a wealth of illustration.

Happily, Dr. Michalson does not join the popular acclaim for peace of mind. Anxiety, he rightly says, is useful, and Christian faith does not remove it. However, in Christ our anxiety is reduced to manageable and useful proportions.

All who are well acquainted with the author know that he is especially fond of making statements which shock and startle. Usually he gets around later to bringing things into better perspective. However, some who read may remember the vivid half-truths and fail to notice the more sober corrections. This would seem especially likely if the book is read, as apparently intended, by laymen who are in emotional conflict.

"To be *like* God" is not man's responsibility; it is his sin," says Michalson (p. 8). A half-truth. The truth neglected is in Matthew 5:43-48. Again our author writes, "Jesus never held a guilty man responsible" (p. 54). A few pages

later he radically alters the apparent meaning of this statement. But who will care to read the fine print, when he can so smoothly rationalize his guilt and continue gaily in sin for which he is assured he is not held responsible?

Throughout the book people are classified as the resigned, the rebellious, the dominant, and the recessive, with Christian theology pointing the way of salvation into poised maturity. This scheme provides a framework for many useful insights and a brilliant display of literary gems from a wide variety of sources. However, it raises two serious questions.

Is the scheme sufficiently near adequacy to be justified as a classification of all people in relation to all the crises described? At times the reader gets the impression that the people who in these pages pass through the great trials of life are stereotypes rather than real, living persons.

More serious still is the question whether the Christian gospel does not appear, after all, as a psychiatric device. Does the author regard all mentally ill people as "lost" in the theological sense, and the well people as "saved"? His statement of purpose at the beginning would seem to imply an emphatic rejection of any such view. Yet the teaching of the book comes perilously close to that current perversion of the gospel.

Discussing death, our vigorous young author makes an absolute separation between the God-given death of the aged and the Satan-induced death of all other human beings. As he grows older, Michalson may find the distinction fading with the years, so that a more adequate view will be required.

The style is breezy, with a generous assortment of witty barbs and wisecracks. The book gives an impression of a greater concern to be exciting than to be true. Certainly it is more clever than tender, more brilliant than profound, more provocative to debate than healing to sin, distress or sorrow.

Indeed, I suspect that the author intended it to be so. In any event, this may be one way to lure some laymen from the soothing syrup of pastoral reassurance to thinking about currently debated theological issues. That would be no mean contribution.

L. HAROLD DEWOLF

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Faith and Knowledge. By JOHN HICK. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. xix-221 pp. \$3.50.

The author, who has come recently from Great Britain to the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell, looks on his book as a "bridging operation" between philosophy and theology. After a good general introduction and some preliminary discussions of "knowledge" and "belief," he considers some recent views of the cognitive aspect of faith and then, in the central part of the book, gives his own view. The concluding chapter is about the central affirmation of Christian faith.

On his view faith is an *interpretation* of the facts of experience. The Christian "finds" a pattern in the facts which others do not find. He cannot prove this interpretation. The evidence also permits an atheistic interpretation, the author says—and also Spinoza's interpretation, Theravada Buddhism's interpretation and others, I suppose. The Christian can explain the way he interprets the world, and he can point to Christ as the "catalyst" of his faith. But he cannot demonstrate that the

world is as he believes it to be. This inability is not peculiar to Christianity. When we say the physical world is objectively real, rejecting solipsism, and when we say we are morally responsible, these also are "interpretations." We do not have any "infallible" knowledge about matters of fact.

The author seems to think that the meaningfulness of the Christian interpretation is more problematical than that of these other assertions. So he offers the possibility of "eschatological verification" as a way of making its assertion empirically meaningful. If this interpretation is true, then all doubts about its truth will be removed in a future life. Instead of John Wisdom's parable of the invisible gardener, the author offers a story of two men traveling the same road. One believes it leads to the Celestial City; the other believes it does not. The road looks the same to both until they reach the end.

Though the author is concerned with the meaningfulness of the Christian assertion he does not seem concerned to support it vis-à-vis its alternatives, and this gives me pause. Granting this is not a matter of proof, still, should we not look for something more than consistency with the facts? Since more than one interpretation is consistent with the facts at hand, do we not need something more? Perhaps I should not ask the author to *propose* supporting reasons. For he is writing as an "epistemologist" (i.e., concerned with saying *how*, if there is a God, he may be known), though it is abundantly clear that he is not neutral about the truth of Christianity. But should not an epistemologist consider what would *constitute* reasonable support of one religious interpretation vis-à-vis another, or vis-à-vis a nonreligious interpretation?

The author writes in a good firm style which, in his expositions of the Christian faith, rises to a subdued eloquence. He takes serious account of some recent philosophical discussions about religious belief. He presents a considered and sustained argument. And he is illuminating at a number of points, for example, on "interpretation" in Chapter 6, and on the way particular interpretations are suggested in the course of our experience (p. 196).

WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN

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The Early Christian Church (2 vols.). By PHILIP CARRINGTON. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957. xx-520, xiii-519. \$10.00 each, \$17.50 set.

These two substantial volumes, covering the first two centuries of Christian history, are another instance of the return of narrative history to the field of creative scholarship—after a long dearth with the so-called scientific histories with their causal relationships, queer analyses, and vain attempts to tell what happened apart from the people who made it happen, as if history were synonymous with some doctrinaire philosophy of history and there were an abstract spirit of the times expressing itself in all events. If you want to know what took place, regardless of the reason why, Carrington's *The Early Christian Church* is the book for you to read.

Indeed, the author expressly states that his work is synthetic and broad. He endeavors both to gain and to give perspective. He takes his sources seriously, that is, seriously enough "to trust the evidence, and the tradition of the church in which it was produced and preserved." Consequently the work is almost as much about sources as about events and persons. This gives the reader confidence, for he knows the materials whence the data are gained and the reasons for their reliability and usefulness.

As nearly as possible, this is a chronological history. Events and persons are presented in the time sequence in which they occurred, lived, and did their mighty deeds. The book is a gold mine of information. Barnabas, for example, is not just called by his name, but the meaning of that name is supplied: "Son of Consolation." The word Thomas means a twin, and Iscariot is perhaps derivative of the word "Sicarius," meaning an assassin. The magus was a well-known figure in the ancient world; he was a religious adventurer, using the unseen spirits to serve his own ends. Paul's conversion is the only sudden conversion described in the New Testament. And so I might go on calling attention to one fact after another.

This is the best introduction I know to the history of Primitive Christianity. I give it an unqualified recommendation. It is dependable and interesting, too.

WILLIAM R. CANNON

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Widening Horizons 1845-95. By WADE CRAWFORD BARCLAY. New York: The Board of Missions of The Methodist Church, 1957. (Volume III of the Six-Volume *History of Methodist Missions*.) xv-1211 pp. \$4.50.

Here is Volume III of an undertaking of monumental proportions. Dr. Barclay has set out to tell in six large volumes the story of the missionary outreach of the American Methodist Church. Volume I, *Missionary Motivation and Expansion*, and Volume II, *To Reform the Nation*, appeared in 1949 and 1950, respectively, and cover the period from the establishment of American Methodism to the North-South break in 1844. The emphasis, therefore, in those first volumes was primarily upon domestic missions—to the frontier, to Indians, to Negroes, with only one overseas mission in existence in 1845, that to Liberia.

Widening Horizons is the first of two volumes, in which the missionary work of the Methodist Episcopal Church is to be told. Volume IV, therefore, will cover the period from 1895 to 1939, the year of unification. Volume V will tell the story of the missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and of the Methodist Protestant Church. Finally in Volume VI the *World Outreach of Methodist Missions* in education, literature, medical service, and co-operation will be portrayed.

Widening Horizons, as its name indicates, is more concerned with foreign than with domestic missions. After three very important introductory chapters in which American economic, social and religious life is penetratingly discussed as a background for the missionary thrust of the church, we find one chapter on domestic missions; then the final two-thirds of the book is devoted to six chapters on the Expanding Program of Foreign Missions, dealing respectively with China, India and Malaysia, Japan and Korea, South America and Mexico, Africa, and Europe.

Valuable as this work is, I suspect that few of its readers will go right through its 1,200 pages, and that much of it will have value primarily as a reference work. But the first three more general and introductory chapters are themselves more than worth the modest price (where can you buy a 1,200-page book today for \$4.50?)—especially Chapter III, "The Church Faces Its Missionary Task," in which many of the perennial problems of missionary work and administration are illuminatingly discussed. And also in the seven chapters discussing different geographical areas, one constantly finds the plethora of detail lightened by penetrating observations on the issues involved.

These issues are always seen from an American or a missionary standpoint,

and this of course is what one would expect from the general plan of the series. If one is looking for an analysis of Chinese, or Indian, or African culture, and an appraisal of the missionary impact upon that culture, he will not find it here.

This reader was intrigued by a very sensible but seldom seen division of footnotes, by which notes of supplementary value to the reader are placed at the bottom of the page, while those indicating the source material only are relegated to the back of the book. The result is that the future research worker will find full source references (and this will be one of the important functions of this volume), while at the same time these references do not unduly obtrude themselves upon the casual reader.

The high quality of this volume serves to whet our appetite for the succeeding volumes of the series.

FRANCIS P. JONES

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Ethics and United States Foreign Policy. By ERNEST W. LEFEVER. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. xix-199 pp. \$1.25.

Theological "neo-pessimism" and political "neo-conservatism" converge in this little volume, distributed by the Church Peace Union, to provide us with a thoroughly sensible summing-up of some crucial ethical problems of American foreign policy. Dr. Lefever, who is currently a research analyst in foreign affairs with the Library of Congress, brings to this task a distinguished background of teaching and research in the international field. In the tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr, he bids us take a hard look at American idealism in the light of biblical faith. And in the tradition of Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan he bids us do the same in the light of political common sense. Dr. Lefever is most convincing in the latter attempt, with theological analysis remaining marginal to the main argument of the book.

Some of Dr. Lefever's heaviest broadsides are fired against the "moralism" with which a goodly portion of the American public views the international scene. It is this "moralism" which is blamed for the utopian delusions often beclouding public opinion in this country. The discussion of the United Nations is a good case in point. Set up to serve as an instrument of international co-operation in the post-World War II period, the United Nations was never intended by its founding governments to become a world superstate. Indeed, its modest pretensions and the political realism of its Charter are among the chief characteristics setting it off from the defunct League of Nations. Yet the United Nations has become to many American liberals a symbol of almost Messianic import. Such idealistic misunderstanding led inevitably to utopianism on the one hand and bitter disillusion on the other. Only by ridding themselves of these grandiose misconceptions can Americans perceive the real possibilities of the institution. Here, as elsewhere in the book, Dr. Lefever's argument repeats the old lesson that relevant action (relevant politically as well as ethically) must cultivate the art of the possible.

The most lucid chapter in the book may well be the one dealing with the ideological aspects of the Cold War. Dr. Lefever discusses in some detail the new element introduced into international affairs by the rise of twentieth-century "political religions." In the face of the pseudo-religious appeal of Communism the call for an aggressive counter-ideology, such as was made by Admiral Radford in 1955, may seem attractive especially to those still prone to think of politics in terms of

crusades. Dr. Lefever warns us strongly against this attraction. Our position in the Cold War, he argues, will not be improved by exporting a synthetic ideology opposed to Communism, but by the intelligent application of the means (political, economic, military and psychological) of diplomacy.

This reviewer is so strongly in agreement with the outlook represented by Dr. Lefever's book that he hesitates to engage in criticism at all. Yet the question cannot be suppressed whether Dr. Lefever's realism is not ironically tinged with some of the same idealism he decries so forcefully. The reaction of the United States to the Suez crisis is repeatedly cited as a prize example of "moralism." Undoubtedly the rhetoric that flowed out of Washington during those critical days in 1956 rang with the tones of moral outrage. The fact remains that the position taken by our government may well have been the most expedient politically. In decrying the "moralistic" delusions of American public opinion Dr. Lefever may conceivably be deluded himself about the relationship of rhetoric and policy at the seat of American power.

Dr. Lefever's book does not claim to present a new viewpoint of American foreign policy. It is a forceful and concise restatement of what some of our best political minds have had to say on the subject. It should be especially useful as a guide to discussion for church groups. The Church Peace Union is to be commended for making it accessible to a wide public.

PETER L. BERGER

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In God We Trust. By NORMAN COUSINS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. viii-464 pp. \$5.95.

Surely one of the great events of all time, not to say miracles, was that at one time and in one place a group of men of the stature of the Founding Fathers should appear. I have never heard any natural explanation that satisfied me. They have been analyzed; their motives have been dissected; the great forces at work in that society have been described. They have been pictured as free-thinkers, economic determinists, and more than average politicians. But in this book, they are allowed to speak for themselves in regard to their religious assumptions and convictions; and it is about time.

I always read Norman Cousins with profit whether it be a book or an editorial in the *Saturday Review*. He has ideas and ideals undergirded with documented facts. He does his usual competent job in editing this significant volume.

The book deals directly with nine of the builders of our American democracy. They are Benjamin Franklin, George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Samuel Adams, John Jay, and Thomas Paine. From their public speeches, their writings, and their letters, Cousins presents their religion and their attitudes toward religion from their personal testimony. The introductory chapter entitled "The Responsive Men" gives the author his only chance to express his own views, and he does it with a simple and convincing eloquence. He comes as near explaining why America was blessed with these men and why they accomplished their mighty task, as any one I have read. I believe there is still an element of mystery beyond what even a man like Norman Cousins can explore. One other chapter quotes from "The Jefferson-Adams Letters." It

reveals the magnanimity of two talented leaders who found themselves often on opposite sides of political questions.

And what is the conclusion of the whole matter? Hear it and shout it from the pulpits! They were all religious men with their intellectual roots deep down in faith in God. They were not all orthodox church members like John Adams. They were for the most part liberal in their spirit and applied their critical minds to theology as well as to politics. But this volume makes it abundantly clear that this nation was conceived in Christianity and born in faith. Freedom of religion is a part of our country's bone and sinew, and faith in God is in the blood stream of our national being.

GERALD KENNEDY

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I Believe. By **GERALD KENNEDY**. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 94 pp. \$1.25.

"I cannot undertake a profound, philosophical, exhaustive discussion of the nature of God, I am simply writing as a witness, telling what I believe. . . ." In ten chapters of less than ten pages each, this is what the Methodist Bishop of the Los Angeles Area does. Each chapter has from three to six imaginative, helpful subheadings: "God Faces Men," "I Cannot Stand Alone," "Life Tests Us," "We Are Homesick for a Future," "What About My Death?" "We Walk With a Different Step—We Gain the Long Look," "Evil Is a Return to Things Outgrown," "We Cannot Live on Doubt," "The Christian Faith Will Hold Us Up."

Here is a starter-book for any "seeker." It is no traditional, doctrinal treatise. As the opening book in an eight-book series called *Know Your Faith*, it gives a general approach to the "What and Why" of belief. A lay reader will be refreshed by the fresh drawer-full of illustrations which pepper the text, and everyone will welcome the reasonable price.

Bishop Kennedy's treatment of Evil is in a chapter titled "I Believe in Triumph." He says: "Evil is cowardly . . . when men choose the evil way, they choose what seems to them the easiest and cheapest way. . . . In heaven's name, let us stop glorifying criminals!" And quoting Fosdick, "Happiness is not mostly pleasure; it is mostly victory."

A reviewer must always have one thing to take issue with. It has been my understanding that Immortality is a Greek doctrine, and that as Christians we believe in Resurrection. I mention this since the future books in the series are to be: "I Believe in God, Jesus Christ, Immortality, The Holy Spirit, The Bible, The Church and Prayer." This first book will be most welcome as an introduction to Belief in nontechnical language with short sentences and many illustrations.

BAYARD S. CLARK

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Luther Today. By R. H. BAINTON, W. A. QUANBECK, G. RUPP. Decorah, Iowa: Luther College Press (Augsburg Publishing House), 1957. x-169 pp. \$2.75.

This is called Volume I of a series to be known as *Martin Luther Lecture*. The lectures are delivered at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa. The lectures for this current volume were delivered from September 30 to October 3, 1956.

The President of the College and the Chairman of the Division of Religion offer introductory remarks praising the work of what is called the "Lutheran Renaissance." The meeting must have been interesting indeed, but the product as a book does not indicate a strong series at all. It is under a mood of mutual praise rather than of scholarly research.

Roland Bainton (Yale) talked on (1) Luther on Birds, Dogs, and Babies, (2) Luther's Use of Direct Discourse, (3) The Aarhus Conference. Warren A. Quanbeck (Luther Theological Seminary) spoke on (1) Experience Transforms Exegesis, (2) The Search for a New Method, (3) The Authority and Power of the Word of God. Gordon Rupp (Manchester, England) presented (1) Luther and Carlstadt, (2) Luther and Thomas Müntzer, (3) Luther and Zwingli.

In Professor Bainton's work there is the expected erudition and there is real interest for us all in the information on the Aarhus Conference. From Professor Quanbeck's work one receives again the old and customary biblical and orthodox emphasis in the revival of Luther interests. Professor Rupp makes very valuable use of the antidotes to Luther in his fair appraisal of the work of three of Luther's great contemporaries. In spite of the efforts to make Luther the great voice of "*Soli Deo Gloria*," the key phrase in the preface, Mr. Rupp's pleas for the "off-center" contemporaries give good ground for moderating the Luther imitation.

The great value of the book lies in the evolutionary process involving the adjustment of strong ideas and deep loyalties to the changing needs of church life. The meeting of Lutheran minds at Aarhus (Denmark) and at Decorah (Iowa) can bring forth only good.

The need to approach Luther biographically, instead of ecclesiastically or theologically, is fundamental. Bainton's report on Aarhus shows this to be recognized, and Rupp's work is moving in that direction. Luther's universalism is deeply rooted in his biographical journey, and the great mood of "relativism" must be applied to our study of him in order not to bury his benefits in a hard and unyielding system. This book is a bid for Luther studies of a high order. The church world will welcome coming volumes, and will look forward to a more serious Lutheran critique.

EDWIN P. BOOTH

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The Society of the Future. By H. VAN RIESSEN. Translated and edited under the supervision of David Hugh Freeman. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Company, 1957. 320 pp. \$4.95.

To attempt to discuss the "Society of the Future" is a big order. H. Van Riessen, Ph.D., who is professor of philosophy at the University of Technology in Delft, Holland, attempts to do this through an analysis of the Christian view of the future, an examination of utopian literature, an analysis of structural principles of society and history, and an examination of the role of science and technique in modern society. Any one of these aspects could fill a complete volume in itself. While this is a carefully documented study, it is still a tremendous task to attempt in a mere 308 pages.

Underlying this book is the assumption that a religiously value-free approach to society is impossible. Therefore in this philosophical and sociological discourse the

author begins by stating his values—the posited principles of his faith. He rightly maintains that "genuinely neutral inquiry into the nature of society cannot exist" because every thinker starts with prescientific presuppositions which for him have the quality of faith. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish sociologist, takes a viewpoint that has similarity when he discusses his methodology in his *An American Dilemma*. One's work will be biased regardless of how scientific one tries to be; therefore, one should state one's bias to begin with and frankly evaluate the work in the light of these value-judgments.

For Dr. Van Riessen, the value-judgment is a somewhat literal interpretation of the Bible. For him the Word of God not only provides us with standards which enable us to find the meaning of the past and present, but especially tells us about the future—in particular the last phase of human society on earth. He tries to bring an eschatological awareness into an interpretation of the society of the future.

To do this successfully one must have a biblical perspective growing out of investigation of both the Bible and of modern society. The author has deemed himself competent to examine only the societal aspect. This is unfortunate, for the value of the book is reduced by uncritical use of eschatological writings.

Interest and understanding could have been enhanced if the author could have frankly discussed other preconceived value-judgments. Certainly some must have grown out of observing his country overrun and a forced Nazi collectivization of industry. Here science and technique were introduced certainly at the expense of individual freedom.

The author does not contend with certainty that we are in the "last days," nor does he say that there is a determinism which is inevitable right now. Rather he writes the book for the purpose of warning us of the dangers of science, automation, cybernetics, and accompanying increase of centralized authority and curtailing of freedom by imposed routine and order. In "the drift toward collectivism" he sees further limitations on freedom and the quenching of initiative and creative thinking. However, he is also critical of capitalism, but sees hope in some American industrial management and labor practices and in a more general application of the principles of group dynamics.

He observes that personal outlook and religion are not the real driving power of American culture. Indeed the American evidently keeps his convictions outside his social contacts. This he sees as the Achilles heel of the American way of life and the American community.

CHARLES W. FISHER

Queen Anne Methodist Church, Seattle, Washington.

Psychology, Religion and Human Need. By W. L. CARRINGTON, M.D. Great Neck, N. Y.: Channel Press, 1957. xi-315 pp. \$3.75.

This book reflects its origin. It grew out of lectures on pastoral care given to Australian theological students and ministers over the last sixteen years. It is practical in its orientation and inclusive in its pastoral scope. The religious worker who seeks guidance in these pages will find specific aids and helpful resources for almost every aspect of his work. He will encounter also the spirit of a consecrated medical doctor whose experience and wisdom in the art of healing is offered with genuine humility. If in the coverage of so many areas of pastoral concern the advice never gets beyond a symptomatic and situational level, there is precedent with

brilliant success in another field by a doctor here in America. "Carrington" belongs on the bookshelf beside "Spock" and "Gesell." It is their pastoral equivalent on "the care and feeding of parishioners"!

C. R. STINNETTE, JR.

Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

Frontier Bishop. By WORTH M. TIPPY. New York: Abingdon Press, 1958. 207 pp. \$3.50.

Born in 1778, Robert Richford Roberts was destined to become the sixth bishop of The Methodist Church. Consecrated by Asbury and the first of Asbury's young preachers to marry, this rugged frontiersman served churches in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Western Pennsylvania, and then as a thirty-six-year-old Bishop began his amazing travels to push Methodism west and south. Riding from upper New York State all the way down to Mississippi, he organized Methodism's first Mississippi Conference. Pushing out into what is now Indiana, he established churches and a college that now bears the distinguished name of DePauw University.

Elizabeth, his wife, was the first to become a Methodist parson's wife, and her trials and tribulations in this role are described with excellent and most readable style. Elizabeth and Robert lie buried on the campus of DePauw University, and with busy student life buzzing all around their graves, one has a feeling that this was most appropriate. Surely, after reading this book, one is certain that both of these people would be bored with a quiet resting place!

E. S. B.

Ralph Henry Gabriel, eminent historian at Yale, has written a thorough but completely readable study, *Religion and Learning at Yale*, examining "religion, the liberal arts, and student life as the College and University have known them from 1757 to 1957—pursuing their interrelationships and setting them against American social and literary history. Yale University Press, \$4.00.

John B. Magee, Professor of Philosophy at the College of Puget Sound, has written a book, *Reality and Prayer*, which Leslie Weatherhead calls "a great book" and "different" (Harper, \$3.50). He begins with the relation of prayer to society, to science and law; he draws upon philosophy, other religions, and modern psychology, but maintains that the starting point of prayer is adoration. He writes illuminatingly on confession, petition, intercession, problem-solving, communion.

In 1934 the late John Clark Archer of Yale published his *Faiths Men Live By*, a notable study of the world's religions with emphasis not only on historical settings but their contemporary relevance. A thoroughly revised up-to-date edition has now been prepared by Carl E. Purinton of Boston University, and published by Ronald Press (\$5.75).

Meridian Books has sent us two fine paperback "Living Age Books Originals." (1) *A Handbook of Christian Theology*, ed. by Marvin Halverson, \$1.45 (Canada, \$1.60), contains 101 concise "definition essays on concepts and movements of thought in contemporary Protestantism"—from "Adam-Second Adam" to "Vocation"—written by 71 theologians of all schools. (2) *Religious Drama 2* (same price) is a second volume of medieval mystery and morality plays, selected and introduced by E. Martin Browne, director of the annual York Festival and now director of

Union's program of religious drama. He adds an appendix on the problems of producing medieval drama in churches and theaters today.

William Barclay of the University of Glasgow, "combining scholarship and popular appeal to a remarkable degree," wrote a Daily Study Bible Series which was so successful among British ministers and church workers that Westminster is publishing it here. First published is *The Gospel of John*, in two volumes, each \$2.50. He supplies his own translation of the text. Westminster also sends us *Introducing New Testament Theology*, by Archibald M. Hunter (\$2.50), "complementing the author's highly popular work, *Introducing the New Testament*." A synthesis of modern theological argument for both ministers and lay readers.

Otto J. Baab has written a little book, *Prophetic Preaching: A New Approach* (Abingdon, \$2.50). "There is a wistful longing on the part of preachers to know the true meaning of prophetic preaching," he says, and proceeds with penetrating studies of the relevance of the Hebrew prophets' type of approach for preachers in the world of today. Abingdon has also brought out a new *Beginner's Handbook to Biblical Hebrew*, by John H. Marks and Virgil M. Rogers (Princeton) (\$4.50). "Combining the inductive and the deductive methods, it starts the student on the reading of *Genesis* early in the course. The primary elements of grammar are introduced slowly, with more difficult principles added gradually."

The Missionary Education Movement (Friendship Press) this year is featuring the North American continent as its "home" field and the Middle East as its "foreign" field. A significant book in the former series is *Concerns of a Continent*, edited by James W. Hoffman (Cl. \$2.95, pa. \$1.50), "a readable survey of our continental neighborhood." In the Middle East series we have *New Voices, Old Worlds*, by Paul Geren (same price), containing true stories of a variety of colorful Christians in that area; also John Badeau's factual and sympathetic *The Lands Between* is notable (Cl. \$2.95, pa. \$1.75).

Attention should be called to Association Press's Reflection Books, unusually small paperbacks for lay readers, 50 cents each, 12 for \$5.00. Three recent titles are *Modern Man Looks at the Bible*, by W. Neil; *Religion and Health*, ed. by S. Doniger; *Ten Makers of Protestant Thought*, ed. by G. L. Hunt. This publisher also continues to bring out World Christian Books, \$1.25 each, such as Ebizawa, *Japanese Witnesses for Christ*; Northcott, *Livingstone in Africa*; Niles, *Living With the Gospel*; Miegge, *Religious Liberty*.

From Bethany Press we have another book following up Oberlin: a paperback, *A Guide to Christian Unity*, by George L. Hunt (\$1.00), designed for study groups. Also *The Church: The Gifted and the Retarded Child*, by Charles Kemp (\$3.50)—an important treatment of a new field for ministers and religious educators. "Every child is entitled to a religious or Christian education to the limits of his capacity and understanding. Many do not get it now."

We have received the first issue (Feb. 1958) of a new Quarterly: *Theology and Life*, successor to various Evangelical and Reformed publications. The new journal is published by The Lancaster Theological Seminary of the United Church of Christ (E. & R.), at Lancaster, Pa. The Editor, Bela Vassady, shows an engaging sense of humor—especially on the origins of the name *Theology and Life*—and he still (as in a RELIGION IN LIFE article some years ago) looks "through ecumenical glasses." \$2.50 per year.

E. H. L.

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